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International development theorists and practitioners agree that human empowerment is a 
necessary part of good development.  This agreement is encouraging because attention 
and resources are being directed towards the important goal of empowering the 
oppressed.  It is problematic because the agreement is relatively superficial and masks 
some deep and important disagreements about the goals and means of development 
theory, policy, and practice.   
 
Chapters One and Two compare the dominant economic growth approach to 
development with the capability approach, a relatively new alternative.  I determine that 
the capability approach offers a more complete and therefore, superior concept of 
empowerment.  Chapter Three considers Thomas Pogge’s argument for the conclusion 
that the praise and attention the capability approach receives cannot be justified.  I 
explain that Pogge’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of the 
capability approach, including the important role of empowerment.  
 
Chapters Four and Five provide detailed consideration of the role of empowerment within 
both Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach. I 
conclude that although neither scholar consistently uses the term empowerment, the 
concept of empowerment – both as agency and as capability-set expansion – plays a 
robust role on both versions of the approach.  Moreover, I make the controversial 
suggestion that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are more a matter of 
style than substance.   
 
Chapter Six considers the concern that Sen does not do enough to engage the role of 
institutionalized power in generating inequalities that prevent individuals from being 
empowered.  I conclude that despite valuable contributions, Sen fails to provide a 
complete account of empowerment issues.  However, this is not a fatal flaw. Considering 
both Sen’s contributions, and the fact that the approach is well suited to accommodate a 
more complete understanding of institutionalized power and of empowerment for 
development (for example, Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach), it is clear that 
Sen and the capability approach have offered valuable steps towards a complete concept 
of empowerment.      
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"Men rape within the marriage. Men believe that paying dowry means buying the wife, so 
they use her anyhow at all times. But no one talks about it." — Ugandan woman 
 
"When I was working I used to decide. When she is working, she owns her money and 
does anything she wishes." a man from Vila Junqueira, Brazil   
 
"When my husband died, my in-laws told me to get out. So I came to town and slept on 
the pavement." — middle-aged widow in Kenya.  
 
"The unemployed men are frustrated because they no longer can play the part of family 
providers and protectors. They live on the money made by their wives, and feel 
humiliated because of this." — elderly woman, Uchkun village, The Kyrgyz Republic.  
 
"When a woman gives her opinion, they [men] make fun of her and don't pay attention." 
"If women go to a meeting, they don't give their opinion." — woman in Las Pascuas, 
Bolivia.1
In the situations described above, groups or individuals are poor, not simply because they 
lack income, but because they lack power.  International development theorists and 
 
1 These quotes are all taken from Voices of the Poor available on the World Bank’s website at:   
http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/voices/listen-findings.htm
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practitioners have come to agree overwhelmingly that “empowerment” is a necessary 
component of good development.  They disagree, however, about what “empowerment” 
means, how individuals and groups become empowered, how empowerment should be 
measured, and why it is important for international development.  My project is to 
identify and examine some of the concepts of empowerment current in development 
theory, practice, and policy, before pointing towards ways to improve what I argue is the 
best available understanding of empowerment.   
The project has three main parts and a total of seven chapters.  The first part – 
Chapters One, Two, and Three – identify and defend what I believe is the most adequate 
concept of empowerment in the theory and practice of development.  Chapter One begins 
with a brief history of international development.  I then offer a comparative analysis of 
the traditionally and still dominant economic growth approach to development which 
focuses on GNP growth, and the relatively new, but increasingly popular, capability 
approach, which looks beyond GNP growth to human development, evaluated in terms of 
what capabilities, or freedoms, individual people have to achieve valuable or valued ways 
of living.  
In Chapter Two, I examine the concepts and roles of empowerment in both the 
economic growth approach and the capability approach.  I conclude that in addressing 
empowerment issues not just in the marketplace, but in every sphere of life, the capability 
approach offers a more complete, and therefore a philosophically and practically 
superior, concept of empowerment than the economic growth perspective does or can 
provide.  Next, in Chapter Three, I consider Thomas Pogge’s critical essay “Can the 
Capability Approach be Justified?.”  I argue that Pogge’s argument for the conclusion – 
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that the praise and attention the capability approach receives cannot be justified – is based 
on a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of the capability approach, including the 
important role of empowerment within the approach.   
The second part of my project – Chapters Four and Five – provides detailed 
consideration of the role of empowerment within the capability approach.  I consider the 
meaning and role of empowerment within both Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s 
versions of the capability approach.  In addition, I address concerns raised by capability 
scholars that Nussbaum’s account of empowerment is flawed in comparison to Sen’s.  I 
conclude that although neither Sen nor Nussbaum systematically uses the term 
empowerment, the concept of empowerment plays a robust role -- as both (1) agency, and 
(2) capability-set expansion -- in both versions of the approach.2 Moreover, I contend 
that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are more a matter of style than 
of substance.   
In the third and final part of my project I consider the challenge of fostering 
empowerment in the face of the oppressive and sometimes deadly “institutionalized 
power” structures that make up society.  In Chapter Six, I consider in a general way a 
criticism that various scholars have made of Sen’s version of the capability approach, 
namely, that Sen does not provide an adequate account of institutionalized power and the 
role it plays limiting or undermining empowerment.  After examining Sen’s considerable 
but often neglected contributions to this topic, I conclude that although Sen is certainly 
aware of the importance of institutionalized power and of the role it plays in generating 
 
2 Agency can be defined as one’s freedom to decide for oneself and “bring about the achievements one 
values and which one attempts to produce.”  (Amartya Sen. Inequality Reexamined. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 1992. Here p. 57. ) Capability-set expansion can be understood as the expanding of the set of 
opportunities an individual has to be and do the things he or she values.  
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inequalities and limiting empowerment, he fails to provide a sufficiently complete 
account.  I further submit, however, that this is not an insurmountable problem for Sen or 
for the capability approach, for at least two reasons. First, Sen has not only done valuable 
work on the topic, but he also recognizes that there remains important work left to do.  
Second, the capability approach can accommodate a more complete understanding of 
institutionalized power and in turn empowerment.  I then point to – and plan to 
investigate in future work -- economic and philosophical feminist theory as a resource for 
a deeper and broader understanding of institutionalized power and an enhanced concept 
of empowerment for both the practice and theory of development.     
I believe my project offers something to both the practice and the theory of 
development.  The project can benefit the practice of development in at least two ways. 
First, by joining the chorus of those who identify the capability approach as superior to 
the still-reigning view of development as economic growth.  Second, by making clear the 
significance of deep disagreements masked by professed agreements on the importance, 
not just of empowerment, but also related programs that promote education, democracy, 
and participation.   
Development theory can benefit from a comparative understanding of the 
concepts of empowerment at work in development discussed in chapters One and Two, 
and from the theoretical examination of the capability approach.  The capability approach 
itself can benefit from the detailed analysis in Chapters Four and Five; including the 
contention that empowerment is helpfully understood as both agency and capability-set 
expansion and that Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of the approach may are similar in 
substance if not in form of expression.  Finally, the examination of institutional power 
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and its relationship to empowerment found in Chapter Six, helpfully identifies an area in 
which the superior concept of empowerment found in the capability approach has room 
for improvement.  It also points towards theories in feminist economics and philosophy 
that is not officially associated, but certainly compatible with the capability approach. In 
future work I plan to show that these theories can strengthen the capability approach 




The Economic Growth Approach and the Capability Approach 
Compared Part I:  A General Overview 
 
For the past four decades, a primary focus of the world economic attention has been on 
ways to accelerate the growth rate of national incomes.  Economists and politicians from 
all nations, rich and poor, capitalist, socialist and mixed, have worshiped at the shrine of 
economic growth.  At the end of every year, statistics are compiled for all countries of the 
world showing their relative rates of GNP growth. . . .  Governments can rise and fall if 
their economic growth performance ranks high or low on this global scorecard.     
 Michael Todaro, Economic Development, 2000
If our attention is shifted from an exclusive concentration on income poverty to the more 
inclusive idea of capability deprivation, we can better understand the poverty of human 
lives and freedoms…. The role of income and wealth—important as it is along with other 
influences—has to be integrated into a broader and fuller picture of success and 
deprivation.    
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999
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Introduction 
International development theorists and practitioners throughout the world have come to 
agree that human empowerment is a necessary part of good development.  This 
widespread agreement is both encouraging and problematic.  It is encouraging that 
theorists and practitioners are directing their attention and other resources towards the 
important goal of empowering the disempowered and oppressed.  It is problematic 
because the agreement is relatively superficial, and masks some deep and important 
philosophical and practical disagreements about the goals and means of development 
theory, policy, and practice.   
Within the field of development, there are several approaches to development.  
Each approach, or perspectives, reflects competing ideas about the goals and means of 
development, that is, about what makes for “good” development.  Rival development 
approaches can and do agree that human empowerment is an important part of good 
development, while disagreeing about what it means to be empowered and what part 
empowerment plays in good development.  These disagreements are not merely academic 
issues to be discussed and disputed by philosophers and economists.  The way the 
development community, or stakeholders3 of development, understands human 
empowerment in particular, and good development in general, has a tremendous impact 
on development policies and practices that shape the lives of billions of people 
throughout the world.    
 
3 For my purposes the stakeholders of development can roughly be identified as all people and 
organizations that have a legitimate interest or stake in development policy and practice.  Thus, not only 
donors, lenders, NGO, governments, and others who invest in development, but also, aid recipients, 
borrowers, countries, communities, individual poor people, and all those who stand to benefit, be harmed, 
or put at risk  by development, are included in the set of stakeholders.  Interesting and important issues I 
will not explore here include: (1) what makes a legitimate interest legitimate, and (2) exactly how much 
does one have to contribute, benefit, be harmed, or put at risk to qualify as a stakeholder.   
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For the purpose of this essay a development approach, or perspective, is a 
framework of a priori, empirical and normative principles, assumptions, and other claims 
that constitute a way of looking at the world and posing questions about it.  Frameworks 
extend from or are generated by a central principle or set of principles.  Examples of core 
principles of development perspectives include:  (1) “economic growth is development” 
or (2) “efficient economic growth is good development.”  Those working within a certain 
perspective appeal to these core principles as an overall way of interpreting happenings 
within their field.  For example, a person who subscribes to (1) will hold that if country X 
has a higher GNP than country Y, then country X is more developed than country Y.  The 
core principles of a perspective are tied to both abstract, general, and theoretical 
economic (and perhaps normative and/or social) principles and formulas on the one hand, 
and more specific practices, strategies, institutions, and empirical data about the world on 
the other.   
A framework – including the explanations and strategies that it generates – is not 
static, but can evolve over time as new theories are introduced and new evidence is 
discovered.  For example, a perspective may evolve with respect to the role of 
investments in basic education.  What practitioners of the perspective once saw as (1) 
“costly and unnecessary for growth” may later be judged to be (2) “an efficient way to 
bolster growth.”  Moreover, as perspectives expand and evolve there may be 
disagreement among those operating within the perspective, or approach, about 
nonessential or peripheral principles.  For example, some may hold (1) while others 
operating within the same perspective may hold (2).  It is the relationship that the theories 
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and interpreted findings (both new and old) have to the unchanging core principles of a 
perspective that make them part of that perspective.   
There can be considerable overlap of nonessential principles among various 
perspectives.  The central principles of each perspective determine how theories and 
findings are understood within that perspective.  For example, education may be seen 
both as a possible tool for growth within the economic growth perspective and as an 
instrumental and constitutive freedom within the capability perspective.  In this case, 
practitioners in both perspectives are likely to support investments in education, but 
would do so for different reasons.  
The core defining principles of perspectives do not change.  To change the core 
principle of a perspective is to depart from the perspective.  For example, a move from (i) 
economic growth is development to (ii) meeting basic needs is development or (iii) 
economic growth plus meeting basic needs is development, would be a departure of the 
perspective, or a shift in perspective. 
In this chapter I consider and compare two development perspectives:4 the 
economic growth approach and the capability approach.  The economic growth 
perspective is the traditional and still dominant approach to development.  At the core of 
this approach is the idea that development is essentially an economic enterprise of 
 
4 In addition to the two I consider, there are several other development perspectives including, but not 
limited to, the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) as pioneered by Paul Streenten (1981. First Things First: 
Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries. Chapter 8. Oxford University Press), which is often 
considered a predecessor of the capability approach; Thomas Pogge’s international-Rawlsian Resourcist 
approach (“Can the Capability Approach be Justified?” in Martha Nussbaum and Chad Flanders eds.: 
Global Inequalities, special issue 30:2 (February 2004) of Philosophical Topics, 167-228); and the Basic 
Human Rights Approach (BHR) (Vizard, Polly. 2000. “The Evolution of the Idea of Human Rights in 
Western and Non-Western Thought.” Background paper for the Human Development Report 2000. UNDP, 
New York.).  Like the economic growth approach and the capability approach, each framework also 
permits variations, that is, alterations of the nonessential principles. 
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generating and sustaining an increase in a country’s gross national product (GNP).5 The 
capability approach is a relatively new, but increasingly popular alternative to economic 
growth-centered development.  Within the capability perspective development is not 
simply economic development calculated in terms of GNP.  Instead, development is 
human development, evaluated in terms of what capabilities, or freedoms, individual 
people have to achieve valuable or valued lifestyles. 
There are many nuances and differences of opinion on specific issues within each 
of these two approaches.  However, within this chapter a general treatment of some of the 
major attributes, including the primary goals and general means of each approach, will 
serve my present purpose of illuminating key differences between the dominant 
economic growth approach and the capability approach.  In what follows, I provide a 
brief sketch of the history of development economics, in which I mention a few of the 
major trends and troubles of the field.  I then give a general account of the key concepts, 
values, goals, and means of both the economic growth perspective and the capability 
approach.  This introductory chapter suggests that there are some good reasons to favor 
the capability approach over the economic growth approach and concludes with a 
summary of the fundamental similarities and differences, including strengths and 
weakness, of the two approaches.  
I continue my comparison and evaluation of the economic growth approach and 
the capability approach in Chapter Two, as I explain how the fundamental differences 
 
5 Gross National Product or GNP can be broken down as follows:  “‘Gross’ indicates that it is measured 
without subtracting any allowance for capital consumption; ‘National’ that it includes residents’ incomes 
from economic activities carried on abroad as well as at home, and excludes incomes produced at home, 
but belonging to non-residents.  ‘Product’ indicates that it measures real output produced rather than real 
output absorbed by residents.”  (John Black.  Oxford Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press. 
2003, p. 204)) 
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discussed in this chapter are sometimes masked and other times revealed at the level of 
policy, projects, and interventions.  I pay special attention to the theoretical and practical 
roles of empowerment within each perspective.  I conclude that the human-centered 
perspective of the capability approach offers a theoretically and practically superior 
understanding of empowerment than the economic growth perspective does or can 
provide.  In Chapter Three, I consider Thomas Pogge’s claim that the capability approach 
does not fare well when compared to the Rawlsian resource approach he favors.  I leave 
for future work the detailed considerations of the merits of the capability approach in 
relation to other alternatives to the economic growth framework.6
1. A Brief History of Development Economics7
One could argue that development economics began with the publication of Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776.  However, most agree that international development 
economics emerged as a sub-discipline of economics in the 1950s with the systematic 
study of the economic processes and problems of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  The 
first development economic theories are firmly rooted in Smith’s traditional or “classical” 
economics.  Like classical economic theories that seek to understand and direct the 
economies of more developed countries (MDCs),8 the development theories of the 1950s 
 
6 I likewise leave for future work a complete examination of the capability approach’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  Such an examination, although important, is beyond the scope of this project.  
7 This section owes a great debt to Michael P. Todaro’s popular textbook on economic development 
(Michael P. Todoro, Economic Development. 7th edition. Addison Wesley. 2005.) and to Paul Streenten’s 
article “Shifting Fashions in Development Dialogue” (in Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and A.K. Shiva Kumar eds.
Readings in Human Development. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2003). 
 
8 MDCs or “First World” countries are the economically advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe, 
North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Some current usage replaces MDCs with “the (global) 
North” in contrast to “the (global) South but Australia and New Zealand are in the Southern Hemisphere. 
Deficiencies are obvious in each of these pairs of contrasting terms.  
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(and beyond) are economic growth centered theories designed to generate optimal growth 
within the relevant country.  However, unlike the more traditional theories, development 
theories are aimed at understanding and directing the relatively complicated 
impoverished economies of poor, or less developed, countries (LDCs).9
Classical economic theories are growth-oriented theories concerned with the 
efficient allocation and optimal growth of scarce productive resources over time in order 
to produce an expanding range of goods and services.  These theories deal with the 
relatively straightforward classical assumptions of “rational,” self-interested, and well 
informed consumers and producers, perfect competitive markets with automatic price 
adjustments, and predictable institutions.  In contrast, development economic theories 
deal with consumers and producers with limited access to information, highly imperfect 
markets, and frequent and unpredictable, major structural changes in societal and 
economic institutions.  In short, given the conditions of LDCs, development economics 
must go beyond classical economic theory.  As a current economic development textbook 
explains:  
Competitive markets simply do not exist, nor, given the 
institutional, cultural, and historical context of many LDCs, 
would they necessarily be desirable from a long-term 
economic and social perspective.  Consumers as a whole 
are rarely sovereign about anything, let alone what goods 
and services are to be produced, in what quantities and for 
whom.  Information is limited, markets are fragmented, and 
much of the economy is nonmonetized…. The ideal of 
 
9 LDCs or “Third World” countries or those nations in “the (global) South” have low incomes and levels of 
material living, high rates of population growth, and general economic and technological dependence on 
MDCs. 
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competition is just that—an ideal with little relation to 
reality.  Instead of the equilibrium, automatic-adjustment 
framework of neoclassical theory, many LDC markets are 
better analyzed through disequilibrium, structural-
adjustment models in which responses to price and wage 
movements can be ‘perverse.’. . .  Finally, the invisible 
hand often acts not to promote the general welfare but 
rather to lift up those who are already well-off while 
pushing down the vast majority.10 
Since the 1950s, the goal of growth-oriented economic development theories has 
been to “develop” countries by generating and sustaining an increase in the country’s 
gross national product (GNP, or the more sophisticated alternative: GNP per capita, 
which takes into account increases both in population and in GNP among other things).11 
The idea is that once a country achieves certain GNP growth rate targets it is no longer a 
poor developing country.  Many, but not all, who subscribe to the economic growth 
perspective 12 believe, or even hope, that growth in a country’s GNP will bring about 
relatively rapid and large scale – at least relative to historical standards – decreases in the 
economic poverty that afflicted the lives of the poor majority living in LDCs.  The gains 
in country’s GNP are expected either to “trickle down” to the poor in the forms of jobs 
 
10 Michael P. Todaro,  Economic Development. 7th edition. Addison Wesley. 2005. (Here p. 98.) 
 
11 Todaro. p. 14. 
 
12 Some economists see the goal of alleviating poverty as a normative concern beyond the scope of the 
value-neutral science of economics.  However, the normative goal of alleviating poverty has a long 
tradition within development economics including the World Bank’s Mission “To alleviate poverty 
throughout the world.”  (For an argument that the classical economists, such as Adam Smith, William 
Petty, Gregory King, Francois Quesnay, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, see economics as concerned with 
alleviating poverty, see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 72-74.)  Of course, even the decision 
to understand international development efforts that effect millions of lives as ethically neutral, is not itself 
an ethically neutral decision.  (See Des Gasper, The Ethics of Development Ch. 1).  
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and other economic opportunities or to create the environment required for a wide 
distribution of social and material goods, which in turn would decrease poverty by 
improving the economic well being of the poor.   
Despite the fact that many less developed countries realized their GNP growth 
rate targets in the 1950s and 1960s, the lives of the vast majority of poor people in these 
countries remained largely unchanged and in many cases got worse.  Development 
economists acknowledged that “rapid by historical standards” is by no means immediate; 
and that it may take several years for the benefits of GNP growth to trickle down to the 
poor.  Yet the consensus at the time was that the immediate problems of hunger, 
unemployment, disease, and illiteracy, would simply have to wait.  Such problems were 
of secondary importance to generating GNP growth and the promise of a developed 
economy with long term benefits for all. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many countries continued to meet their GNP 
growth rate targets without improving the lives of the poorest forty percent of their 
citizens in terms of employment, equality, or real income.13 Although many held fast to 
GNP growth as the goal of development, claiming more time was needed to allow for the 
trickling down of wealth, others began to criticize the approach, calling for the 
“dethronement of GNP.”  Alternative approaches to development began to emerge in the 
1970s.  Dudley Seers’ 1969 paper “The Meaning of Development,”14 explicitly redefined 
economic development in terms of the elimination of poverty, unemployment, and 
inequality.  In 1974 the Development Research Center of the World Bank and the Sussex 
 
13 Todaro, p. 15. 
 
14 Dudley Seers.  “The Meaning of Development.” Paper presented at the Eleventh World Conference of the 
Society for International Development, New Delhi. 1969.  
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Institute of Development Studies published the book: Redistribution with Growth.15 The 
1976 World Employment Conference of the International Labor Office introduced the 
basic needs approach to development, which gives development priority to the world’s 
poorest citizen’s meeting their basic needs of food, health, education, shelter, and 
sanitation.  However, the dominant approach to international development in the 1970s 
remained focused on GNP growth.  Without altering the fundamental growth principle of 
the economic growth perspective, most development work sought to accommodate some 
of the new ideas and expanded its scope to include the targeting of inequality through the 
redistribution of economic resources within the context of a growing economy.  
“Redistribution from growth” was a common slogan.16 
Unfortunately, despite giving some attention to inequality and making some 
commitment to resource redistribution, the growth approach polices introduced in the 
1970s did not succeed in bringing about relatively rapid and large scale improvements to 
the lives of the poor.  Paul Streeten identifies one shortcoming of the economic growth 
approach’s theories of redistribution with growth and its focus on income equality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient is an aggregate measure of 
income inequality.  Its numerical representation ranges from 0 (or perfect equality) to 1 
(or perfect inequality).  A high coefficient reflects high inequality of income distribution, 
while a low coefficient represents a more equitable income distribution.17 The Gini 
coefficient may be a valuable tool.  It provides a snap shot of income distribution, one 
important variable that can and often does influence the lives of individuals.  However, as 
 
15 Hollis Chenery. et. al. Redistribution with Growth. Oxford University Press. 1974. 
 
16 Todaro, p. 15. 
 
17 Todaro, p. 746. 
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Streeten explains, it is not enough to represent the most relevant aspects of inequality that 
affect the poor:    
Much of the redistribution literature measures inequality by 
the Gini-coefficient, which runs through the whole range of 
incomes, from the richest to the poorest.  It measures 
somewhat meaningless percentiles instead of socially, 
regionally, or ethnically significant deprived groups.  It 
does not tell who is in these deprived groups, for how long, 
or for what reasons.  Nor does it indicate the scope of 
mobility or the degree of equality of opportunity.  Normally 
there is no particular interest of those concerned with 
poverty reduction in redistribution to the middle, which 
would reduce inequality but leaves poverty untouched.18 
As Streeten suggests, just as a country’s GNP can grow in accordance with target 
growth rates without improving the lives of the poorest forty percent of its citizens, so too 
a country’s Gini-coefficient can decrease without improving the lives of those who live in 
absolute poverty.  Absolute poverty is poverty assessed not in relation to others, but in 
relation to a minimally adequate level of well-being.  A change in the income distribution 
between the rich, the middle class, and even some of the poor, (where the rich earn less 
income and the middle class and some of the poor earn more) may result in a change in 
Gini coefficient, but not a change in the lives of many of the poor.  After all, a reduction 
in a country’s inequality may still not afford the (poorest of) the poor with the 
opportunity for a minimally decent life.   
Moreover, even if the individual members of a country’s poor population 
experience an increase in income, the country’s Gini coefficient does not explain whether 
 
18 Streeten, p. 96. 
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they have more or less opportunity, mobility, or access to valuable goods.  For example, 
getting a new job that requires working long hours in a copper mine or a factory that 
results in exposure to hazardous chemicals may result not only in an increase in income, 
but also in several serious health problems that require expensive medical attention.  The 
end result maybe a greater gross income, but fewer material resources (after income is 
spent on medicine) and a lower quality of life.  In such situations, improvement in the 
Gini-coefficient will reflect only the greater income equality and not the greater material 
deprivation.  In short, much of the Gini coefficient-focused redistribution literature and 
policies that emerged within the economic growth approach in the 1970s (and beyond) 
did not prove relevant to understanding and directing the reduction of absolute poverty or 
inequality of real opportunity despite a continued focus on income equity as GNPs 
continued to rise and meet their growth target rates in many less developed counties 
during this time.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, things got worse.  This was a time of crisis, 
criticism, and change for the international development in general and for the economic 
growth development perspective in particular.  The majority of less developed countries 
stopped meeting their GNP growth rate targets, and in many cases, especially in Africa, 
GNP growth rates turned negative.  Poor countries often sacrificed state social and 
economic redistribution programs as they struggled to repay mounting foreign debts.  
Adjustment and stabilization polices came to represent much of the work of international 
economic development.  The needs of the poor were once again seen as secondary or 
even irrelevant to the needs of growth in the national economy.  As Streeten puts it: “The 
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poor were either forgotten or, instead of seeking how to reduce their number, ways were 
sought to prevent an increase.”19 
A great deal of criticism emerged with respect to particular economic growth 
perspective policies (for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s “stabilization 
without adjustment” policy20) and the general top down (often called “neocolonial”) 
approach to the international development policies of the day (including the “Washington 
Consensus” discussed below).  At the same time, however, scholars, policy analysts, and 
activists introduced into the development dialogue concerns for democratic participation, 
the environment, human rights, population, political and cultural freedom, government 
integrity, infant mortality, child labor, the roles and concerns of women, empowerment, 
and many other issues relevant to human well being.  Several “new growth theories” 
arrived on the scene that changed – sometimes dramatically – the economic growth 
perspective.  These theories continue to shape the still dominate economic growth 
approach, and in turn, international development today.  
The “new growth theories” were motivated not only by the general debt crisis of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, but also by the traditional, or “old growth theories’” failure to 
explain important empirical findings including: (1) the dramatic disparities in economic 
performance across countries, and (2) why capital disproportionately flows from poor 
countries to rich countries, despite the fact that labor costs less in poor countries and 
therefore (according to the IMF’s and World Bank’s old growth theories) should have 
attracted capital investments from rich counties to poor counties.  According to the new 
growth theories, the key to understanding these findings lies in analysis of endogenous 
19 Streeten, p. 96. 
 
20 For more on this policy and its criticisms see: Streeten, p. 99, or Todaro, Chapter 14.  
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growth.  Endogenous growth is the economic growth generated by factors from within a
country’s production process, for example, a stronger, smarter, or better (technologically) 
equipped work force.   
New growth theories explain technological advancements that result in greater 
production as an endogenous outcome of public and private investments in human 
capital.  Old growth theories fail to account for endogenous factors.  Instead, they 
consider technological advancements to be exogenous (outside) or independent of the 
country’s production process.21 
In recognizing that internal factors, including local technology and the skills and 
behavior of local people, are relevant to production outcomes, the new growth theories 
are able to offer an explanation for (1) the dramatic disparities in economic performance 
across countries, by citing cross country disparities in technology, infrastructure, 
education, and health.  New growth theories can also explain (2) why capital flows from 
poor countries to rich countries, despite the fact that labor costs less in poor countries.  
Although raw labor costs less in poor countries than in rich countries, other costs are 
required to facilitate the use of relatively cheap poor country labor.  These other costs, 
called “complementary investments,” largely erode the cost savings (rates of return on 
investment).  It does not benefit individual investors and/or companies to pay for cheap 
labor in a poor country if they will also have to pay to develop the country’s physical, 
social, and technological infrastructure (for example, roads, legal system, banking 
system, communication services, and so forth.), and human capital pool (via. education, 
health services, and more).   
 
21 See: Todaro, Chapters 3 and 4. 
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The lack of reliable and well developed technology, infrastructure, and skilled 
labor in poor countries motivates even investors from the poor countries to invest their 
capital in expensive, but relatively skilled and reliable, labor facilitated by advanced 
technology, quality health care, and efficient infrastructure.  Thus, capital flows 
disproportionately from poor to rich countries rather than the reverse.22 The significant 
insight of the new growth theories is that public and private investment in research and 
development (R&D), technology, social and physical infrastructure, and people – or 
“human capital” – increases productive output, and in turn, results in higher GNP growth.  
This insight resulted in an evolution of the economic growth approach that has 
dramatically shaped the current theories, policies, and practices of development. 
As a result of the new growth theories and other factors of change introduced in 
the 1980s, meeting certain immediate needs of the poor people that have been repeatedly 
(if not continuously) forgotten, or at least considered secondary to the needs of the 
national economy, is now recognized as a central—albeit instrumental—part of 
development within the economic growth approach.  The economic growth approach is 
still focused on generating and sustaining GNP growth, and is still the dominant approach 
to international development.  It was also in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 1998 
economic Nobel laureate Amartya Sen first introduced his promising human-centered 
alternative to economic growth-centered development: the capability approach.  In the 
following sections, I discuss and compare the current version of the economic growth 
perspective and Sen’s capability approach.   
 
22 For more on new growth theories see: Todaro, Chapters 3 and 4.   
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2. The Economic Growth Perspective and the Capability Approach 
The economic growth perspective —in one form or another—has dominated the field of 
international development since it emerged in the 1950s.  As explained in the previous 
section, the perspective has undergone some modifications over the decades, particularly 
since the introduction of the new growth theories in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
However, the essential neo-classical elements of the economic growth approach have not 
changed.  The economic growth approach still understands development as 
fundamentally an economic enterprise of generating and sustaining an increase in the 
country’s gross national product, often with the expectation and even the hope, but again, 
not a professed ethical commitment, of bringing about (relatively) rapid and large scale 
decreases in that country’s poverty.  Within this approach, poverty is – and always has 
been – economic or “income” poverty.  Income poverty is identified with earning an 
income lower than a certain minimum, specifically, lower than the “poverty line.” The 
poverty line is usually defined as either one half of the median income or, more recently, 
the equivalent of one or two US dollars a day.  Similarly, on this view well-being is 
economic well-being, assessed in terms of income and access to and consumption of 
material goods.  
The means of development within the economic growth perspective are market-
focused and aspire to perfect economic efficiency.  The policies and practices of one 
current version of the perspective are often identified, especially in the developing world, 
with neo-liberalism and the “Washington Consensus.”23 The following policy directives 
 
23 John Williamson introduced the phrase “Washington Consensus” in 1990s “to refer to the lowest 
common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin 
American countries as of 1989.”  But the phrase now refers to various related policies that can be said to be 
economic growth approach polices; hence the phrase “neo-Washington Consensus” is sometimes used. 
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(the first nine of which make up the original Washington Consensus) provide good 
examples of development conceived centrally as the market-centered means of the 
economic growth:  
• Fiscal discipline 
• A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high 
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure 
• Tax reform (lower marginal rates and a broadening of the tax base) 
• Interest rate liberalization 
• A competitive exchange rate  
• Trade liberalization; liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
• Privatization 
• Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) 
• Secure property rights 
• Free capital mobility 
• World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
• Flexible labor markets 
• Anti-corruption or integrity within governments.    
 
(John Williamson. “What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?” World Bank 
Research Observer. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Vol. 
15, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 251-264.)  For more on neoliberalism and the Washington consensus see 
Benjamin Friedman, New York Review of Books, David Held’s “Globalization: The Dangers and The 
Answers” (www.openDemocracy.net.), and, Dani Rodrik. “The Global Governance of Trade as if 
Development Really Mattered,” New York: UNDP, 2001. 
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These policies (among others) are the means by which the end of development – a strong 
GNP – is to be achieved.  Again, many believe that a growing GNP will eventually result 
in a declining percentage of people living below the poverty line.  
Like the economic growth approach, the capability approach draws on the 
classical Anglo tradition and recognizes markets and economic growth as valuable.  
Unlike the economic growth approach, however, the capability approach goes beyond 
economic growth indicators, markets, and the tradition and emphasizes that these are, at 
best, some of the means to the end or goal of development processes, namely, expanding 
the substantive freedoms people enjoy.  Amartya Sen’s capability approach is not simply 
an approach to international economic development.  It is also, and primarily, an 
approach to human development in which economic growth is but one means – 
sometimes not necessary and by itself never sufficient.   
Before elaborating on the means and ends of development within this human-
centered perspective, it is helpful to get clear – in a provisional way – on two essential 
concepts of the capability approach: “capability” and “functioning.”24 For Sen, human 
development has to do with human beings and doings.  To grasp humans and their 
activity, Sen proposes, among others, the concepts of “capability” and “functioning.” 
These concepts correspond respectively to Aristotle’s concepts of potential and actual.  
Within the capability perspective, the various doings and beings a person actually 
achieves are called “functionings.”  Functionings can be elementary, like the basic 
physical state of being well nourished, or complex, like the social achievement of 
appearing in public without shame.   
 
24 I introduce other essential concepts of Sen’s capability approach, including agency and process freedom, 
in the following sections and chapters.  
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The word “capability” refers to the various functionings a person is free to 
achieve.  For example, a person may have the capability of being well nourished, that is, 
she may be free or able to achieve the functioning of being well nourished, if she has, 
among other things, reliable access to sufficient quantities of nutritious food and a 
healthy digestive system.  Thus, capability is a type of substantive freedom: “the 
substantive freedom to achieve alternate functioning combinations.”25  
An individual’s “capability set” represents the real opportunities she has, or the 
various alternative lifestyles she is free to achieve.  A person’s capability set reflects not 
only what she can achieve (for example, civic participation), but also the extent to which 
she can achieve it: from publicly expressing ideas, to voting, to organizing a political 
movement, to holding office.  Moreover, the capability approach takes into account that 
different people will require different bundles of resources (which may include, but are 
not limited to, income) to have the same capabilities or achieve the same functionings.  
“People have disparate physical characteristics connected with disability, illness, age or 
gender, and these make their needs diverse.”26 For example a person who suffers from 
parasites may need more food to be properly nourished than a person of the same size 
who does not suffer from parasites.  “A disabled person may need some prosthesis, an 
older person more support and help, a pregnant woman more nutritional intake, and so 
on.”27 Furthermore, the same capabilities or functionings in two different people may be 
promoted by diverse and different packages of goods or services.  For example, someone 
 
25 Amartya Sen.  Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York. 1999. (Here, p. 75.) 
 




with diabetes may require different foods (than a healthy non-diabetic person) as well as 
insulin in order to be healthy and well nourished. 
The capability approach recognizes the importance of an individual’s freedom to 
exercise her own agency as she chooses to achieve certain functionings (and not others) 
from various real opportunities. We make our own decisions and act as authors of our 
own lives rather than being coerced or controlled by others or mere pawns of external 
circumstances.28 This freedom to choose between opportunities is the significant 
difference between a person who chooses to fast despite access to sufficient quantities of 
nutritious food and a healthy digestive system, and the person who has no choice but to 
starve.  Neither person has achieved the functioning of being well nourished, but the first 
person (and not the second) has the capability of being well nourished.   
Thus, the capability approach offers two focal points for the evaluation of 
individual well-being: (1) capabilities, the opportunities people have, for example, to fast 
or to be well nourished, and (2) functionings, what people actually achieve, for example, 
the state of being well nourished. Sen calls these two aspects “well-being freedom” and 
“well-being achievement” respectively.  Sen’s approach29 also recognizes two focal 
points for individual agency: (1) agency freedom, one’s freedom to decide for oneself and 
to “bring about the achievements one values and which one attempts to produce”30 and 
(2) agency achievement, “the realization of goals and values she has reason to pursue, 
 
28 See: David A. Crocker. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapter 5.   
 
29 As I discuss in Chapter Five, Martha Nussbaum rejects Sen’s distinction between agency and well-being 
(on the grounds that she does not think making the distinction “adds any extra clarity.”  See Martha 
Nussbaum.  Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2000. (Here p. 14.)  
 
30 Sen, Amartya. Inequality Reexamined. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992. p. 57. See also: Amartya Sen’s 
Elements of a Theory of Human Rights and Crocker, Ethics of Global Development, Ch. 5.  
26
whether or not they are connected with one’s own well-being.”31 Subsequently, (in 
Chapters Four and Five,) I analyze and evaluate these normative concepts in a more 
detailed way.  At this juncture it is important is to recognize that Sen (1) affirms human 
well-being and agency as the goal of development and (2) conceives human well-being in 
relation to certain functionings and the capabilities (freedoms) to so function. 
The capability approach rejects the traditional and still dominant idea of the 
economic growth approach that development is simply or most fundamentally an 
economic process of efficiently increasing and sustaining a country’s GNP growth.  
Instead the capability approach understands economic growth as at best one of several 
complementary means to development.  Growth does not always advance human 
development.  And even when economic growth does contribute to development, growth 
is insufficient for development as defined within the capability perspective.  
Development on this view is, most fundamentally, a process of expanding the real 
freedom of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value.  It 
follows from this understanding that well-being is not fundamentally assessed in terms of 
the metric of income or access to material goods as with the economic growth approach.  
Instead, within the capability approach, well-being is assessed in terms of the various 
valuable capabilities one has and the functionings one achieves.  Income and access to 
material goods can be important, but if so, they are only important as means to the end of 
development: the expansion of valued freedoms.   
Similarly, poverty is not simply a lack of income, but also, and more 
fundamentally, a deprivation of capabilities to function in certain basic ways.  
 
31 Ibid. p. 56. In the empowerment section of Chapter Two and in following chapters, I discuss the role of 
agency in Sen’s account and Nussbaum’s reasons for not recognizing Sen’s distinction between agency and 
well-being, See also: Sen’s Inequality Reexamined, and Development as Freedom. (esp. Chapter 8.) 
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Deprivation of basic capabilities can be reflected in low life expectancy, high infant and 
child mortality rates, significant undernourishment, low literacy rates, widespread 
occurrences of disease and infection, and other foreseeable and preventable sufferings.  In 
contrast to the economic growth perspective’s assessment of development in terms of 
GNP growth and sometimes income poverty decline (as a secondary indication), 
assessments of development within the capability perspective reflect a multidimensional 
concept of poverty.  Such assessments recognize the instrumental importance of 
economic growth and income poverty, several non-economic means to freedom and 
obstacles to well-being, and a plurality of dimensions to both capability deprivation and 
freedom expansion.    
There are good reasons to understand poverty in terms of the more complicated 
but inclusive basic capability and agency deprivation, instead of the relatively narrow but 
clear cut concept of income.  Understanding poverty in terms of deprivation of basic 
capabilities allows us to recognize aspects of poverty (and well-being and agency) that 
income measurements cannot capture.  Recall the example (mentioned earlier in this 
chapter) of the person who takes a job that requires working long hours in a copper mine 
or a factory where she is exposed to hazardous chemicals and consequently develops 
serious health problems that require expensive medical attention.  Despite an increase in 
gross income, this person may be considerably worse off than before she took the job.  
She will not only have access to fewer material resources after income is spent on 
medical treatment, she will also be deprived of basic capabilities including the capability 
to live a long life, the capability to enjoy bodily health, as well as any capabilities that 
require good bodily health (for example, reproduction).  These and several other 
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important capabilities are not apparent when income alone is considered.  The capability 
perspective can recognize this person as worse off in light of the plurality of serious 
deprivations she experiences, while the economic growth perspective would actually see 
her as better off due to a single metric, namely, her higher income.   
As mentioned above, evaluating well-being in terms of capabilities and 
functionings also allows capability theorists to take into account that different people may 
require different incomes in order to achieve the same functionings.  Sen offers the 
following example:  
Consider…the person with a high metabolic rate, or a large 
body size, or a parasitic disease that wastes nutrients. He is 
less able to meet minimal nutritional norms with the same 
level of income, compared with another person without 
those disadvantages.  If he is to be seen as poorer than the 
second person, despite the fact that they both have the same 
income, the reason for this lies in his greater capability 
failure.32 
The capability approach is able to recognize the first person as worse off than the second 
because he is less able to meet his minimal nutritional needs.  The economic growth 
approach, however, would hold that the two people are equally well (or ill) off because 
they have the same income.  As Richard Jolly explains: “Neo-liberalism is totally silent 
about the ends towards which the economic indicators lead.  It may address the increase 
 
32 Sen, 1992, p. 111. 
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in income, but it does not consider what that income actually brings to people’s lives and 
whether they enjoy better living conditions or not.”33 
Perhaps the most startling phenomenon that becomes apparent when we look 
beyond income statistics is that of “missing women.”  Sen estimates that more than 100 
million women may be seen as prematurely dead or “missing.”  These women are 
“missing” in the sense that – given their biological advantage with respect to longevity – 
they would be alive if they had been treated in their families and societies more equitably 
in relation to the men.  There is no country in which women are treated as well as men,34 
but women are “missing” mainly in South Asia, West Asia, North Africa, and China.  
Twenty nine million women are “missing” from China alone.35 While the relatively 
dramatic and well-know practices of sex-selective abortion and female infanticide 
contribute to these deaths, the main culprit, according to Sen, is a the much more subtle 
and less talked about “comparative neglect of female health and nutrition. . . . There is 
indeed considerable direct evidence that female children are neglected in terms of health 
care, hospitalization and even feeding.”36 
The premature deaths of women and girls are not revealed by income statistics.  
Statistics that capture only country, household, or per capita averages are particularly 
unhelpful because they do not reflect intra-household distributions that too often reflect 
gross inequalities as the most basic needs of women, and especially, girls, are 
consistently neglected.  Instead the phenomenon of “missing women” as well as other 
 
33 Richard Jolly. “Human Development and Neoliberalism Compared” in Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and A.K. 
Shiva Kumar eds. Readings in Human Development. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2003. (Here p. 108.) 
 
34 According to the findings of the UNDP’s GDI and GEM. HDR 2003 
 




forms of inequality, including fatal inequalities that effect groups, must be analyzed by 
“demographic, medical and social information.”37 (Sen’s work on the social inequalities 
women and girls face is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.)  
The detection and representation of the realities of poverty and deprivation that 
cannot be detected by GNP or income statistics alone, including the terrible phenomenon 
of “missing women,” are among the good reasons to understand poverty in terms of basic 
capability deprivation rather than income deficits.  The multidimensional poverty 
measurement of the capability approach goes beyond measuring income and GNP.  The 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP’s) operates largely38 within the capability 
approach as it focuses on human, rather than economic development.  The UNDP’s 
Human Development Reports (HDRs) have introduced a number of indexes that measure 
human capabilities and functionings.   
The Human Development Index (HDI) measures income (or Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita adjusted to purchasing power parity (ppp)39), plus life 
 
37 Ibid. p. 20.  
 
38 Many UNDP reports, documents, and representatives explicitly refer to Sen’s work and the capability 
approach.  However, the UNDP is a large, complex, and ever-changing organization.  It is full of 
individuals with their own research and opinions about development, and many-sided internal debates (for 
example the 2006 discussion of the UNPD’s Gender Empowerment Measurement (GEM) found at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/nhdr/).  I do not wish to argue that the UNDP works entirely within the capability 
approach.  My goal is more modest: I simply wish to provide “real world” examples of capability 
measurements and the influence of the capability approach on development practice.  
 
39 Due to dissatisfaction with GNP’s inability to represent factors of distribution, character, or quality of 
economic growth, among other things, the UNDP (and others) opted to use GNP per capital adjusted for 
purchasing power parity or ppp, in an attempt to represent “real income” or what a person can actually buy 
with her income. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics offers the following definition of ppp: The theory 
that exchange rates between currencies are determined in the long run by the amount of goods and services 
that each can buy.  In the absence of transport costs and tariffs, if the price of tradable goods were lower in 
one country than another, traders could gain by buying goods in the cheaper country and selling in the 
dearer: relative price levels thus determine the equilibrium exchange rate.  Not all goods are tradable, and 
even for traders transport costs and tariffs mean that prices need not be equal, but the same forces of 
arbitrage limit their differences, and thus their deviations of exchange from ppp.  The HDI in current 
Human Development Reports uses GDP per capita adjusted for ppp. For more on the construction and 
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expectancy, school enrolment, and literacy (weighted 1/3, 1/3, 1/6, and 1/6, respectively).  
The Human Poverty Index (HPI), in order to address the absolute deprivations of the least 
well off, includes measurements of the percentage of people who lack sustainable access 
to safe drinking water, and the percentage of children under five who are underweight for 
their age.  The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) represents the same indicators 
as the HDI, but captures inequalities in achievements between women and men.  The 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) measures gender inequality in economic and 
political participation and decision making by tracking “the percentages of women in 
parliament, among legislators, senior officials and managers and among professionals and 
technical workers – and the gender disparity in earned income, reflecting economic 
independence.”40 
These indices represent not only what functionings people achieve, but also the 
extent to which they achieve them.  The relatively rich information provided by these 
indices provides a more accurate assessment of human well-being and poverty than 
income only assessments like GNP growth or the percentage of populations living below 
the income poverty line.  As Sen explains: “To have inadequate income is not a matter of 
having an income below an externally fixed poverty line, but to have an income below 
what is adequate for generating the specified levels of capabilities for the person in 
question.”41 Critics argue that the multidimensional poverty indexes are too complicated 
 
evolution of the HDI and other human development indexes, see: Mahbub ul Haq “The Birth of Human 
Development Index” and Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen “Human Development Index: Methodology and 
Measurement” and Selim Jahan “Evolution of the Human Development Index” all of which can be found in 
Section 2 of Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A.K. Shiva Kumar eds. Readings in Human Development. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford. 2003. (pp. 127 – 163.)  
 
40 UNDP HDR 2003 (Here p. 61.) 
 
41 Sen, 1992, p. 111. 
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and that the information they represent is vaguer than that provided by a simple indicator 
like GNP.  Defenders of capability-centered, multidimensional poverty measures often 
respond by reminding their critics that, as Sen says, it is better to be vaguely right, than 
precisely wrong.42 
It is worth reiterating that the capability approach does not deny the importance of 
economic growth, nor that of income-based statistics.  The former may be a means to 
valuable freedoms, and the latter is one important type of development indicator.  Indeed, 
as Sen observes, the “deprivation of capabilities can have close links with the lowness of 
income, which connects in both directions: (1) low income can be a major reason for 
illiteracy and ill health as well as hunger and undernourishment, and that (2) conversely, 
better education and health help in the earning of higher incomes.”43 Yet, Sen goes onto 
remind us that it is “precisely because income deprivations and capability deprivations 
often have considerable correlational linkages, [that] it is important to avoid being 
mesmerized into thinking that taking note of the former would somehow tell us enough 
about the latter.”44 
In other words, we must not make the mistake of thinking that monitoring 
income, which is at best a means to development, is enough to understand the ends of 
development, that is, the real freedoms people enjoy.  “The connections are not that tight 
and the departures are often more important.”45 Some women in some countries may be 
resource rich, in the sense that they have an opulent lifestyle in many ways – plenty of 
 
42 See Jolly, 2003 p. 114. 
 






food, fine clothing, and access to many material goods.  Yet, these same women may lack 
the freedom to dress as they like, work in the public sphere, or to learn to drive a car.  
Others may be, like Mother Theresa, income-poor but rich in freedom and (achieve 
many) functionings.  
Consider also the data from Morocco and Vietnam.  Morocco has a GDP of 3,600 
USD per capital, about 14.3 per cent of its people live on less than two dollars a day, with 
less than 2 per cent with incomes lower than one dollar a day, and its HDI is 0.606 (on a 
scale of 0 – 1).  In contrast, Vietnam’s GDP is considerably lower at just over 2,000 USD 
per capita, with 63.7 per cent – more than three of every five – of its people living on less 
than two dollars a day, and 17.7 per cent (almost one of every five) have incomes less 
than one dollar a day.  Yet, at 0.688, Vietnam’s HDI reflects a better quality of life than 
that of Morocco.  For whatever reasons, people in Vietnam live longer (which suggests 
better health), and are much more likely to attend school and to be literate than people in 
Morocco, despite the fact that Moroccans have on average a significantly higher 
income.46 According to the key indicators of the economic growth perspective the 
country’s relatively high GDP and low percentages of people earning incomes below the 
poverty line Morocco is much more developed than Vietnam.  However, the more 
inclusive assessment of the capability perspective’s human development index suggests 
that the people of Morocco may actually be in worse shape than those living in Vietnam.   
 




This chapter introduces the capability approach to development as a relatively 
new alternative to the traditional and still dominant economic growth development 
approach.  A comparison of the two approaches reveals a few key similarities and several 
fundamental differences between them.  Both the economic growth perspective and the 
capability perspective recognize economic growth and income distribution as valuable to 
the development process.  One major difference between the two perspective is that while 
the economic growth approach focuses exclusively on economic growth and increasing 
income as the goal of development, the capability perspective understands economic 
growth and income as one sometimes necessary, but never sufficient means to 
development as a process of expanding various freedoms.  Moreover, as we have seen, 
there are good reasons, including a richer assessment of well being of individuals and the 
detection of more than 100 million “missing women,” to hold that the capability approach 
offers a more accurate, albeit, more complicated and difficult to way to assess 
understanding of poverty.  These basic differences of the two approaches are summarized 
on Table One below.   
In light of this general evaluation, I submit that the richer, more accurate, 
understanding of poverty and development offered by the capability approach is superior 
to the relatively clear cut and ineffective concepts of the economic perspective.  In 
Chapter Two, I continue to compare and evaluate the two approaches.  As I do so, it 
becomes increasingly clear that the human-centered perspective of the capability 
approach offers a theoretically and practically superior concept of empowerment than the 
economic growth perspective does or can provide.  
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Table One: The Economic Growth Approach and the Capability Approach 
 Economic Growth Approach 
 
Capability Approach 




Generate and sustain an 
increase in GNP 
 
Human Development: Expand freedoms, 
that is, capabilities, that people have 










Promote and protect instrumental 
freedoms, including, but not limited to 
economic growth and other economic 
facilities, political freedoms, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees, 
and protective securities47 
Poverty 
 
National: Low GNP; 
negative GNP growth 
 
Individual: person under 
an income- poverty line 
(one or two US dollars a 
day) 
 
National: Low scores on HDI and HPI 
 




Economic or material 
well-being; sufficient 
income and access to 
material goods 
 






Economic - GNP 
Growth, Percentage 
below poverty line 
 
Multidimensional - HDI, HPI, GDI, 
GEM.  
47 I discuss each of these general types of instrumental freedoms in the Chapter Two.  Except for economic 
growth, these types for freedoms are also intrinsically good. 
 
48 The capability approach as developed by Amartya Sen is focused on the level of the individual, but some 








Clear cut, easy to 
determine standards for 
development 
 
Rich assessment of deprivation and well 
being/agency; detection of marginalized 




Fails to represent 
various forms of 
deprivation that affect 
peoples’ lives. 
 
More difficult to assess data; standards of 
development are relatively vague. 
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Chapter Two 
The Economic Growth Approach and the Capability Approach 
Compared Part II: A Closer Look 
[I]n judging economic development it is not adequate to look only at the growth of GNP 
or some other indicators of overall economic expansion.  We have to look at the impact 
of democracy and political freedoms on the lives and capabilities of the citizens. 
 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999
Citizen participation can also build consensus and support of difficult reforms needed to 
create a positive investment climate and induce growth.  In addition, the empowerment 
agenda supports development effectiveness by promoting growth patterns that are pro-
poor. 
The World Bank, Empowerment and Poverty Reduction, 2002
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter I introduced the traditionally dominant economic growth 
perspective and compared it with the relatively new alternative capability perspective.  I 
explained how the approaches differ in their understandings of the primary ends and 
means of development, as well as the concepts of poverty and well-being.  In this chapter, 
I continue to compare and evaluate the two perspectives.  I explain how fundamental 
differences are sometimes masked and other times revealed at the level of policy, 
projects, and interventions.   
I address how those working within each perspective often work towards 
significantly different ends, while claiming to promote the same goods, including, health 
care, education, democracy, and other civic rights and freedoms.  Special attention is paid 
to the role of empowerment within each approach.  I find that although both approaches 
agree that empowerment is necessary part of good development, this relatively superficial 
agreement conceals deep disagreements about what empowerment is and why it is 
important to development.  I conclude that the capability perspective offers a more 
comprehensive, and therefore, a theoretically and practically superior, concept of 
empowerment than the economic growth perspective does or can provide.  
 
1. Heath, Education, Democracy, and Freedom for All:  But Not in the Same Way, 
or for the Same Reasons 
Although both the economic growth approach and the capability approach recognize (1) 
that income can have an effect on health and education and (2) that health and education 
can have an effect on income, each approach focuses on a different direction of this 
correlation.  The capability approach emphasizes higher incomes as a means to the end of 
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enhanced capabilities, such as better education and health.  In contrast, the economic 
growth approach promotes better education and health but solely as a means to the end of
higher income.  This difference in valuational focus is a fundamental difference between 
the approaches that often goes unnoticed at the level of policy and projects because not 
only organizations that reflect the economic growth perspective (for example, parts of the 
World Bank), but also organizations that reflect the capability perspective (including the 
UNDP), currently make investment in primary health and education a priority.49 
Recall from Chapter One that the primary policy directives of the most recent 
versions of the economic growth perspective listed in the Washington Consensus (see 
Chapter One, p. 22) require the redirection of public expenditure priorities towards 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure, and that the stated purpose of 
such redirection is to generate “both high economic returns and the potential to improve 
income distribution.” (Washington Consensus)  The policy directive is concerned with 
the effects that health care and education have on people as human capital, that is, as 
economic resources.  It is not directly concerned with how being healthy and well 
educated affects the lives of the people as human beings who are ends within themselves.  
As Sen writes:   
 
49 Although many of the policies and projects of the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program do reflect the economic growth approach and the capability approach, respectively, for reasons 
explained in Chapter One, note 21, I do not wish to claim that either organization operates entirely in one 
perspective or the other.  Both institutions are large, complex, and ever-changing organization.  Some 
recent work within the Bank even suggests a departure (at least in some areas) from the economic growth 
perspective and towards the capability perspective.  See for example, the World Bank’s 2006 World 
Development Report: Equity and Development, the back cover of which reads: “The Report advocates 
taking explicit account of equity in determining development priorities: public action should aim to expand 
the opportunities of those who, in the absence of policy interventions, have the least resources, voice, and 
capabilities.”  That said, the World Bank currently – and certainly traditionally – operates largely within the 
economic growth perspective.    
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At the risk of some oversimplification, it can be said the 
literature on human capital tends to concentrate on the 
agency of human beings in augmenting production 
possibilities.  The perspective of human capability focuses, 
on the other hand, on the ability—the substantive 
freedom—of people to lead the lives they have reason to 
value and to enhance the real choices they have.50 
When investment in health and education is seen as investment in human capital, 
which is as no more than an investment in an economic system designed to increase 
GNP, investments in health and education are only made when, and to the extent that, 
such investments are deemed economically efficient.  That is, when such investments will 
bring a good rate of return.  In contrast, when health and education are seen as 
intrinsically valuable as well as instrumentally valuable capabilities, it is understood that 
they should be provided both because they expand the valuable freedoms enjoyed by 
human beings, and because they sometimes contribute to other good things, like greater 
income.  Whether or not greater income or other economic consequences ensue, however, 
investments in health and education are always a priority – even in cases where GNP 
would be lower.  (Although in a particular situation a case might be made that they 
should be secondary to another valuable freedom, for example, food security.)  Thus, 
while the economic growth approach and the capability approach both encourage 
investment in basic health care and education, they do so (and might cease to do so) for 
fundamentally different reasons and with different priorities.   
 
50 Sen, Amartya.  Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York. 1999. (Here, p. 293.)  See also: pp. 
143-45 and 292-97.  
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Democratic governance is also valued and promoted by the current (but not 
necessarily the traditional) version of the economic growth approach as well as the 
capability approach.  Free and fair democratic elections as well as basic political and civil 
rights are currently a priority for both approaches.  However, the economic growth 
approach has been slow to recognize that good governance, including democratic 
governance, may play a valuable role in promoting economic growth.  The approach still 
tends to favor a minimal state, which is typically expected to contribute efficiently to 
economic growth.  It also requires only a relatively “thin” democracy.  (Moreover, even 
the requirement for thin democracy may result more from political pressure from First 
World democracies rather than from an authentic evolution of the perspective, which may 
be just as likely to endorse economically efficient autocratic regimes, such as China).  In 
contrast, the capability approach emphasizes the importance of some key state functions, 
including democratic functions, as both intrinsically good, because they enable people to 
express their agency, and instrumentally good, because they tend to promote human well-
being better than do alternative governance structures.51 
Several of the policy directives associated with the economic growth perspective 
(such as privatization, deregulation, and free capital mobility,) seek to ensure a minimal 
or small government with relatively limited citizen participation or re-distribution of 
wealth.  This system is guided by general principles of economic efficiency.  It rewards 
market participation and seeks to maximize economic freedom, while strictly limiting any 
taxation of the rich designed to meet the needs of the poor.   
 
51 See Sen, 1999 Ch. 6, and Crocker, David A. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and 
Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapter 9.   
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The economic growth perspective has recently come to recognize that some 
redistribution of wealth, what it calls “equity,” is necessary to promote and sustain 
economic growth.  Hence, it employs investments in human capital and infrastructure in 
order to attract investments (both foreign and domestic), and holds that we can and 
should design some redistribution policies for the sake of economic growth and increased 
efficiency.  However, even in this recent evolution of the economic growth perspective, 
economic growth trumps equity.  Equity-enhancing measures should be abandoned when 
they no longer result in greater growth.  As the World Bank’s 2006 World Development 
Report: Equity and Development explains: 
[W]hile such equity-enhancing redistributions (of power, or 
access to government spending and markets) can often be 
efficiency-increasing, possible tradeoffs need to be 
assessed in the design of policy. At some point higher tax 
rates to finance spending on more schools for the poorest 
will create so much disincentive to effort or investment 
(depending on how the taxes are raised), that one should 
stop raising them.52 
Finally, the economic growth perspective may support civil and political rights, including 
freedom of speech and a more equitable redistribution of political (and economic) power.  
Of course, these freedoms are not promoted as intrinsically important, but only if and 
when they contribute to economic growth: “The central argument here is that unequal 
power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status, 
and wealth—and that typically are also bad for the investment, innovation, and risk-
 
52 World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report: Equity and Development. p. 10. 
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taking that underpin long-term growth.”53 Thus, the economic growth approach favors a 
government that provides services and institutions that work to generate greater equality 
in power, status, and wealth only to the extent that it is economically efficient and 
promotes long-term growth.  That is, only to the extent that equity is a means to GNP 
growth and efficient economic expansion. 
In contrast, Sen rejects the idea that good governance, democracy, and political 
freedoms are simply a means to economic growth or development.  Rather, within the 
capability perspective they are valued as sources of important freedoms independent of 
the fact that they are also likely to promote economic growth.  Such dependency puts too 
many people at risk.  As Sen puts it in one of this chapter’s epigraphs, “[I]n judging 
economic development it is not adequate to look only at the growth of GNP or some 
indicators of overall economic expansion.  We have to look also at the impact of 
democracy and political freedoms on the lives and capabilities of the citizens.”54 
In contrast to the – at best – weakly distributive government of the economic 
growth approach, the capability approach allows for, indeed sometimes requires, the 
state’s or civil society’s provision of several services that facilitate the expansion of 
certain capabilities, or freedoms of all people even though doing so may entail a 
relatively large government, considerable redistribution of wealth, and in some cases, less 
growth.55 Within the capability approach, the expansion of freedom is considered both 
the primary end and the principal means of development.  These two roles of freedom in 
development can be called the “constitutive role” and the “instrumental role” 
 
53 Ibid. p. 9.  
 
54Sen, 1999. p. 150. 
 
55 See: Sen. 1999, pp. 38 – 39. 
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respectively.  “The constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive 
freedom in enriching human life.”56 When we consider people’s lives as better because 
they have a certain freedom (or worse due to lacking a certain freedom), for example, the 
freedom to be well nourished, to drink clean water, to live to adulthood, and so on, we are 
considering the constitutive aspect of freedom.  
“The instrumental role of freedom concerns the way different kinds of rights, 
opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general, 
and thus to promoting development.”57 In other words, instrumental freedoms are the 
enabling capabilities, or background conditions, which contribute to our general capacity 
to live as we freely choose to live.  Understanding the instrumental aspect of freedom 
allows us to recognize that many freedoms are interrelated and that promoting freedoms 
of one type (for example, education) can help in promoting and/or protecting other types 
of freedoms (for example, employment).  Sen has identified (1) political freedoms, (2) 
economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees, and (5) 
protective security as some of the categories of instrumental (as well as substantive) 
freedoms that the policies and programs of the capability approach seek to ensure that 
states and communities promote and protect.  
Societies, through both governments and civil society associations, are 
responsible for promoting and protecting political freedoms. Promoting and protecting 
such freedoms entails not only by having free and fair democratic elections, but also by 
 
56 Ibid. p. 36. 
 
57 Ibid. p. 37. 
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ensuring “political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest sense.”58 
Such political entitlements include a multiparty system, freedom of speech – including a 
free press, and freedom to participate in other mediums of exchange (including, parades, 
peaceful protests, town hall meetings, and the like) that facilitate engagement in critical 
political dialogue, including the criticism of government leaders.  In addition, 
government and civil society institutions should be in place to facilitate the continuous 
exchange of ideas, or democratic deliberation about what sort of capabilities we should 
value and seek to promote at the state level.  
Economic facilities are the freedoms that individuals have to participate in 
economic consumption, production, or exchange.  The capability perspective recognizes 
not only that markets should be open to all, but also that gross economic inequalities are 
often the root of inequalities of other types of power, such as political influence.  Jolly 
captures some of the ways in which institutions of governance can promote the sort of 
economic facilities encouraged by the human development view of the capability 
perspective:   
The human development view recognizes many areas 
where state action is vital: in strengthening the human 
capabilities of all the human population; in ensuring a fair 
distribution of opportunities through a fair distribution of 
income; in creating active policies to ensure markets work 
with equity as well as efficiency, which includes 
monitoring market outcomes and allowing interventions 
where necessary, to offset extreme inequalities of market 
power; and in encouraging the formation of local 
 
58 Ibid. p. 38. 
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institutions that provide opportunities for participation and 
empowerment in a whole range of activities and services.59 
Social opportunities, such as basic health care and primary education, are another 
general kind of instrumental (and substantive) freedom.  People’s lives are enriched due 
to good health and trained mental capacities.  Health care and education are also 
instrumentally valuable to development as they allow for more effective political and 
economic participation.  Healthy people who are literate and numerate are qualified for a 
wide variety of jobs at better wages.  They attract outside investments, and they are better 
equipped to participate in more advanced market activities, such as managing a business 
or participating in micro-credit programs. They are also able to read government 
documents and newspaper articles and to communicate in writing about political 
activities.  
Political and economic interactions require a certain amount of trust.  People need 
to trust that the goods they exchange are properly represented, that the leaders they elect 
are using state funds as pledged and claimed, and that contracts will be serviced and paid 
as agreed.  Transparency guarantees provide the freedom to deal with one another under 
guarantees of disclosure.  States can provide such guarantees by requiring a certain level 
of openness and clarity in economic transactions, governments, and contracts, and by 
penalizing violations of such requirements.  These guarantees promote the public trust 
necessary for healthy political and economic interactions and have an obvious role in 
protecting people from the harms of fraud, corruption, financial irresponsibility, and other 
forms of deceitful dealings.  
 
59 Jolly, Richard. “Human Development and Neoliberalism Compared” in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A.K. 
Shiva Kumar eds. Readings in Human Development. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2003. (Here p. 109.) 
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Within the capability approach, what Sen calls “protective security” involves not 
only protecting citizens against harms that result from the direct actions of others such as 
theft, rape, assault, and fraud, but also against the deprivation of basic capabilities that 
can result from physical or economic circumstances.  As Sen explains: 
Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net 
for preventing the affected population from being reduced 
to abject misery, and in some cases even starving to death.  
The domain of protective security includes fixed 
institutional arrangements such as unemployment benefits 
and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as 
ad hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emergency 
public employment to generate income for destitutes.60 
The freedom to avoid death and starvation is not only intrinsically valuable but is also is 
clearly instrumental to enjoying other valuable freedoms. 
Both the economic growth approach and the capability approach require states 
and civil society to promote and protect many of the same political and civil freedoms, 
access to markets, transparency guarantees, and security.  However, the capability 
approach requires the state to promote these freedoms even if doing so requires a 
relatively large government, considerable redistribution of wealth, including taxation of 
the rich, and a slower (or less economically efficient) rate of GNP growth.  As Jolly 
rightly remarks, “it is not so much that the neo-liberal approach ignores all of these 
[freedoms], but it generally accords them lower importance than the goal of economic 
 
60 Sen 1999, p. 40. Emphasis original. 
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efficiency.”61 In other words, the economic growth approach promotes and protects 
many of the political and civil freedoms discussed above to the extent, but only to the 
extent, that doing so maximizes – or at least does not negatively effect – economic 
growth.  GNP growth (often with the expectation or hope of reducing poverty) remains 
the primary end of development within the economic growth approach.  
It must be underscored that within the human-centered capability perspective, the 
political and civil freedoms we have been considering as instrumental freedoms, are not 
merely instruments or means of development.  They are also among the valuable ends of 
development.  For these various instrumental freedoms, including political freedoms, 
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security 
not only enrich our lives, but also and provide an answer to the question “What is 
development?.”  The fact that they are instrumentally valuable does not in any way 
diminish their value as ends of development.  As Sen observes:  
Within the narrower views of development (in terms of, 
say, GNP growth or industrialization) it is often asked 
whether the freedom of political participation and dissent is 
or is not ‘conducive to development.’ In light of the 
foundational view of development as freedom, this question 
would seem to be defectively formulated, since it misses 
the crucial understanding that political participation and 
dissent are constitutive parts of development itself. Even a 
very rich person who is prevented from speaking freely, or 
from participating in public debates and decisions, is 
deprived of something that she has reason to value.62 
61 Jolly, p. 109. 
 
62 Sen, 1999, pp. 36 – 37. Emphasis mine. 
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Because the capability perspective understands development as the expansion of valuable 
capabilities, the freedom to speak or participate is a part of good development, whether 
such freedom results in optimal economic efficiency, or not.    
When it comes to promoting and protecting the political and civil freedoms 
discussed above, policies that stem from recent positions within the economic growth 
approach as well as more essentially from the capability approach emphasize anti-
discrimination measures to ensure the inclusion of women, minorities, and the disabled.  
However, we see the same pattern.  The economic growth approach’s inclusion of such 
marginalized peoples is contingent on such inclusion’s enhancing economic efficiency by 
utilizing previously untapped human resources.  The capability approach, in contrast, 
calls for more protection to marginalized people through emphasizing inclusion in order 
to expand justly the capability-sets of all, especially the previously excluded – even when 
doing so does not result in economic growth.   
Although both approaches support international trade and encourage economic 
aid from more developed countries, the policies and priorities of each approach are also 
different at the international level of development.  The economic growth approach calls 
for free trade without barriers among nations.  It also calls for more developed countries 
to provide economic aid and investment to bolster the economies of less developed 
countries in accordance with directives from outside experts.  One World Bank document 
describes the economic growth approach stance at work in traditional World Bank 
approach, that is, the “external expert stance” as follows: 
Usually, these externally positioned sponsors and designers 
are substantive experts in the subject matter they are 
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investigating. They determine what the project will look 
like. They view other stakeholders mainly as sources of 
information and opinions. Their “expert role” includes 
collecting information and opinions from the other 
stakeholders, making sense out of what they collect, and 
converting all of it into a development strategy or project.63 
The capability approach focuses on fair trade, which emphasizes sustainable wages for 
all workers of the global market.  It calls for MDCs to provide international support 
(including economic aid) for national actions democratically adopted by LDCs with the 
aim of expanding the capabilities the people of the LDC value.   
Thus, the policies and projects that stem from the economic growth perspective 
and the capability perspective often work towards similar short term goals such as 
promoting basic health, democratic governance, and anti-discrimination.  However, they 
sometimes do so in different ways and for different reasons.  They also accept different 
sorts of trade-offs as they aim at fundamentally different long term goals that correspond 
to their fundamentally different understandings of development.  Table Two summarizes 
some of the similarities and differences between the institutional means of development 
recognized by the economic growth approach and the capability approach. 
 
63 The World Bank Participation Sourcebook.  (Here, p. 4.) (Available on line at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sbhome.htm.)  The authors of the sourcebook add that: “The 
external expert stance is not a World Bank innovation but an inherent and deeply embedded part of our 
understanding of how to produce results and the role one plays in producing them.” 
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minimal state; promotion 
and protection of basic 
political and civil 
freedoms and some basic 
human rights  
 
Emphasis is on good 
governance for economic 
efficiency  
 
Democratic elections; inclusive and 
deep democracy; important state 
functions and institutions that 
promote and protect not only basic 
political and civil freedoms, all basic 





Promotion of economic 
consumption, production, 
and exchange; open 
markets; limited market 
interventions as means to 
economic growth 
 
Promotion of economic consumption, 
production, and exchange; open 
markets; market interventions when 
necessary to offset inequalities of 
income and power  
 
Economic activity as one intrinsically 
good freedom as well as a means to 






Important investments in 
human capital; invest in 
primary health care, 
education, and nutrition, 
but only when there is a 
good rate of return 
 
Important to improving human lives, 
not only as means to other 
opportunities, but also as ends within 
themselves; (almost) always invest in 
primary health care, education, and 
nutrition (unless a democratic 










Openness about economic 
transactions, 
governments, and 
contracts (as means to 
reduce corruption and 
promote growth) 
 
Openness and clarity from economic 
transactions, governments, and 
contracts (as intrinsically valuable as 
well as means to other freedoms) 






Protection from harm; 
social safety nets where 
affordable and 
contributory to economic 
growth 
 
Stronger protection from harm 
through social safety nets even when 
(within democratically decided limits) 
the result is less aggregative 







resources of human 
capital as a factor in 
economic growth 
 
Expanding the freedoms of all, 
especially previously marginalized 





Market and expert 
decisions for free trade 
international aid as means 
of promoting  economic 
growth 
 
National and local decisions for Fair 
Trade, international support for 
national self-determination of 
strategies to expand capabilities 
 
2. The Concept and Role of Empowerment  
International development theorists and practitioners of both the (current version of the) 
economic growth approach and the capability approach agree that empowerment – the 
focus of my project – is a necessary part of good development.  However, as with many 
of the issues discussed above, each perspective has a different understanding of what 
empowerment is (and is not), what it means to promote empowerment within 
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development, and why doing so is part of good development.  In this section, I provide a 
brief account of the nature and role of empowerment within each approach.  (I provide a 
more detailed account of empowerment within the capability approach in Chapters Four 
and Five.)  I argue that the human-centered perspective of the capability approach offers 
a more comprehensive, and therefore, a theoretically and practically superior, concept of 
empowerment than the economic growth perspective does or can provide.64 
Those who work within the economic growth perspective active throughout much 
of the world today claim that empowerment is a key part of good development.  That is, 
that empowerment is one of the key ingredients of a formula that will result in efficient 
GNP growth.  However, as with other extra-market concepts (including, education, heath 
care, democracy, and so forth), the approach has been slow to adopt an adequate concept 
of empowerment or recognize the complex value of empowerment in good development.  
Recall that within the economic growth perspective “good development” is efficient 
economic growth (GNP) with the expectation that the result will be relatively rapid 
decreases in poverty; that is, fewer people earning wages below the poverty line.  In this 
context, empowerment is largely, if not exclusively, economic employment, productivity, 
and other forms of market participation.  As such, empowerment is a valuable part of 
development to the extent that productive employment and other economic means 
promotes growth or increases economic efficiency.  In other words, being economically 
empowered by having a productive job is valuable only as a means to efficient economic 
growth.  
 
64 Note that my current project is not to provide an account of the ideal concept of empowerment.  Rather, it 
is to investigate some of the concepts of empowerment that are currently at work in development.  
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The power to participate in market activities, earn a living wage, secure a loan, 
produce and sell goods, purchase goods, and so on, are of great importance on this 
approach.  Projects and policies that promote and protect these economic powers – 
particularly among those who were previously excluded (including, women, lower castes, 
the disabled, and others) from full economic participation – are often touted as 
empowerment projects.  An individual may be considered empowered to the extent that 
she can make market-related decisions and control her economic status.  For example, 
individuals who make decisions about the sort of work they do, the sort of wage they 
earn, and the sort of goods they buy – not only in amount, but also variety, are more 
empowered that those who cannot work, or have no choice but to work in poor conditions 
for subsistence wages, and have little access to the goods they need or want.  Thus, it 
seems that any development intervention that aims to increase employment or wages, or 
to expand market opportunities, can be broadly understood as an empowerment 
intervention from within the economic growth perspective.  It is worth noting that the 
vast majority of these empowerment interventions are planned and executed by 
development experts, whether foreign or national.   
Although the traditional “external expert stance” mentioned above remains the 
prevailing commitment and practice within the economic growth perspective (and the 
World Bank), some within the perspective (and some within the World Bank) encourage 
the adoption of an alternative “participatory stance” in development projects, or 
interventions.  The participatory stance assumes that high levels of participation are 
linked to high levels of empowerment.  Empowerment, in turn, is important in so far as it 
is a means to broader and more stable markets and long term growth.  This view assumes 
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that people are more economically productive when they are empowered to make 
decisions or have other “ownership” investments in a project. 
It is important to note that on this view “participation” and “empowerment” still 
refer to market participation and economic empowerment.  Involving poor stakeholders 
as decision makers and other participants in development interventions is merely a means 
to the end of greater economic gains.  Thus the new and alternative “participatory stance” 
is an additional way to promote economic growth (in the same vein as recognizing 
endogenous factors).  It is not a dissent from, or abandonment of, the economic growth 
perspective, which remains grounded in an understanding of development as economic 
growth.  In contrast, a move to value and promote participation and/or empowerment as 
an end of good development independent of any economic consequences of doing so, 
would be a departure from the economic growth perspective. 
According to the World Bank’s Participation Sourcebook, the “participation 
stance” occurs in development interventions when “the sponsors and designers take a 
stance that places them inside the local social system being addressed; that is, they 
demonstrate a willingness to work collaboratively with the other key stakeholders65 in 
carrying out the steps required to prepare a project for World Bank financing.”66 The 
Sourcebook rightly recognizes that fostering participation of the poor involves “a lot 
 
65 The Participation Sourcebook defines stakeholders as: “Borrowers, that is, elected officials, line agency 
staff, local government officials, and so on. Governments representing borrower member countries are the 
Bank’s most significant partners in that they are shareholders as well as clients and are responsible for 
devising and implementing public policies and programs; indirectly affected groups, such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private sector organizations, and so forth with an interest in 
outcomes; and the Bank, that is, Bank management, staff, and shareholders.” (p. 6)  
 
66 Participation Sourcebook, p. 3.  
56
more than finding the right technique.  It requires strengthening the organizational and 
financial capacities of the poor so that they can act for themselves.”67 
The sourcebook offers the concept of “a continuum along which the poor are 
progressively empowered… On one end of this continuum, the poor are viewed as 
beneficiaries—recipients of services, resources, and development interventions.  In this 
context, community organizing, training, and one-way flows of resources through grant 
mechanisms are often appropriate.”68 As people become empowered “their voices begin 
to be heard, they become ‘clients’ who are capable of demanding and paying for goods 
and services from government and private sector agencies… We reach the far end of the 
continuum when these clients ultimately become the owners and managers of their assets 
and activities. This stage ranks highest in terms of the intensity of participation 
involved.”69 
The most empowered on this account do not simply receive whatever goods and 
services donors decide to provide through one way distribution.  Rather, they actively 
participate in and influence the results of the decision making processes concerning their 
economic assets and activities.  As owners and managers of economic assets and 
activities, individuals and groups exercise their power to make decisions for themselves 
or with other stakeholders (including, but not limited to outside development 
professionals) about what products to buy, what products to produce, what methods of 
productions to use, and more.  These decisions both influence and respond to local 
markets, and in this way work to ensure that the market reflects the interests of the 
 
67 Ibid. p. 8. 
 
68 Ibid.  
 
69 Ibid.  
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stakeholders.  Supporters of the participation stance within the economic growth 
perspective believe that the participation of empowered stakeholders in development 
interventions and other economic projects will ultimately result in strong markets and 
sustainable economic growth.  
The authors of the Sourcebook also recognize that empowerment requires: 
“building sustainable, market-based financial systems; decentralizing authority and 
resources; and strengthening local institutions” as well as creating an “enabling policy 
environment that allows all stakeholders—especially poor and disadvantaged ones—to 
…influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and 
resources which affect them.”70 An environment in which poor and disadvantaged 
stakeholders are able to influence and control policy, is an environment in which the poor 
and disadvantaged have access to basic education, health care, and civic participation.  
Thus, interventions that promote and protect education, good health, and civic 
participation, may also be considered empowerment projects.  It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that – maintaining the pattern identified earlier – these projects are only 
considered valuable parts of good development to the extent to which they ultimately 
promote GNP growth, reduce economic poverty, or enhance economic efficiency; which 
may be considerable.  It is in this way that the economic growth approach understands 
empowerment: as an economic concept that plays a valuable role as a means to good 
economic development, that is, a(n sustainable) increase in GNP.  
The capability approach has a more complex conception of empowerment, one 
that goes beyond the market and emphasizes individual and group agency (via. 
deliberation) in all spheres of life.  Moreover, the capability perspective recognizes that 
 
70 Ibid. p. 9.  
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such empowerment is not only as a means to good development but is also as an 
important end of good development.  In this section I provide only a general explanation 
of the role of empowerment within the capability approach in order to make clear how it 
differs fundamentally from the role of empowerment within the economic growth 
approach.  In Chapters Four and Five, I provide a more detailed account of empowerment 
within the capability approach, including an evaluation of theoretical similarities and 
differences found in economist Amartya Sen’s and philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s 
versions of the capability approach.  
As we have seen, within the capability perspective “good development” is a 
process of expanding the set(s) of valuable substantive freedoms, or capabilities, people 
enjoy.  Within this approach empowerment, in a general sense, can be understood as the 
process of expansion of the valuable substantive freedoms people enjoy.  In this way, 
there is a sense in which all of the development projects and interventions promoted from 
within the capability perspective can be understood as empowerment projects that seek to 
empower people to achieve a lifestyle that they have reason to value.  Thus unlike the 
limited concept and instrumental role that empowerment plays within the economic 
growth perspective, empowerment is a very central concept with an extensive role within 
the capability perspective.   
Moreover, in this very general sense, the process of good development is the 
process of empowerment.  If a person has the capability to be well-nourished, read, vote, 
or buy and sell goods, then she is empowered to be well-nourished, read, vote, or buy and 
sell goods.  Empowerment on this view is not simply tied to the market, but can be found 
in every sphere of human life – including, and for some especially, the private spheres.  
59
By focusing on what people are free to do and be, the capability approach is able to 
recognize the most empowered people not just as owners and managers of assets and 
economic activities, but as owners and managers of their own lives; not only in the 
market, but also in the polis, the academy, the family, and in every other sphere of life.  It 
is in this way that the role of empowerment – as both a process and a result – is much 
more comprehensive within the capability approach than with in the economic growth 
approach.   
Sen uses the concept of agency to represent such ownership and management of 
one’s own life.71 As mentioned above, on Sen’s account agency has both a freedom 
aspect, agency freedom, and an achievement aspect, agency achievement.  A person’s 
agency achievement is her “success in the pursuit of the totality of her considered goals 
and objectives.”72 These goals can include objectives that enhance one’s own well-being, 
for example, one might seek to be well-nourished or to own a sports car.  However, 
agency goals are not restricted to making one’s own life better, and in this way may be 
distinct from what Sen calls “well-being achievement” (which I discuss in detail in 
Chapter Four).   
Sen recognizes that human beings are not psychological egoists.  We often have 
interests in achieving goals that go beyond benefiting ourselves.  A parent may want to 
(that is, have the agency objective of) seeing her children’s lives go well.  In many cases, 
a parent’s well-being is enhanced by the fact that her children’s well-being is enhanced.  
 
71 As mentioned above (note 18), Martha Nussbaum does not use Sen’s agency/well-being distinction.  
However, as I discuss in Chapter Five, Nussbaum often (especially in her work in 2000 and after) uses the 
term “agency” in a way that is compatible with Sen’s use and argues that people should be recognized as 
“sources of agency and worth in their own right, with their own plans to make and their own lives to 
live…deserving of all necessary support for their equal opportunity to be such agents.”  (Nussbaum. 2000.  
p. 58) 
 
72 Sen, 1999. p. 56. 
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It is important to note, however, that our personal well-being is conceptually separate 
from the well-being of others.  A parent may also act to enhance the well-being of her 
children in a way that diminishes her own well-being.  In this case, despite being slightly 
offset by the psychological benefits of seeing her children do well, the parent’s overall 
well-being is diminished, but her agency is enhanced.  It is not only with respect to their 
children that agents act in ways that diminish their own well-being in order to pursue 
other agency objectives.  One may incur great personal costs to herself as she works 
towards the greater good of her country, or the environment, or even the demise of her 
enemies. 
On Sen’s account, agency objectives are goals that a person has her own reason to 
pursue; they are not (simply) the goals of someone else.73 Moreover, agency objectives 
are not based on a “whim or caprice that a person happens to have,”74 nor are they 
coerced by outside forces (be they people or natural disasters), but are autonomously 
decided.  According to Sen, an agent is a reasonable individual “who acts and brings 
about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own objectives, 
whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criterion as well.”75 
Agency freedom is the freedom individuals have to realize the objectives they 
value and pursue.  To have more agency freedom is to have “more opportunity to achieve 
 
73 Sen’s use of the term “agent” is not to be confused with a use of the same term to denote a person acting 
for and accountable to someone else, namely, a principal, as it is sometimes employed within economics 
and game theory.  See: Sen, Development as Freedom. p. 19. This is not to say that people cannot have 
common or shared goals. As discussed in later chapters of this work, people can and often do work as 
collective agents to achieve common goals. 
 
74 Sen, Amartya. Inequality Reexamined. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992. (Here, p. 56, n. 1).  
 
75 Sen, 1999. p. 19. 
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those things that we value, and have reason to value.”76 Sen distinguishes between this 
opportunity aspect of freedom, which is “concerned primarily with our ability to achieve” 
and the process aspect of freedom which is concerned with “the processes through which 
that achievement comes about.”77 
In valuing process freedom, the capability perspective is recognizing that 
development theories and projects should work not only to create valuable opportunities, 
but also to ensure that the opportunities arrive through an agency-expressing and just 
process.  For example, development interventions might seek the opportunity for 
members of a historically oppressed group to own their own land.  The intervention 
should not, however, do so by forcing the members of the historically oppressed group to 
relocate together to an area that they did not choose, for example assigned reservation.  
Note that an individual or group’s process freedom can be violated even if the oppressed 
group happens to find their new location desirable.  It is the lack of choice, or expression 
of agency in the matter that is significant.78 
The important concept of agency implies empowering public sphere policies and 
institutions that express and support agency (individual and group autonomy) and direct 
valuable projects.  Such projects may include the expansion of market access, as well as 
popularly decided and just land reform, to name a few.  Within the capability approach, 
the concept of agency also facilitates the incredibly important empowerment of 
 
76 Sen, Amartya. Rationality and Freedom. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 2002. p. 585.  
 
77 Ibid.  
 
78 Although the current work of the economic growth approach includes some good governance measures 
and some protection of human rights, it does not focus on matters of process freedom.  Instead, those 
working within the perspective are likely to insist that their mission is a value-neutral one restricted to the 
economic endeavor of raising GNP and that internal political projects including the details of a country’s 
land reform scheme are beyond the scope of the approach.  
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individuals as decision makers with some control within the private or informal contexts 
of their daily lives.  This is an area that results in the critical deprivation of many men, 
women, and children, including the women who make up the millions of “missing 
women” (introduced in Chapter One).  
In a deeply patriarchal or gender biased society, a woman with access to essential 
resources like food may not have the capacity to be well nourished due, for example, to a 
cultural norm that leaves her with no choice (agency) but to give the majority of the 
household’s food to her husband or other male relatives.79 Or, perhaps in some cases, she 
herself believes that giving her husband the majority of the household’s food is normal, 
proper, and not to be scrutinized or questioned.  Simply providing such a woman with 
official legal or even protected physical access to additional food may do very little to 
allow her to express her agency or to alter her actual opportunity freedom or capability 
set, as long as she lacks the psychological and social power to autonomously reject the 
norm that dictates her husband is more important and deserves the majority of her food.  
(Of course, improving legal and/or physical access to food may be one valuable or even 
necessary step towards expanding her options.)  
As mentioned above, even a “wealthy” woman, who enjoys an opulent life by 
most standards, may lack agency as well as important basic capabilities.  Consider, for 
example, a woman who is forced to marry a person of someone else’s choosing, and by 
no coincidence suffers from physical abuse, sexual abuse, and forced pregnancy, because 
according to her cultural beliefs to refuse any of these is to offend her community, her 
 
79 For a detailed account of how such a norm influences the lives of women in parts of India see: Rajni 
Palriwala. “Beyond Myths: The Social and Political Dynamics of Gender.” In Naila Kabeer and Ramya 
Subrahmanian. Eds. Institutions, Relations, and Outcomes: Framework and Case Studies for Gender 
Aware Planning. London: Zed Books. 1999. (pp. 49 – 79. especially pp. 64 – 67.)  
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ancestors, or God.  Such a woman lacks authorship or control of her life and the 
important capability that capability philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls “bodily 
integrity.”80 Mere formal access to divorce or a court system that perpetrates spousal 
abuse will not benefit a woman who believes she is unworthy of choice or well-being, or 
fears not only offending God in heaven, but also provoking the treatment of “wrong-
doers” in her earthly community.  The capability approach recognizes that the women in 
these situations need more than a greater income or supported access to markets alone.  
The capability perspective recognizes that expanding a person’s capability set, 
and enhancing a person’s agency often requires more than income.  The concept of 
individual agency is central to Sen’s capability approach.  Although often inescapably 
linked to income, public resources, and institutions (including education and 
employment), the agency-focused perspective allows us to go beyond (but not without) 
these basic resources to advocate that individuals and communities themselves should 
remove—or have an important role in removing—unfreedoms by altering institutionalize 
social attitudes and cultural practices.  (I consider issues of institutionalized social values 
and cultural norms in greater detail in Chapter Six.) 
Recall that a woman empowered as an agent is a woman who herself decides and 
“acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her 
own values and objectives, whether or not we asses them in terms of some external 
criteria as well.”81 Such a woman is better equipped to recognize and give voice to her 
 
80 For Nussbaum, bodily integrity requires:  “Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s 
bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e., being able to secure against assault, including sexual assault, 
child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproductions. (Nussbaum, 2000 p. 78.)  For Nussbaum’s complete list of “Central Human 
Functional Capabilities” see p. 156 of this essay. 
 
81 Sen. 1999, p. 19. 
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needs and to question informal institutional factors such as current social values and 
cultural practices that limit freedom.  She is not simply dependent on the design of 
government institutions or even development interventions.  As Sen writes:  
Indeed, the agency of women can never be adequately free 
if traditionally discriminatory values remain unexamined 
and unscrutinized.  While values may be culturally 
influenced…it is possible to overcome the barriers of 
inequality imposed by the tradition through greater freedom 
to question, doubt, and – if convinced – reject. An adequate 
realization of women’s agency relates not only to the 
freedom to act but also to the freedom to question and 
reassess.82 
Despite the fact that Nussbaum does not make use of Sen’s agency/well-being 
distinction in her version of the capability approach, she agrees with Sen about the value 
of examining traditional discriminatory values as she embraces the concept of practical 
reason: “Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life.”83 This concept of practical reason (among other aspects 
of Nussbaum’s account discussed in Chapter Five,) makes explicit Nussbaum’s 
agreement that the capability approach requires that individuals recognize themselves as 
(and actually be) people in control of their own lives, people Sen would call agents.  For 
Nussbaum:  
 
82 Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen. India:  Development and Participation. Oxford University Press: 1996, 
2000. (p. 274.)  
 
83 Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 78 – 79. 
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[T]he notion of choice and practical reason… is a 
normative notion, emphasizing the critical activity of 
reason in a way that does not reflect the actual use of 
reason in many lives…It also entails that there is something 
wrong with not seeing oneself in a certain way, as a bearer 
of rights and a citizen whose dignity and worth are equal to 
that of others.84 
Thus, within the capability perspective simply having formal legal rights and 
access to, or even control over, a variety of market centered assets and activities is not 
enough.  The capability approach not only requires that an individual receive the income 
and institutional support necessary to achieve basic functionings associated with the 
economic sphere.  It also requires that she actively recognizes herself as a self-
determining or autonomous being, a bearer of rights, worthy of an equal share of 
economic and other, cultural and social opportunities and resources, as she plans her own 
life.  Within the capability approach women and men empowered as agents are not 
simply passive recipients of resources, or instruments for increasing GNP growth.  
Instead they are active critics and shapers of formal institutional policies as well as 
informal institutional cultural practices and social values.   
 A woman who actively recognizes her worth as equal to that of others is 
empowered to challenge cultural norms that, for example, require her to give the majority 
of the household’s food to the men in her household despite her own malnourished state, 
or unquestionably defer to their decisions.  A woman who sees herself as a bearer of 
rights and dignity is empowered to challenge, for example, violations of her bodily 
 
84 Ibid. pp. 112 – 13. 
66
integrity, no matter how accepted or even valued such violations are in her society.  A 
woman who is empowered to plan her own life can make autonomous decisions for 
herself, for example whether and who to marry.  She can participate in many of the 
decision making processes within various spheres of life (including the market) and 
levels of society.  I discuss these points in some depth in later chapters (especially 
Chapter Six). 
 The economic growth approach and the capability approach agree that 
empowerment is a valuable part of good development.  However, upon examination of 
the concept and role of empowerment within each approach, it becomes clear that the 
ideal of empowerment of the capability perspective is more comprehensive than the 
relatively limited and thin, market-centered concept found within the economic growth 
perspective (as summarized on Table Three below).  I submit that this comprehensive 
quality of the concept and role of empowerment within the capability approach is 
theoretically and practically superior to that found within the economic growth approach. 
 The concept of empowerment in within the capability approach is theoretically 
superior because it facilitates the understanding of individuals as human beings, and not 
simple as human capital, or resources for economic growth.  Likewise, this understanding 
of empowerment is practically superior in that it allows for a more complete treatment of 
empowerment in development interventions, by going beyond the market to promote and 
protect empowerment within other relevant spheres of life, for example, the household.  
Moreover, given that empowerment within the economic growth approach can never be 
more than a mere means to the end of GNP growth (any move to value empowerment as 
an intrinsically valuable end of development would be a departure from the perspective) 
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the economic growth approach cannot provide a more comprehensive account of 
empowerment.  
68









Expansion of power to 
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efficient economic growth 
 
A process that is both instrumental and 
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One who actively 
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other’s (passive recipients) 
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as equal to that of others and is able to 
be an author of her own life by 
autonomously accepting, modifying, 
challenging or rejecting economic, 
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1) Expressing and enhancing 
agency through education, 
deliberation, critical scrutiny, 
and decision making 
 
2) Facilitating opportunities to 





This Chapter provides a closer look at and comparison of the policies and practices of the 
capability approach to development as a relatively new alternative to the traditional, and 
still dominant economic growth development perspective.  The comparison reveals key 
differences in the policies of the two approaches, including differences in the way each 
perspective understands the ends of good development, and the roles that democracy, 
education, and empowerment play in good development.  It is clear that although both the 
economic growth approach and the capability approach agree that human empowerment 
is a necessary part of good development, this agreement masks deep disagreements about 
what empowerment is and what role it plays within good development.  Furthermore, in 
light of the above analysis, I submit that the capability perspective offers a more 
comprehensive, and therefore, theoretically and practically superior – concept of 
empowerment than the economic growth perspective does or can provide.  
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Chapter Three 
Can Pogge be Justified? A Response to Thomas Pogge’s  
‘Can the Capability Approach be Justified?’ 
 
[T]here are internal capabilities: that is developed states of the person herself that 
are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of 
the requisite functions.  
 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 2000
Introduction 
The first two chapters of this essay offer a comparison of the traditionally dominant 
economic growth approach to development, and the relatively new capability approach.  I 
conclude that the relatively comprehensive capability approach is philosophically and 
practically superior to the economic growth approach.  In this chapter, I consider Thomas 
Pogge’s representation of the capability approach as he compares the approach to yet 
another perspective on development he calls “Rawlsian resourcism.”  I argue that 
Pogge’s assessment of the capability approach fails to appreciate both the depth of the 
approach in general and the role of empowerment within the approach in particular.   
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In his essay “Can the Capability Approach be Justified?”85 Thomas Pogge 
observes that the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
has come to play a central role in political philosophy and in normative economics.  
Pogge asserts that the popularity of the capability approach among both academics and 
policy makers comes at the expense of competing resourcist and welfarist approaches.  
With this in mind, Pogge sets out to examine how the capability approach might be 
justified as superior to what he calls its “Rawlsian resourcist competition.”  He concludes 
that the capability approach cannot be justified as superior to the resourcist approach.  In 
light of this conclusion, he suggests that it is not the capability approach, but resourcism, 
that deserves our attention as political philosophers and normative economists.  I do not 
here explain or assess Rawlsian resourcism.  Nor do I address Pogge’s comparison of the 
two approaches.  Instead I focus on Pogge’s claim that the capability approach cannot be 
justified in receiving the attention of scholars and practitioners.   
I believe that Pogge is justified in examining the capability approach.  Indeed, he 
is to be applauded for critically engaging the approach.  However, I do not believe that 
the evaluation of the capability approach that Pogge provides is justified.  In the present 
chapter, I argue that Pogge’s essay fails to present a full and accurate account of the 
capability approach.  I attempt to make clear some of the most serious limitations and 
distortions in Pogge’s representation of the capability approach including his 
misrepresentation of capabilities as merely instrumental, and his failure to account for 
individual empowerment, and in turn, the rich valuation processes that are part and parcel 
 
85 Thomas W. Pogge. “Can the Capability Approach be Justified?” in Martha Nussbaum and Chad Flanders 
eds.: Global Inequalities, special issue 30:2 (Fall 2002, appeared February 2004) of Philosophical Topics,
167-228.  In my essay all page references refer to the electronic posting of Pogge’s paper (http://aran.univ-
pau.fr/ee/page3.html).   
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of the capability approach that both Sen and Nussbaum promote.  I conclude that Pogge’s 
representation of the approach is so flawed that his essay concerns not the capability 
approach, but a misrepresentation of the approach that neither Sen nor Nussbaum could 
endorse.  Consequently, Pogge’s conclusion that the capability approach cannot be 
justified is, at best, irrelevant to a healthy discussion of how the capability approach 
relates to other approaches within development. 
I want to be very clear that I am not suggesting that Pogge’s work in general, or 
even in this paper in particular, have nothing to contribute to the discussion.  On the 
contrary, I myself am one of many who owe a great academic debt to Thomas Pogge.  
Moreover, my purpose here is not to vindicate the capability approach as superior to the 
resourcism Pogge favors.  Rather, it is the more modest goal of clearing away potential 
obstacles to a healthy discussion of how the capability approach – properly understood – 
relates to other approaches to international development including Rawlsian resourcism.  
I believe that such a discussion is essential to the progress of international development 
theories, and in turn, to the practice of international development.   
 
1. Pogge’s (Mis)Representation of the Capability Approach 
Pogge’s flawed representation of the capability approach seems to stem from his 
efforts to isolate differences between the capability approach and the Rawlsian 
resourcism he favors.  Pogge sees isolating such differences as a necessary step in the 
process of determining “which approach can deliver the most plausible public criterion 
of social justice.”86 In the first section of his paper Pogge equates “the debate about 
 
86 Pogge, p. 1. Emphasis original. 
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criteria of social justice” with an arguably more narrow debate about “how institutional 
schemes are to be assessed and reformed in the name of justice.”87,88  Once this move is 
made the “key question” for Pogge becomes:  “Should alternative feasible institutional 
schemes be assessed in terms of ‘participants’ access to valuable resources or in terms of 
their participant’s capabilities, that is, access to valuable functionings?”89 In answering 
this question Pogge asks that we “confine ourselves” to what he calls “the central 
disagreement between the two approaches,” which he explains as follows: 
Resourcists believe that individual shares should be defined 
as bundles of goods or resources needed by human beings 
in general, without reference to the natural diversity among 
them.  These goods might include certain rights and 
liberties, powers and prerogatives, income and wealth, as 
well as access to education, health care, employment, and 
public goods – with different lists and different weights 
specified by different resourcist views.  Adherents of the 
capability approach hold, by contrast, that individual shares 
should be defined so as to take account of “personal 
characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods 
into the person’s ability to promote her ends.”90 Thus, an 
 
87 Pogge, p. 2. 
 
88 In his paper, Pogge’s use of the phrase “institutional schemes” is limited to what I call “formal 
institutions” in Chapter Six of this essay.  For the sake of clarity, in this chapter I adopt Pogge’s use of 
“institutional schemes” to represent institutionalized rules or patterns of typically official and public sphere, 
institutions, including the government.  I also use the phrase “extra-institutional” instead of “informal 
institutions” to represent the rules and patterns of the typically unofficial and primarily private or social-
cultural systems that influence the way we live, for example, the family, the church, the tribe, and so forth.  
I discuss some “extra-institutional” matters of justice and the fact that the capability approach, properly 
understood, can account for them in Section 4 of this chapter. 
 
89 Pogge p. 16.  
 
90 Pogge’s footnote 76 is found at this point in his text.  It reads:  
Sen: Development as Freedom, 74.  This formulation is defective by suggesting that the capability 
approach features criteria of social justice that take account of the specific ends that different persons are 
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equalitarian capability criterion holds that, under a just 
institutional order, persons with mental or physical frailties 
or disabilities would receive more resources than others, 
enabling them to reach the same level of capabilities, the 
same level of opportunities to promote human ends, insofar 
as this is reasonably possible.91 
Presenting the capability approach in this way limits the approach to a simple call for an 
institutional order that distributes resources in a way that reflects each individual’s ability 
to convert such resources into capabilities.  At first blush, this description in itself is not 
obviously distorted.  However, careful reading of Pogge’s paper reveals that the 
description is at the root of several problematic positions woven throughout the essay.  In 
what follows I attempt to make clear the limitations and distortions of Pogge’s 
representation of the capability approach by untangling some of the problematic positions 
it generates.   
 
2. The Intrinsic Value of Capabilities and Functionings 
Pogge’s limited description of the capability approach as a simple call for an 
institutional order that distributes resources (albeit in such a way that reflects each 
 
pursuing.  This is not the case.  Capabilities are defined without regard to such ends.  One person does not 
count as having lesser capabilities than another merely because the former chooses to pursue more 
ambitious ends.  What matters for capability theorists is each person’s ability to promote typical or 
standard human ends — and not: each person’s ability to promote his or her own particular ends. 
However, as discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, Pogge is mistaken.  The capability approach is 
concerned with a person’s ability to promote his or her own particular ends over other ends, albeit, among 
standard human ends.  The capability approach recognizes the importance of not just the doings and beings 
one actually achieves, but also the opportunities that one has, and yet chooses not to pursue, that is, one’s 
capability set (introduced in Chapter One).    
 
91 Pogge, pp. 33 – 34. 
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individual’s ability to convert such resources into capabilities), is linked to his 
problematic understanding of capabilities and functionings.  Pogge fails to recognize that 
capabilities and (some) functionings have intrinsic value.  Pogge correctly understands 
that “resources are of merely instrumental significance, [and] are important only insofar 
as they give persons opportunities to pursue their goals.”92 However, Pogge reveals his 
misunderstanding of capabilities, and in turn the capability approach, as he attempts to 
assign an equivalent, merely instrumental, value to capabilities.  He argues that: “Like 
rights and access to money, so the abilities to be well nourished and to move about are of 
mostly instrumental importance.”93 
Pogge is right that many capabilities, including those he mentions, do have 
significant instrumental value (for example, the ability to move about is instrumental in 
the task of getting a glass of water from the other room).  However, unlike resources, 
capabilities are not of mere instrumental significance.  Capabilities are a type of freedom, 
and as such they are intrinsically valuable.  According to Sen:  “Capability is…the 
substantive freedom to achieve alternate functioning combinations ([that is, combinations 
of the various things a person may value doing or being] or, less formally put, the 
freedom to achieve various lifestyles).”94 
A person with the capacity to be well-nourished enjoys the freedom to choose 
between being well-nourished and not being well-nourished (for example, by fasting).  In 
contrast, a person with resources, even sophisticated resources like “access to money” or 
“access to food” may or may not be free to convert those resources to meet her actual 
 
92 Pogge. p. 34. 
 
93 Pogge. p. 35. 
 
94 Sen, Amartya.  Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York. 1999. (Here, p. 75.) 
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needs, in this case, being well-nourished.  A person can have access to food, but lack the 
capacity to be well-nourished due to a medical condition, for example, she may suffer 
from a parasitic disease.  As explained in Chapter One, an affluent person with plenty of 
food and a healthy digestive system who chooses to fast may have the same functioning 
achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute person who is forced to 
starve.  However, the first person has a different “capability set” than the second.  The 
first person can choose to eat and to be well nourished in a way that the second person 
cannot.95 
Of course, as an advocate for the resourcist may point out, without access to 
valuable resources like food one cannot have the capability of being well nourished.  This 
is true.  In this way resources are sometimes necessary, but they are never sufficient for 
capabilities and in turn functionings.  That is, capabilities will sometimes depend on 
access to external (and merely instrumental) goods, but they will always require 
something internal, for example, a proper digestive system (or psychological state of 
empowerment).  As I discuss in more detail in Chapters Four and Five, capabilities are 
actual intrinsically valuable opportunities for active doing and beings, as such they 
account for all that is necessary – external and internal – to achieve the relevant 
functionings.  In other words: capabilities are both necessary and sufficient for achieving 
functionings.96 A person who has the capability to be well nourished is, by definition, a 
person who can choose to be well-nourished.   
 
95 Sen, 1999, p. 75. 
 
96 Although capabilities, or real opportunities, are necessary and sufficient for functionings, or realized 
achievements, they do not necessitate functionings.  A person will have several capabilities (for example, 
being nourished) in his capability set that he chooses not to realize (for example, by fasting).  
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Pogge’s limited description of the capability approach fails to capture fully this 
important point.  It problematically holds that the distribution of resources is often both 
necessary and sufficient for achieving capabilities and functionings.  Pogge seems to 
believe that a resourcist position that requires not just the institutional distribution of 
primary goods, but the more sophisticated “access to primary goods,” can somehow 
account for all that is necessary to achieve functionings.  However, even the cleverest of 
resourcists, one that can account for institutional distribution of the most sophisticated 
resources Pogge identifies, for example, “access to the social bases for self respect,” 
cannot fully account for capabilities, including what Nussbaum calls the capability for 
Senses, Imagination, and Thought. As one of the ten capabilities Nussbaum considers 
central to human functioning, this capability is concerned with an individual’s essential 
capacity “to imagine, think, and reason…in a ‘truly human’ way.”97 Such capabilities 
rely on internal powers and dispositions that can be cultivated and facilitated by external 
resources – for example, education or proper nutrition – but can never be provided by 
them.   
 Pogge’s failure to recognize the intrinsic value of capabilities leads him to a 
deeply flawed understanding of the capability approach.  He demonstrates this in his 
treatment of a criticism made by Sen and originally directed at a version of resourcism.98 
Sen’s original criticism faults resourcism for its use of strictly instrumental resources.  
Because Pogge wrongly assigns the same instrumental role to capabilities, he also 
 
97 Nussbaum, Martha.  2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. (Here. p. 78.)  See Chapter Five of my project for a complete list of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities.  
 
98 For Sen’s original criticism see Pogge p. 34, Sen, Amartya. 1992. Inequality Re-examined. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. (p. 19 n. 20). 
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wrongly believes that “Sen’s criticism of resourcism [can] be turned against himself.”99 
Pogge attempts to turn Sen’s own argument against him as he substitutes “capabilities” 
for “resources” and paraphrases Sen’s criticism as: “Equality in the space of capabilities 
is seen as important because they are instrumental in giving people equitable opportunity 
to pursue their respective goals and objectives.  This distance introduces some internal 
tension in Sen’s theory, since the derivative importance of capabilities depends on their 
role in allowing persons to fulfill their ends.”100 
Pogge fails to realize that this criticism is confusing, if not nonsensical, when 
capabilities are properly understood as freedom or “real opportunities” to achieve “the 
various things a person may value doing or being.”101 It becomes increasingly obvious 
that Pogge has misunderstood, and therefore does not accurately represent, the capability 
approach as he writes: “If Sen’s argument were sound, it would show that what matters 
for social justice is not equity in the space of capabilities (access to functionings) but 
equity in the space of opportunities to fulfill one’s particular goals.”  This statement 
demonstrates clearly that Pogge does not understand capabilities and functionings.  After 
all, capabilities are opportunities to fulfill one’s particular goals (that is, the freedom to 
achieve “various lifestyles” that one has reason to value).  When Pogge misrepresents 
capabilities and functioning in this way, he critically misrepresents the capability 
approach.  
 
99 Pogge, p. 34. 
 
100 Pogge, p. 35.  
 
101 Sen. 1999, p. 75. 
79
3. Not by the Distribution of Resources Alone 
Pogge oversimplifies the capability approach when he portrays it as a simple call for an 
institutional order that distributes resources.  However, Pogge does not commit himself to 
the overly simple and false view that when any individual is given resource x (for 
example, access to food), she will necessarily have the capability for functioning y (in 
this case, being well nourished).  Rather, Pogge acknowledges that on the capability 
approach, the ability to convert access to resources (food) into realized functionings 
(being well-nourished) varies among individuals, such that when given access to equal 
shares of resources some people will be better suited to meet their needs than others.  
Much102 of the variation among individual ability to convert resources into functionings 
results from what Sen calls “personal heterogeneities.” As mention in previous chapters, 
according to Sen:   
People have disparate physical characteristics connected 
with disability, illness, age or gender, and these make their 
needs diverse.  For example, an ill person may need more 
income to fight her illness—income that a person without 
such an illness would not need….A disabled person may 
need some prosthesis, an older person more support and 
help, a pregnant woman more nutritional intake, and so 
on.103 
102 Both Sen and Pogge discuss other reasons for variation in the ability to convert resources including, 
climate, environment, intra-family distribution – which (as I discuss in Chapter Six) is often related to 
gender differences, and in this way is linked to “personal heterogeneities.”   
 
103 Sen 1999, p. 70. 
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Thus, the capability approach holds that some individuals may need more resources to 
achieve certain basic functionings than others.  Moreover, it holds that just institutions 
will work to ensure that all individuals can achieve a certain level of capability even if it 
means (to a reasonable extent) providing some individuals with more resources than 
others.  For example, because access to a certain amount of food may allow those without 
parasites to be nourished, but not those who suffer from parasites, the capability approach 
may require that those with parasites (but not those without them) receive the additional 
resources required to become well nourished, for example, treatment for parasites or 
more food.  Pogge correctly understands that personal heterogeneities, and in turn, an 
individual’s diverse capacities to convert resources into valuable functionings, play an 
important role within the capability approach, and thus avoids saddling the capability 
approach with a “one-size fits all” distributional system. 
 Unfortunately, the distributional system Pogge does attribute to the capability 
approach is still deeply flawed.  This is in part because Pogge commits himself to the 
problematic position that the only way the capability approach can hope to enhance 
capabilities – regardless of a particular individual’s situation – is through the distribution 
of various quantities and qualities of resources.  Thus, according to Pogge, the capability 
theorist, like the resourcist, is concerned only with institutional distribution of resources.  
This is a grave error.   
 The capability approach does hold that institutions should provide individuals 
with the resources they need in order to achieve a certain level of functioning, and that 
due to disparate physical characteristics some individuals will need and should be 
provided with more resources than others.  However, “institutions should distribute more 
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resources” is not the capability approach’s only response to situations in which an 
individual is impeded from acquiring basic capabilities.  I have already argued that 
although resources do play an important role in the capability approach, due to their 
instrumental nature, resources can never be sufficient for ensuring capabilities.  I will 
now argue that “institutions should distribute more resources” is not the capability 
approach’s only response to deprivation.  To suggest otherwise – as Pogge does – is to 
misrepresent the approach.     
 While the capability approach holds that resource distribution alone is not 
sufficient for achieving a basic level of functioning regardless of one’s gender, the case is 
most clear when considering some of the extra-institutional obstacles faced by women 
and girls.  The capability approach recognizes that a woman’s ability to achieve valuable 
functionings is greatly diminished in a culturally sexist society in which, despite formal 
access to legal rights and resources, she is considered – even by herself – to be a second 
class citizen.  This is true for a number of complex reasons.  These reasons include not 
only “institutional” factors like access to resources and unequal treatment from 
institutions, but also “extra-institutional” factors like cultural practices, values and norms 
that result in relatively low bargaining power in both the private and the public sphere, 
and in turn a low sense of self-worth for women.  Consider the story of Vasanti, a woman 
who felt trapped in an abusive marriage, which Nussbaum shares:   
Like many women, she seems to have thought that abuse 
was painful and bad, but still a part of women’s lot in life, 
just something women have to put up with as part of being 
women dependent on men, and entailed by having left her 
own family to move into her husband’s home.  The idea 
that it was a violation of rights, of law, of justice, and that 
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she herself has rights that are being violated by her 
husband’s conduct – these ideas she did not have at the 
time, and many women all over the world don’t have them 
now.104 
Sen has also provided good reasons to believe that many women are conditioned to 
expect less from life than men in similar circumstances.  Many women have made mental 
adjustments as a result of social influences that underplay their needs relative to the needs 
of different members of the family.  A survey of widows and widowers, carried out by 
the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Singur near Calcutta, in 1944, one 
year after the Bengal Famine of 1943, illustrates this phenomenon.  The survey included 
questions on the perception of one’s own health, in addition to medical examination by 
doctors.  The results were as follows: 
In answer to the question as to whether or not they were 
‘ill’ or in ‘indifferent’ health, 48.5 per cent of the widowers 
(men, that is) confided to being thus afflicted, while the 
corresponding proportion of widows was merely 2.5 per 
cent.  The contrast is even more interesting when we look 
at the response to the question as to whether one was in 
‘indifferent’ health, leaving out the category of being ‘ill’ 
for which some clear-cut medical criteria do exist.  45.6 per 
cent of the widowers confessed to having the perception of 
being in indifferent health.  In contrast, the proportion of 
the widows who had that perception was—it is reported—
exactly zero!105 
104 Nussbaum, 2000. pp. 112 – 13. 
 
105 Sen, Amartya.  Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press.  1999. (Here, p. 53.)  See also 
his Chapter Two:  Adaptive Preference and Women’s Options.  (pp. 111 - 66.) 
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The results of this survey reveal that many women are unaccustomed, if not unable, to 
consider their own needs as important.  Thus, even when granted formal access to rights, 
or a certain distribution of resources, too many women do not feel that they are worthy of 
taking advantage of them. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in a patriarchal society, a woman who has formal 
access to basic resources like food may not have the capacity to be well nourished due to 
some formal or extra-institutional factor.  For example, some cultural norm – that she 
herself may subscribe to as normal and proper – may require her to tolerate physical or 
sexual abuse within marriage, or to give the majority of the household’s food to her 
husband or other male relatives.  Providing such a woman with legal access to bodily 
protection (police) or divorce from an abusive spouse, or legal or even physical access to 
additional food may do very little to alter her capability set (the set of freedoms she 
actually enjoys).  As long as she lacks the psychological and/or social power to reject the 
norms that dictate that her husband can do what he wants with her body, or that he is 
more important and therefore more deserving of the majority of the food, she will lack 
the capabilities of bodily integrity and the capability to be well-nourished.  Likewise, a 
relatively “wealthy” woman who enjoys an opulent life by most standards may not have 
the capabilities necessary to live what capability theorist would consider a life of human 
dignity due to restrictive gender-biased norms.   
Formal access to greater shares of formal institutional schemes will not benefit 
women who lack genuine access due to social or cultural norms, including norms that she 
herself has internalized.  The capability approach recognizes that the women in these 
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situations need more than a greater share of institutional distributed resources.  
Consequently, the capability approach holds that resources (including income) are neither 
the only nor the best remedy for all situations.   
The capability approach, properly understood, recognizes that expanding a 
person’s capability set often requires more than institutional distributions of resources 
and that people need not be mere passive recipients of institutional resource distributions.  
Again, as discussed in Chapter Two, the concept of individual agency is central to Sen’s 
capability approach.  Recall that, although capabilities are unavoidably linked to 
resources and institutions, agency goes beyond these basic resources to remove 
unfreedoms by working to alter the sort of extra-institutional attitudes and cultural 
practices that result in gender inequalities, and in turn the low estimation of (self) worth 
of women.  Women empowered as agents are not simply passive recipients of the 
benefits of institutional distribution schemes.  Rather they are empowered to question 
extra institutional factors, such as current social values and cultural practices, that limit 
freedom and to act to bring about changes in their own lives and their cultures.  As Sen 
explains:  
In terms of the medieval distinction between the ‘patient’ 
and the ‘agent,’ this freedom-centered understanding of 
economics and the process of development is very much an 
agent-oriented view.  With adequate social opportunities, 
individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help 
each other.  They need not be seen primarily as passive 
recipients of cunning development programs.  There is 
instead a strong rationale for recognizing the positive role 
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of free and sustainable agency—and even of constructive 
impatience.106 
As I explain more fully in Chapter Five, although she rejects Sen’s agency well-
being/distinction, Nussbaum agrees with Sen that individuals must be able to actively 
“shape their own destiny.”  One of her ten central capabilities is practical reason, which 
calls for “being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life.”107 Moreover, Nussbaum makes it clear that capabilities 
represent opportunities that individuals actively choose when they achieve functionings.  
She sees this understanding of individuals as active choosers (or agents) – as opposed to 
passive recipients of resources – as an essential part of the capability approach upon 
which she and Sen agree:   
When we think of health, for example, we should 
distinguish between the capability or opportunity to be 
healthy and the actual healthy functioning:  a society might 
make the first available and also give individuals the 
freedom not to choose the relevant functioning.  But I am 
not sure that any extra clarity is added by using a well-
being/agency distinction here:  healthy functioning is itself 
a way of being active, not just a passive state of 
satisfaction….Sen would surely agree with this.108 
106 Sen, 1999, p. 11. 
 
107 Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 78 – 79. See Chapter Five of my project for a complete list of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities.  
 
108 Nussbaum, 2000. p. 14.  
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Thus, for Nussbaum (as for Sen) simply having rights and access to resources is not 
enough.  The capability approach, properly understood, requires not only that the 
individual receive the resources necessary to achieve a basic level of functioning, but also 
that she actively recognize herself as a bearer of rights, worthy of an equal share of 
resources, and thereby empowered – not simply to receive resources – but to choose a
lifestyle she values.  Such empowerment is an essential aspect of the capability approach.  
Pogge fails to recognize this when he limits the approach to a simple call for the 
distribution of resources.   
 
4. “The Relevant Difference”  
It is not entirely clear why Pogge fails to even mention the essential role of individual 
empowerment either in terms of Sen’s agency, or Nussbaum’s robust role of active 
choice in capabilities, or even her essential capability of practical reason.  He 
acknowledges that the capability approach recognizes the many complex ways in which 
various personal heterogeneities, including gender, can influence an individual’s 
capability set (real opportunities) and in turn her well being.  Moreover, he clearly 
recognizes not only that extra-institutional factors (for example, culturally sexist values 
and practices,) influence the well-being of individuals, but also that accounting for such 
factors is important to Sen and Nussbaum:  “Offensive correlations need not manifest 
inherent injustice of an institutional order.  They may instead be caused by prevalent 
cultural practices and attitudes, and are often so caused as Sen and Nussbaum have 
shown so effectively.”109 He even refers specifically to “the very great contributions Sen 
 
109 Pogge, p. 11. 
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and Nussbaum have made toward spreading awareness of the economic injustices 
inflicted specifically upon women and girls.”110 
However, oddly enough, Pogge never connects either Sen’s or Nussbaum’s work 
on gender empowerment to his representation of the capability approach.  Instead he 
misrepresents the approach by restricting its scope to a too narrow evaluation of 
alternative institutional resources distribution schemes.  That is, he fails to recognize that 
empowerment issues related to gender relations and other social relations found within 
formal institutional and extra-institutional social systems are part and parcel of the 
capability approach.  What is worse, he incorrectly charges that “the capability approach 
may even weaken the feminist cause by suggesting – falsely – that women’s terrible and 
disproportionate suffering in most of this world is due to their being insufficiently 
compensated for their inferior natural endowments.”111 
I believe that it is Pogge’s misunderstanding of the capability approach that leads 
him to find the resourcism offers a superior response to the fact that women suffer more 
than men.  According to Pogge: 
Women’s suffering in the world as it is does not result from 
social institutions being insufficiently sensitive to the 
special needs arising from their different natural 
constitution.  Rather, it overwhelmingly results from 
institutional schemes and cultural practices being far too 
sensitive to their biological difference by making sex the 
basis for all kinds of social (legal and cultural) exclusions 
and disadvantages.  Women and girls have a powerful 
 
110 Pogge, p. 24. 
 
111 Pogge, p. 24. 
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justice claim to the removal of these barriers, to equal 
treatment (in a resourcist sense).  If these barriers were 
removed, if our social institutions assured women of equal 
and equally effective civil and political rights, of equal 
opportunities, of equal pay for equal work, women could 
thrive fully even without any special breaks and 
considerations.112 
The upshot of Pogge’s consideration of situations relating to gender differences seems to 
be that if institutions are just, which for Pogge seems to require providing equal treatment 
“in a resourcist sense” (which is most probably equal resource distributions) to men and 
women, then extra-institutional factors such as cultural attitudes and practices will simply 
dissolve on their own.  Pogge does not explain how simply adjusting institutions will 
allow women to thrive or any of the challenges cultural attitudes and practices may pose 
either to institutional adjustments or to women’s thriving.  Presumably, Pogge holds that 
the official recognition of a woman’s equal worth will lead to a cultural recognition of 
her worth not only in the public sphere, but also in the private sphere, and even in her 
own mind.   
 Pogge’s position is clearly at odds with the capability approach, which holds that 
official institutional recognition is only one important part of the empowerment of 
women.113 I do not, however, discuss this at length in this chapter.  My present task is 
 
112 Ibid.  
 
113 It may be worth noting that there is good reason for women to prefer a system in which treatment is fair, 
but not necessarily equal in Pogge’s “resourcist sense” (which seems to hold that the best way to treat men 
and women equally is to treat all females like males).  Such a fair system would be able to account for 
genuine and relevant biological differences through special considerations like maternity leave and the real 
dangers of rape and domestic violence women face, without limiting female access to, for example, 
education, or property ownership.  Moreover, the system Pogge seems to favor runs the risk of eliminating 
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not to settle any disagreements between the two approaches, but to demonstrate how 
Pogge has misrepresented the capability approach.  I do, however, discuss in Chapter Six, 
the capability approach’s ability to address issues of social power as they relate to 
empowerment.  For our present purposes it suffices to say that with regard to issues 
related to gender differences and other personal heterogeneities Pogge’s position is that 
the institutional schemes required by the resourcist are “no less able to address most of 
the important deprivations and inequalities that so disfigure our world.”114 
Pogge considers both the capability approach and the resourcist approach capable 
of accounting for the vast majority of deprivations that result from what Sen calls 
“personal heterogeneities.”  For this reason he considers the vast majority of such 
personal heterogeneities irrelevant when deciding which approach is superior.  Rather, 
the significant issue for Pogge’s evaluation is the issue he claims the two approaches 
disagree about: how to account for the remaining “pure” personal heterogeneities, or as 
he rephrases it: “how institutional schemes are to respond to natural human diversity,
with the reminder that such natural human diversity may arise from any combination of 
ordinary genetic variations, self-caused factors, and differential luck.”115 
5. Natural Human Diversities 
To sum up, it seems that we can arrive at Pogge’s discussion of natural human diversity 
in three steps:  He (1) erroneously limits the capability approach, like the resource 
 
not only harmful cultural practices but also rich cultural practices, that, upon reflection, cultures have good 
reason to value.  By empowering individuals and cultures to makes these decisions for themselves, the 
capability approach does not run this risk.  
 
114 Pogge, p. 33. 
 
115 Pogge, p. 33. Emphasis original.  
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approach, to be a (mere) system for deciding how institutions should distribute resources.  
He then (2) claims that there is a great deal of agreement, albeit for different reasons, 
among the capability approach and the resource approach about how the vast majority of 
individuals should be treated.  That is, Pogge claims the two approaches agree on who 
should get what shares of resources, even if they disagree about why they should get 
them.  Finally, in light of the vast agreement Pogge finds in (2), he (3) claims that the 
relevant difference between the two approaches is simply a matter of how each approach 
looks to distribute resources in view of the conversion rates that stem from what Pogge 
calls natural human diversity. As Pogge puts it, the significant differences between the 
two approaches boil down to this: “Capability theorists assert, while resourcists deny, 
that a public criterion of social justice [that is, just institutional schemes]should take 
account of the individual rates at which persons with diverse physical and mental 
constitutions can convert resources into valuable functionings.”116 Thus, according to 
Pogge, the “intended role” of the capability approach is the “compensatory fine-tuning of 
the distribution of resources so as to take account of persons’ vertically diverse capacities 
to convert resources into valuable functionings.”117 
As mentioned above, Pogge is correct that the capability approach holds both that 
resource distribution can and does influence the functionings individuals enjoy, and that 
resource distribution should reflect individual citizens’ diverse capacities to convert 
resources into valuable functionings.  However, he is wrong to suggest that resource 
distribution is the only way to influence the functionings individuals achieve.  In making 
such a suggestion, he fails to account for the role of active empowerment, which is an 
 
116 Pogge, p. 2. Emphasis original. 
 
117 Pogge, p. 59. 
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essential aspect of the capability approach.  Moreover, I submit that the role of what 
Pogge calls natural human diversity within the capability approach is confused and serves 
only to further misrepresent the approach.    
 The capability approach both for Sen (through his requirement that individuals 
have equal access to “basic capabilities”118), and for Nussbaum (through her list of 
central capabilities for human functionings), requires that individuals are equally entitled 
to a certain threshold, or level of capability.119 However, in his consideration of natural 
human diversity, Pogge confuses the limited set of diverse human needs and abilities that 
are relevant to an individual’s ability to achieve a certain level of basic capability that 
either Sen or Nussbaum would require, with the very large set of physical and mental 
differences that occur between human beings – no matter how irrelevant the difference 
may be to a person’s ability to achieve a reasonable threshold of basic or central 
functionings.  This mistake leads Pogge to make the bizarre and misguided claim that the 
capability approach requires not only the vertical ranking of each and every physical and 
mental feature – from suffering from a severe inborn disability to having freckles – but 
also the vertical ranking of each and every individual person in a society based on the 
features they possess.  
Pogge incorrectly holds that the capability theorist uses a very messy system 
which requires the listing and ranking all of the capabilities that a community is to value.  
According to Pogge: “Using a list of capabilities in this way involves grading all of the 
 
118 As discussed in Chapter One, basic capability can be defined as “the ability to satisfy certain elementary 
and crucially important functionings up to certain levels.” (Sen, Inequality, p. 46. n. 19.)  
 
119Pogge describe accounts that employ thresholds, like the capability approach (properly understood), as a 
sufficientarian, “which assess any institutional order by the extent to which its treatment of any of its 
participants avoidably falls below some threshold (however defined). On such a view, an institutional order 
could be perfectly just even while it generates vast inequalities above the threshold.”  (Pogge, p. 8.) 
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citizens for their natural aptitudes towards each of the capabilities on the list, determining 
their specific deficits, and ensuring that these deficits are duly neutralized through 
suitable compensatory benefits.”120 Pogge erroneously asserts that capability theorist 
insists on understanding all natural human diversity as vertical.121 According to Pogge, 
the capability theorist ranks all sorts of variations between human beings, for example 
being blind, having green eyes, being tall, being quadriplegic, being bald, having a good 
singing voice, being intelligent, and so on, as better or worse properties.   
Pogge claims that capability approach affirms certain institutional orders that give 
greater shares to some people, but not to others based on their rankings of these diverse 
attributes.  In so doing, the approach (as Pogge represents it) is claiming that the natural 
endowments of some are and “should be characterized as deficient and inferior, and those 
persons naturally disfavored and worse endowed – not just in this or that respect, but 
overall – not just in the eyes of this or that observer, but in the eyes of the shared public 
criterion of social justice.”122 As Pogge (mis)understands it, the capability approach 
ranks each and every citizen as better and worse off according to the capabilities they 
have by virtue of natural diversity, and then designs or fine-tunes an institutional order 
that distributes goods in an attempt to even the playing field – not just between the 
severely deprived and those free to live a life they have reason to value, or to achieve 
human flourishing, but between the hairy and the bald, the blue and brown eyed, the short 
and the tall, and so forth.  
 
120 Pogge, p. 59. 
 
121 See Pogge. pp. 52 – 57. 
 
122 Pogge, p. 54. 
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Pogge is wrong to suggest that (1) the capability approach requires the vertical 
ranking and evaluation of each and every element of natural human diversity, (2) the 
approach requires the vertical ranking of all individuals in terms of their natural human 
diversity, and (3) it is the job of the capability theorist to strictly dictate what capabilities 
a community will value.  Given the sufficientarian nature of the capability approach, and 
some key aspects of the valuation processes Sen and Nussbaum require (discussed 
presently), the vertical ranking system Pogge describes is simply not a valuation process 
that either scholar could accept.  I believe that Pogge’s misrepresentation of valuation 
within the capability approach is closely linked to both his restricting of the capability 
approach to a simple call for the distribution of resources, and to his failure to represent 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of individual empowerment. 
 Contrary to Pogge’s suggestion, the capability approach does not recognize 
citizens as merely dependent on an institutional order that not only provides resources, 
but also dictates what capabilities individuals should value.  Rather, (as quoted above,) 
Sen’s capability approach holds that:  “With adequate social opportunities, individuals 
can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other.  They need not be seen 
primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs.  There 
is a strong rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency.”123 
On this view, individual agents choose to value and work to achieve certain functionings 
over others.  Individual agents within communities and not (simply) outside capability 
theorists establish a shared criteria of social justice and determine the value of various 
freedoms and unfreedoms that reflect their cultural context through “public discussion 
 
123 Sen, 1999.  p. 11. 
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and a democratic understanding and acceptance” within their communities.124 
Empowered as agents, stakeholders question, assess, and reform the institutional order in 
the name of justice.  The role of agency in the process of valuation (the process of 
choosing and working to achieve the functionings one has reason value) is an essential 
aspect of Sen’s version of the capability approach.  
Nussbaum also requires that citizens have an active role in determining what 
freedoms they value both as individuals and as a community.  Nussbaum’s version of the 
capability approach promotes a list of ten essential capabilities including several 
capabilities that protect and promote empowerment.  Consider for example: practical 
reason: the ability to “form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s own life” and control over one’s political environment:
“being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life.”125 
Nussbaum’s list is essential to her version of the capability approach in that “a life that 
lacks one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, will fall short of being a good 
human life.”126 Yet, (as I explore in detail in Chapter Five) the capabilities that appear on 
the list are deliberately general “to leave room for plural specification.”127 
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach takes a serious step towards 
defining a criterion of social justice in prescribing a list of ten general capabilities and in 
holding that this list should be constitutionally enshrined.  However, Nussbaum does not 
 
124 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen. India: Development and Participation. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. 
2002.  (Here, p. 79.) 
 
125 Nussbaum, Martha. Sex and Social Justice. Oxford University Press. 1999.  (Here, pp. 41- 42.)  
 
126 Nussbaum, 1999. p. 42. 
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prescribe a specific public criterion of social justice that can be manifested in a particular 
institutional order.  Rather, she relies on individual citizen participation to establish 
institutional schemes that reflect their community values both in specifying the 
capabilities required by her list and in moving beyond the list (once all have at least the 
listed capabilities).  As she writes: 
[P]art of the idea of the list is its multiple realizability:  its 
members can be more concretely specified in accordance 
with local beliefs and circumstances…The threshold level 
of each of the central capabilities will need more precise 
determination, as citizens work toward a consensus for 
political purposes.  This can be envisioned as taking place 
within each constitutional tradition, as it evolves through 
interpretation and deliberation.128 
Thus, as I examine in some detail in subsequent chapters, there appears to be 
some disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum about the details of the valuation process 
within the capability approach.129 Sen holds that no specific list of capabilities should be 
required for constitutions, but that valuation is a process undertaken by individual agents 
who democratically decide what capabilities should be valued as part of a basic threshold 
within their communities.  Nussbaum holds that some form of a list of basic capabilities 
should be constitutionally enshrined to ensure that everyone meets a minimum threshold 
of capability, but that citizens should exercise their practical reason and control over their 
political environment to interpret and deliberate the concrete specifications and precise 
 
128 Nussbaum, 2000, p. 77. 
 




capability thresholds of any list.  It is important to note that both Nussbaum and Sen 
agree that the capability approach considers individuals as more than passive recipients of 
the benefits and requires individual participation in the process of valuation of 
capabilities and establishing a full fledged criterion of social justice.  
Pogge’s failure to account for the essential aspects of individual empowerment, or 
agency, and in turn, the capability approach’s valuation process is very problematic.  I 
have already discussed one reason that Pogge might not account for valuation and the 
essential aspects of agency or practical reason, namely, his understanding of the 
capability approach as a mere institutional resource distributor.  However, Pogge might 
also claim that he chooses not to consider the valuation processes in Sen and Nussbaum 
in an effort to leave aside “internal diversities” found within the capability approach.130 
But avoiding the internal debate between Sen and Nussbaum about the role of 
empowerment in the valuation of capabilities by ignoring the valuation process 
altogether, is like keeping the bath water clean by leaving out the baby.   
The valuation process, including the enhancement of empowerment-related 
capabilities, is essential to the capability approach.  In failing to represent any valuation 
process Pogge fails to represent adequately the capability approach.  Moreover, it seems 
Pogge is led to misrepresent the approach by inserting his own messy vertical ranking 
method of valuation.  In focusing on institutional distributions of resources and 
neglecting the role of agency, Pogge overlooks an additional means of enhancing 
capabilities and removing unfreedoms.  He also fails to recognize that communities 
themselves, and not (simply) outside capability theorists, work to establish specific public 
criteria of social justice.   
 
130 Pogge, p. 17.  
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Pogge fails to recognize that the capability approach is deliberately open when it comes 
to determining the value of capabilities in order to allow for the participation of 
individual agents in the valuation process.   
Unlike the capability approach Pogge describes, the capability approach properly 
understood, does not provide (and would not accept) the type of specific top down 
vertical-ranking public criterion of social justice that Pogge depicts.  A proper 
understanding of (both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of) the capability approach 
recognizes that it is not up to the capability theorist but to individual communities to 
produce a specific public criterion of social justice.  The valuation system that Pogge 
describes is so misrepresentative of the capability approach that neither Sen nor 
Nussbaum could endorse a view that claimed it.   
 
Conclusion 
I have shown that Pogge (1) fails to fully represent the role of capabilities as 
intrinsically valuable opportunities, (2) fails to acknowledge the role of individual 
empowerment as he wrongly limits the capability approach to a mere resource 
distribution system, and (3) misrepresents the capability approach in attributing a vertical 
ranking of all properties of natural human diversity.  In light of these failures, I conclude 
that Pogge’s representation of the approach is so deeply flawed that his essay concerns 
not the capability approach, but a mere misrepresentation of the approach that neither Sen 
nor Nussbaum could endorse.  Consequently, I claim Pogge’s conclusion that the 
capability approach cannot be justified, is – at best – irrelevant to a healthy discussion of 
how the capability approach relates to other approaches within development.  
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Chapter Four 
Empowerment Concepts in Sen’s Version of the Capability Approach 
Understanding the agency role is thus central to recognizing people as responsible 
persons: not only are we well or ill, but also we act or refuse to act, and we can choose to 
act one way rather than another. 
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999.
Introduction 
In Chapters One and Two, I argued that the capability approach to international 
development in general, and its concept of empowerment in particular, are superior to 
that of the traditionally and still dominant economic growth approach.  In Chapter Three, 
I argued that Thomas Pogge’s failure to recognize the important role that empowerment 
plays within the capability approach leads him to misrepresent the approach, and in turn 
to the unjustified conclusion that the Rawlsian resourcist approach is superior to the 
capability approach.  In the present chapter and in Chapter Five, I consider the role of 
empowerment within the capability approach in greater detail.   
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Pioneer capability theorists Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum both recognize 
empowerment as an important aspect of ethically-based human development, even if they 
do not explicitly use the term or subject it to critical analysis.131 They seem to disagree, 
however, about how empowerment should be represented within the capability approach.  
Both Sen and Nussbaum use various, often technical, concepts to connote human 
empowerment (including agency, choice, practical reason, opportunity, freedom, and 
many others).   
Two concepts that connote empowerment, “agency” and “freedom,” play 
prominent roles in much of Sen’s recent work on the capability approach.132 These 
concepts, which I first introduced in Chapter One, are shaped by two cross-cutting 
distinctions central to his approach: (1) the distinction between agency and well-being, 
and (2) the distinction between freedom and achievement.  Although Nussbaum 
recognizes that “the concepts introduced by these distinctions are important,” she does 
not endorse the distinctions.  Instead, she claims that “all the important distinctions can 
be captured as aspects of the capability/function distinction.”133 This claim has led some 
scholars to question whether or not Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach can 
 
131 In 2005 (at a workshop in Cortona, Italy) I had the opportunity to ask Amartya Sen about the fact that 
the term “empowerment” does not appear in the index of many of his major works (including: Development 
as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York. 1999; Inequality Reexamined. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992; 
Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002). The term “empowerment” 
does appear (with numerous entries) in the index of India: Development and Participation. 2nd ed. (Oxford 
University Press. 2002, which he co-authored with Jean Drèze), interestingly, “empowerment” does not 
always appear in the text noted within the index.  Sen explained that although he (and Drèze) may not have 
often used the term “empowerment,” he believes the concept of empowerment is and always has been at 
work in his approach to development.  The term “empowerment” is also absent from the index of Martha 
C. Nussbaum’s major works on this topic (including: Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach. Cambridge University Press.  Cambridge. 2000; Sex and Social Justice. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford. 1999, and Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership. The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. 2006.) 
 
132 See: Sen. 1992, and 1999.  
 
133 See: Nussbaum, 2000. (Here p. 14). 
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properly account for human empowerment, and, in some cases, to conclude that her 
approach is significantly flawed by comparison to Sen’s account.134 
In this chapter I analyze some of the fundamental concepts and structure of Sen’s 
version of the capability approach.  I identify and explain the influence of this deep 
structure on the role of empowerment and related concepts in his account.  I begin by 
presenting and critically engaging Sen’s key distinctions and the empowerment concepts 
found within his account.  I consider several agency related concepts that appear in Sen’s 
account and observe that although most of the concepts allow for helpful distinctions, one 
of them (namely, realized agency success,) is problematically broad.  I conclude with the 
observation that Sen’s version of the capability approach can be helpfully understood as 
offering two fundamental and very useful conceptions of empowerment: (1) agency and 
(2) capability-set expansion.  
In Chapter Five, I continue my consideration of the role of empowerment with the 
capability approach as I introduce and examine the role of empowerment in Nussbaum’s 
version of the capability approach.  I make comparisons with Sen’s approach as presented 
in this chapter when appropriate.  I engage the debate about whether or not Nussbaum’s 
version of the capability approach can properly account for human empowerment and the 
related claim that her view may be flawed by comparison to Sen’s account.  I conclude 
that various valuable empowerment concepts – especially the concepts of agency and 
capability set expansion – play a robust role in both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of 
the capability approach.  I further suggest that many – but not all – of the differences in 
 
134 See: David A. Crocker.  Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapters 5 and 6.  See also Robeyns’s 
mention of the different concepts of agency in Sen and Nussbaum in Ingrid Robeyns. “The Capability 
Approach: A Theoretical Survey.” In Journal of Human Development. Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005. 
Routledge. (pp. 93 – 114.  Here, p. 105.) 
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the representation of empowerment on the two versions are more a matter of style than of 
substance.   
 
1. Sen’s Key Distinctions and Concepts 
There are two cross-cutting distinctions at the heart of Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach:  (1) agency and well-being, and (2) freedom and achievement.  Table Four 
helps to illustrate the basic relationship between these distinctions and the important 
concepts they involve.    
 






Agency Achievement - the 
realization of goals and values 
a person chooses and has 
reason to pursue.  
 
Well-Being Achievement 
(Functionings) - the quality of the life 
an individual is living based on the 





Agency Freedom – the 
freedom to choose and bring 
about the achievements one 
has reason to value. 
 
Well-Being Freedom (Capabilities) - 
the freedom to achieve the beings and 
doings that are constitutive of one’s 
well-being.  
 
135 My Table Four is adapted from David A. Crocker’s “Figure 1.”  See: Crocker.  2008.   
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Sen distinguishes between two dimensions of each person that he understands to be 
related but irreducible: “the agency aspect” and “the well-being aspect.”136 Each of these 
dimensions calls for respect (sometimes in the form of aid and/or protection) from 
institutions and individuals.  Sen also distinguishes between the achievement dimension 
and the freedom dimension of both agency and well-being.  Thus, the two cross-cutting 
distinctions of agency and well-being, and achievement and freedom, provide four 
important concepts: (1) agency achievement, (2) well-being achievement, (3) agency 
freedom, and (4) well-being freedom.   
As discussed in previous chapters, a person’s agency achievement is “the 
realization of goals and values she has reason to pursue.”137 Well-being achievement, 
often called “functioning,” refers to the quality (wellness) or “personal advantage,” or 
“personal well-fare,” of the life an individual is currently living, where her life is 
understood in terms of achieved beings and doings.  Of course, if one is poor or 
oppressed, her well-being achievement will reflect ill-being.  In Sen’s more technical 
writings on the capability approach, a person’s well-being achievement is sometimes 
described as the vector of her interrelated beings and doings.138 
Agency freedom, also discussed in previous chapters, is “one’s freedom to bring 
about the achievements one values and which one attempts to produce.”139 Although 
agency freedom is concerned with the freedom of the individual, Sen recognizes that this 
freedom is “inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political, and economic 
 




138 Ibid. p. 39.  
 
139 Ibid. p. 57.  
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opportunities that are available to us.”140 Well-being freedom, often called “capability,” is 
the freedom to achieve the beings and doings (or alternate lifestyles) that are constitutive 
of one’s personal well-being, that is, one’s “personal advantage.”141 In what follows, I 
provide a deeper analysis of agency freedom and agency achievement than that found in 
earlier chapters, and introduce and discuss the concepts of well-being freedom and well-
being achievement and their relationship to empowerment.   
 
2. Agency Freedom and Agency Achievements 
As explained in Chapter Two, a person’s agency achievement is her “success in 
the pursuit of the totality of her considered goals and objectives”142 whatever they may 
be: including being well-nourished, owning a sports car, having her children’s lives go 
well, protecting the environment, or even the demise of her enemies.  The achievement of 
these goals may enhance or even diminish one’s own well-being.  However, the goals 
must be ones that an individual autonomously chooses to pursue, and not simply the 
goals of others – even if others happen to have the same goal.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the capability approach is concerned with an individual’s empowerment in the form 
of agency in all the public and private spheres of life, and not only the economic sphere 
or other public spheres.  
On Sen’s account, “agency success” occurs when agency objectives are achieved.  
Sen distinguishes between (1) Realized Agency Success, and (2) Instrumental Agency 
Success. Realized agency success occurs whenever a person’s objectives are realized 
 
140 Sen, 1999. pp. xi – xii. 
 
141 Sen, 1992. p. 57. 
 
142 Ibid. p. 56. 
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whether or not she plays any role whatsoever in their achievement.  Instrumental agency 
success, by contrast, is obtained only when an individual plays some role in bringing 
about the realization of her agency objectives.143 
Suppose, for example, that my agency objectives include an end to violence in 
country A as well as an end to the unrelated violence in country B, and that I am involved 
in the peace process for country A, but not for country B. Suppose further, that violence 
in both country A and in country B does end.  On Sen’s account, realized agency success 
has occurred with regard to my agency objectives for both A and B. When determining 
my realized agency success, it does not matter to Sen whether or not I played any role in 
bringing about the achievements.  Instrumental agency success, on the other hand, has 
occurred only with regard to Country A, where I was involved in purposively bringing 
about an end to the violence.  Instrumental agency success is a subset of realized agency 
success.144 This distinction allows Sen to recognize formally the important difference 
between having one’s objectives realized and participating in the realization of one’s own 
objectives.145 
Instrumental agency success is clearly a measure of one’s success as an agent. 
Sen is right to recognize this concept of empowerment as a form of agency achievement.  
However, Sen also seems to recognize all instances of realized agency success as agency 
achievement.146 I think this is a mistake.  I believe that instrumental agency success 
 
143 See: Crocker (2008) Chapter 5 for a criticism of this distinction and his alternative of direct and indirect 
agency both of which involve effort and action on the part of the agent.  
 
144 As illustrated on Figure One: Sen’s Agency Concepts at the end of this chapter (p. 121).    
 
145 For more on this distinction see Sen, 1992 p. 58. 
 
146 I am not aware of a place where Sen explicitly claims that all realized agency success is agency 
achievement.  However, the terminology (“agency success”) and his general treatment of the concept 
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reflects agency.  I also believe, however, that outcomes of processes in which an 
individual is not a purposive causal factor in any way are not measures of her success as
an agent, and should not be considered agency achievements or considered instances of 
realized agency success.147 
In contrast, Sen’s account suggests, for example, that if my agency objectives 
include having chocolate cake for dessert and by pure coincidence you bake a chocolate 
cake for my dessert, then the conditions for what Sen calls my “realized agency success” 
are met.  On this account, the conditions for my realized agency success are met even if I 
am not in any way involved with achieving the objective.  For example, if you baked the 
cake, not by coincidence, but to please someone else, or by some mistake (suppose you 
wanted to make carrot cake, but used the wrong cake mix).  Even if you make the cake in 
hopes of frustrating my agency objectives, if for example, you believe I am dieting and 
want to avoid desserts, or that I am allergic to chocolate, Sen would consider this an 
instance of my “realized agency success.”   
It is difficult to understand why Sen suggests that this event should be considered 
a measure of my agency success or achievement and not simply my well-being or some 
other sort of achievement.  It is, after all, the achievement of my goal, but by someone 
else’s agency. The event in no way reflects any power I have.  Nevertheless, the 
chocolate cake situations described above clearly meet Sen’s standard for my realized 
 
(1992, pp. 56 – 66) suggests that he considers all instances of realized agency success to be agency 
achievements.   
 
147 Figure One, found at the end of this chapter (p. 121), may be useful in illustrating this point.  
Instrumental agency success and effective agency success (discussed below) are subsets of rational agency 
success that reflect agency.  The spotted area represents what Sen calls “realized agency success” that does 
not reflect agency. 
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agency success: my agency objective was achieved “irrespective of the part I manage to 
personally play in bringing about the achievement.”148 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, agency freedom is the freedom individuals have to 
choose and realize the objectives they value and pursue.  To have more agency freedom 
is to have “more opportunity to achieve those things that we value, and have reason to 
value.”149 Sen distinguishes between this opportunity aspect of freedom, which is 
“concerned primarily with our ability to achieve” and the process aspect of freedom 
which is concerned primarily with “the processes through which that achievement comes 
about.”150 
Control freedom, the ability to achieve objectives by making influential decisions 
and directly controlling the levers of change, is the most robust form of opportunity 
freedom.  Control over resources is significantly different from having access to 
resources.151 A woman who lives in a nice house and is given plenty to eat and a lot of 
nice clothes to wear may not be free to choose how to dress, or to invite others to her 
home for a meal.  Furthermore, she may even be denied access to these resources upon 
the death of her husband.  Such a woman has (at least limited) access to resources, but 
not control over them.   
This is not to suggest, however, that more freedom to control directly the objects 
and events in our lives is always better.  For example, I am free to access the resources of 
 
148 Sen, 1992. p. 58. 
 
149 Sen, Amartya. Rationality and Freedom. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 




151 For more on the distinction between access and control see: March, Candida, Ines Smyth, and Maitrayee 
Mukhopadhyay. A Guide to Gender Analysis Frameworks. Oxfam GB.  Sen’s work is certainly compatible 
with this valuable distinction, but I am not aware of any place in which he emphasizes it. 
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the international postal system, which I use to send letters across the globe.  I do not, 
however, have or want direct control over the international postal system.  My life would 
not be better off if I had countless decisions to make about how my letters are collected, 
routed, and delivered, or who will carry each of my letters, and how the mail carriers 
should be accommodated and compensated.  Sen rightly recognizes that such an increase 
in my options would not enhance my agency.   
Expanding my trivial options (for example, by giving me the option of deciding 
whether my letter will leave Washington DC via. Dulles International Airport, Baltimore-
Washington International Airport, or Ronald Reagan International Airport), as opposed to 
opportunities that we have reason to value, “may be the result of misspecifying freedom 
by overlooking the loss of [the]option of leading a peaceful and unbothered life.”152 I am 
able to meet more of my agency objectives (including enhancing my well-being) because 
the international postal service, and not I, decides how to coordinate the many details 
involved in transporting my letter from Washington, DC to Kampala, Uganda.   
Thus, while control freedom is a valuable empowerment concept that (like 
instrumental agency success) can be used to identify and discuss a robust level of 
participation, more control, especially over trivial matters, is not necessarily empowering, 
but can diminish both our agency freedom and our well-being.  This example captures 
what David Crocker calls indirect agency.  Even though I do not control most of the links 
in the complex causal chain that takes my letter from Washington, DC to Kampala, 
Uganda the successful delivery of my letter is still the result of some action on my part (I 
address and post the letter) and also realizes my intention and is thereby an expression of 
 
152 Sen, 1992. p. 63. (Emphasis original.) 
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my agency.  Yet, it is not as direct an exercise of agency as personally hand delivering 
the letter.153 
Not only would it be a mistake to think that expanding the scope of our direct 
control always expands the set of freedoms we value, it would also be a mistake to think 
that our freedom to achieve our agency objectives is limited to what we can control 
directly.  Sen uses the concept of “effective freedom” to explain how opportunity 
freedom extends beyond what we ourselves can control directly:   
Many freedoms take the form of our ability to get what we 
value and want, without the levers of control being directly 
operated by us.  The controls are exercised in line with 
what we value and want (i.e., in line with our 
‘counterfactual decisions’—what we would choose), and in 
this sense gives us more power and more freedom to lead 
the lives that we would choose to lead.154 
Sen claims that effective freedom is closely related to his concept of realized agency 
success.  I submit that there are some significant differences between the two concepts.  
Like Sen’s realized agency success, effective freedom extends beyond the limits of our 
direct participation, and is said to be enhanced whether or not we play a controlling role 
in realizing our desired outcomes.  My effective freedom does not depend on any action 
from me beyond my having, and in some cases expressing, the goal.  However, unlike 
realized agency success, effective agency achievements cannot be a matter of pure 
coincidence or error; some elements of process are also important.  Effective freedom 
requires not only that (1) our objectives are achieved, but also that those who operate the 
 
153 See Crocker (2008) Chapter 5.  
 
154 Sen, 1992. p. 64.  (Emphasis original.) 
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levels of control do so (2) in line with what we would have chosen, and (3) because it is 
what we would have chosen.155 Honoring the wishes of a person expressed in his will 
after his death captures the spirit of Sen’s effective freedom as a meaningful 
empowerment concept.  When we honor an individual’s will, we take actions (for 
example, bury him in the family plot, scatter his ashes in the river by the bridge, provide 
for cousin Margaret’s education, let brother Oscar know how he really felt about him, and 
so forth), precisely because the actions are willed by the deceased – that is, because they 
are in line with what he would have wanted.   
Consider the chocolate cake example discussed above.  My effective agency 
freedom is enhanced if and only if you made chocolate cake because you knew it is what 
I would have chosen if the choice were mine to make and my having the intention is a 
reason for your action.  As Sen puts it: “As long as the levers of control are 
systematically exercised in line with what I would choose and for that exact reason, my 
‘effective freedom’ is uncompromised, though my ‘freedom of control’ may be limited or 
absent.”156 If you give me chocolate cake by chance or mistake, but not because I would 
have chosen it or actually intend to have it, my effective freedom is not enhanced despite 
the fact that my objective is achieved.  For Sen, such cases of coincidence or mistake are 
cases of realized agency success, but not effective freedom enhancement.  In such a case, 
my well-being might or might not be enhanced by eating the cake, but that is a separate 
(though not entirely unrelated) issue.    
 
155 Effective agency is akin to what Crocker calls indirect agency in Ethics and Global Development 
(2008). See especially, Chapter 5. 
 
156 Sen, 1992. p. 64 - 65. (Emphasis original.) 
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If you believe that I would chose tiramisu over chocolate cake (when I would in 
fact have chosen the cake), and for this reason prepare tiramisu, then my agency objective 
or intention is not realized (that is, there is no realized agency success) and my agency is 
not enhanced (there is no effective freedom).157 This is true even if I enjoy having the 
tiramisu as much as, or even more than, I would have enjoyed having the cake.  In a case 
where I wanted chocolate cake, but enjoyed the tiramisu, my well-being is enhanced, but 
not my agency.   
If you attempt to make chocolate cake because you know I would choose it, but 
fail (for example, the cake burns), then my agency objective is not achieved.  Yet, I 
submit that my agency does seem to be enhanced by your attempt to bring about my 
actual (not hypothetical) goal – or better, intention – on my behalf, if my intention is a 
reason for your action.  It is not clear what Sen would say about this.  Perhaps he would 
say that my goal of your working on my behalf is achieved, but not my goal of getting 
cake.  Sen’s position on theses issues is summarized below in Table Five.  
 
157 See: Sen, 1992. p. 67. n.14. 
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You give me cake, because 
I want it. 
 
Yes  Yes 
I want cake, and you give 




I want cake, but don’t get it. 
 
No No 
You work to provide cake, 




Perhaps, but only to the extent that my 
goal of your working on my behalf is 
realized 
 
To consider an example in a public policy context, suppose we want peace in Country B 
but are not in a position to choose or do anything to bring an end to the violence there.  If 
our representative works to establish peace in Country B, because she believes that it is 
what we want, then our agency freedom is enhanced by her actions and the resulting 
achievements that we value, and have reason to value.  This is so even if do not (or even 
cannot) play any role in the peace process ourselves.  This holds true whether we have 
acted to inform her of our desire for peace directly, or if she anticipates our desire 
without any direct action from us, for example, based on our expressed desire in a similar 
situation, or from general polls in which we did not personally participate.  Again, the 
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process is important here.  If someone works for peace, not because we would choose it, 
but only because she thinks a petroleum company in which she has a financial interest 
will make more money if there is peace, then our effective freedom is not enhanced.  She 
is not representing our actual interests or will.   
Thus far, I have discussed several interrelated empowerment concepts of Sen’s 
account in terms of their relationship with agency objectives.  I provide Table Six as a 
way of a summary of these concepts.  The table lists the concepts and their corresponding 
attainment using the peace example.  The concepts are ordered as I believe they 
increasingly relate to more and more robust empowerment.  Control freedom, the ability 
to achieve these objectives by directly controlling the levers of change, is the most robust 
of these concepts, followed by instrumental agency success, and then achievement 
realized by means of effective freedom.   
At the bottom of the table I list Sen’s “realized agency success,” which Sen 
describes as a measure of my agency “irrespective of the part I manage to personally play 
in bringing about the achievement.”158 I have argued that some forms of realized agency 
success are too weak to qualify as a type of agency, and, in turn, a concept of 
empowerment.  Indeed, I submit that Sen should not consider the satisfaction of an 
individual’s objectives which occur irrespective of any role of the individual an exercise 
of that individual’s agency.  Such achievements may enhance the individual’s well being, 
and may even be considered realizations of the individual’s agency objectives, but are not 
exercises of the individual’s agency.  Nevertheless, I include realized agency success on 
my table because the purpose of the table is to represent Sen’s account of agency 
concepts as he actually provides it, not as I wish he would.  
 
158 Sen, 1992. p. 58. 
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Table Six:  Sen’s Agency Concepts 
 





I want peace in country A.  I personally negotiate a cease-fire and 




I want peace in country A.  I play some role in securing peace.  For 
example, I start a campaign for peace, actively lobby politicians to 





I want peace in country A and because my representatives are aware 
that (I and others like me) want peace, a peace pact is negotiated 
and implemented. (Note: My will does not have to be the only 
motivating factor for peace, but it must be one of the motivating 





I want peace in country A.  Peace takes hold in country A 
irrespective of any role I have in bringing about peace. 
 
Up to this point I have focused on presenting and critically engaging the concepts Sen 
uses to address different ways in which agents can and do decide on and realize their 
objectives, that is, forms of agency achievements and agency freedom.  However, Sen’s 
account is concerned not only with what agents are free to realize (either through their 
direct control or through agency enhancing representatives, including institutions), but 
also with limitations and violations of agency freedom.  As Crocker explains: “I might be 
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an agent, but due to external coercion or internal compulsion at present I am not now free 
to choose or to achieve what I choose.”159  
Moreover, Sen makes it clear that his account holds that if a person is forced to 
perform an action that she would have performed voluntarily, she might get what she 
wants and thereby achieve her objective (that is, realize the desired functioning), but she 
is not acting as an agent due to a “violation of the process aspect of [her] freedom, since 
an action is being forced on her (even though it is an action she would have chosen 
freely).”160 For example, suppose I want Candidate X to be president and I planned to 
vote for her on Election Day.  Suppose further that on Election Day, I am confronted by 
armed Candidate X enthusiasts at the polls who force me to vote for Candidate X.  In this 
case my objective is successfully realized (I achieve the functioning of voting for 
Candidate X), but my agency is compromised.  The realization of the agency objective is 
disqualified as an agency achievement due to violations of the process aspect of 
freedom.161 
My well-being may be enhanced despite the violation of my agency, if for 
example, voting for Candidate X really meant a lot to me.  But, it is likely that any 
enhancement of my well-being will be offset (I am still glad I voted for Candidate X, but 
wish it did not happen this way) or even entirely outweighed (I wanted to vote for 
 
159 Crocker, 2008. Chapter 5.  
 
160 Amartya Sen. “Human Rights and Capabilities” in Journal of Human Development. Vol. 6, No. 2, July 
2005. Routledge. (pp. 151 – 166) (Here, p. 153). See also Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights,” Philosopjhy & Public Affairs, 32 (2004): 315-56. 
 
161 I am not aware of any place in which Sen addresses the issue directly, but his work on process freedom 
supports this claim. It is worth noting that the case discussed above is significantly different from a case of 
a subspecies of what he calls realized agency success in which an individual wants Candidate A to win the 
election and Candidate A does win, but the relevant individual plays no role whatsoever in electing 
Candidate A, not because of coercion or an unfair institutional process, but, for example, because she is not 
a member of the relevant community and is therefore not entitled to participate in the election.  
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Candidate X, but not like this), by the violations of my process freedom.  Or, to change 
my example from my voting for Candidate X to her winning the election: I may really 
want Candidate X to win the election, but I would rather her lose in a fair election, than 
win because of the unfair pressure exerted by armed enthusiasts. 
Violations of process freedom are not simply occasional events (like those 
brought about by armed zealots on Election Day), but can be products of oppressive 
social arrangements and a part of daily life.  Sen’s capability approach calls on those who 
design and implement public policies and development projects to work towards 
promoting, protecting, and restoring both agency freedom and well-being capabilities, or 
freedoms.  As Sen explains:  
Social arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, 
the market, the legal system, political parties, the media, 
public interest groups, and public discussion forums, 
among others) are investigated in terms of their 
contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substantive 
freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of change, 
rather than passive recipients of dispensed benefits.162 
Thus, Sen’s view has a robust role for empowerment in the form of agency as it calls 
individuals to be empowered agents of change throughout the development process. 
 
3. Well-Being Freedom and Achievements 
In addition to promoting empowerment in the form of agency, Sen’s version of the 
capability approach advocates that “institutional arrangements and development polices 
and practices be evaluated and constructed in relation to the norm of human well-
 
162 Sen, 1999. pp. xii – xiii. 
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being.”163 As we have seen, well-being and agency are distinct, but closely related 
concepts on Sen’s account.  My well-being may be enhanced or diminished as a result of 
my agency freedom and achievements, which can extend beyond my direct control.   
For Sen, a person’s well-being may be influenced or affected by other-regarding 
concerns and by events that she cares about, even if they do not affect her directly.  For 
example, my well-being may be enhanced by knowing that my sister’s surgery went well 
even though it otherwise changes nothing about my own life, or by learning that a peace 
agreement has been reached in a distant country, even if I have never been there and do 
not know anyone who has.  My well-being is enhanced because these events contribute to 
my happiness, even though they do not change my personal circumstances or advantage 
in other ways.   
The concept of “standard of living” is narrower than that of well-being on Sen’s 
account.  It relates only to aspects of one’s own personal advantage and does not reflect 
satisfaction, caused by the success of my other-regarding aims.  As Crocker suggests, the 
nature and relations of Sen’s concepts of agency, well-being, and standard of living can 
be helpfully represented in terms of three concentric circles:   
The largest (agency) circle represents a person’s 
autonomous choice of action or, more generally, of a way 
of life.  Among choices that the person might make are 
those that enhance or diminish his own well-being (as well 
as those that concern others or impersonal causes).  Still 
narrower are those choices that affect one’s standard of 
living—those aspects of his well-being such as nutrition or 
 
163 Crocker, 2008. Ch. 5. 
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physical health that derive from his own being rather his 
response to the well or ill-being of others.164 
Crocker quickly, and correctly, adds that for far too many people in the world, well-being 
and living standards are not matters of their own control or agency.  I submit that this is 
true, not only for the economically, politically, or socially impoverished, but also for the 
ill, the grief stricken, and many (if not all) other people to varying extents.  Of course, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, Sen is concerned with those whose lack of basic capabilities 
results in an impoverished well-being or standard of living, not those whose ability to 
own a yacht or win an Olympic medal is beyond their control.  
Thus, Sen’s concept of well-being is related to empowerment in that well-being 
can be limited by the power one has to make choices.  For example, choosing to eat 
enough nutritious food to be healthy can have a tremendous effect on one’s standard of 
living, but not everyone is free (or empowered) to choose to do so.  (Even fewer have the 
power to control the monetary and social resources that may be required to have access to 
a top surgeon for their sister’s surgery.)  Well-being is also related to empowerment in 
that achieving a certain standard of living is empowering.  Individuals who are healthy 
and/or have other personal advantages have a greater power to make choices, act, and 
make an impact on the world.  For example, a well-fed and otherwise healthy individual 
is much more likely to be capable of – that is empowered to achieve – successful 
employment or political participation, than is someone who is weak from 
malnourishment or illness.   
 
164 Ibid.  
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Like his concept of agency, Sen’s concept of well-being has an achievement 
dimension and a freedom dimension.  A person’s well-being achievement can be 
understood as a set of interrelated beings and doings, or functionings.  Again, as I cited in 
Chapter One, Sen explains:  
The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary 
things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, 
avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., 
to more complex achievements such as being happy, 
having self-respect, taking part in the life of the 
community, and so on.  The claim is that functionings are 
constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of well-
being has to take the form of an assessment of these 
constituent elements.165 
A person’s well-being freedom is her capability to achieve various combinations 
of functionings represented in her capability set: the set of “all the alternative 
combinations of functionings a person can choose to have.”166 In other words, one’s 
capability set represents the various alternative realities or lifestyles that person is free, or 
empowered to achieve, that is, the opportunities she has. The capability approach 
recognizes this freedom to choose from various options a very important aspect of well-
being.  According to Sen:  
A properly described social state need not merely be 
described in terms of who did what, but can also be seen as 
telling us what options each person had.  Thus seen, the 
preference or valuation over different social states can 
 
165 Sen, 1992. p. 39. 
 
166 Ibid.  
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include assessment of the opportunities enjoyed by 
different persons…The rejection of alternatives that were 
available but not chosen are a part of ‘what happened’ and 
thus a part of the appropriately described social state.167 
Recall Sen’s often cited and powerful comparison between person A, who 
chooses to fast (over the available option of eating), and person B, who has no choice but 
to starve, to convey the significance of capabilities for well-being.  Both A and B may 
have realized the same functioning of malnourishment.  But A chooses not to eat, even 
though she has the resources and is free to do so, and for this reason is said to be better 
off (that is, to have a better standard of living) than B.   
It is in this way that available, but un-chosen alternatives (reflected in a person’s 
capability freedom) are an important part of “what happened,” of one’s wellness of being.  
For the same reasons, a person’s capability set (including un-chosen options) reflects an 
individual’s freedom, or power, to engage the world and make significant decisions about 
what she will be and do in her life.  In other words, a person’s capability set can reflect 
the level of empowerment she is experiencing.  The more valuable capabilities she has, 
the more empowered she is.  Similarly, if a person lacks certain basic capabilities she 
may be recognized as poor, oppressed, or disempowered. 
Thus, Sen’s capability approach offers an understanding of the process of 
empowerment as the process of expanding an individual’s well-being freedom, or set of 
valuable capabilities.  Of course, for the same reasons provided in my account of control 
freedom (above), the addition of trivial capabilities or choices will not be considered to 
 
167 Sen, 2002. p. 593. 
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be empowering in any rich sense.  This understanding of empowerment may be less 
obvious, than the (arguably distinct, but related168) role of empowerment as agency which 
is often emphasized in discussions of empowerment within Sen’s account.  Indeed, 
although many people cite the acquisition of individual capabilities (for example, 
literacy, public sphere employment, or political participation) as empowering, I believe I 
am the first to make explicit that within the capability approach, this process of 
expanding of an individual’s set of valuable capabilities can be helpfully understood as 
an empowerment process.  Nevertheless, (as I continue to argue in Chapter Five,) I 
believe that the understanding of empowerment as capability-set expansion is an 
extremely important feature of the capability approach in general and of Sen’s version of 
the approach in particular.   
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Sen’s version of the capability approach offers two valuable and central 
roles for empowerment: (1) agency, and (2) capability-set expansion.  Agency 
empowerment is grounded in Sen’s concept of agency freedom (the freedom individuals 
have to choose and realize the objectives they value and pursue) which has both an 
opportunity aspect – our ability to achieve, and a process aspect – the process of that 
achievement.  Other things being equal, the more valuable and valued functionings that 
we are able to achieve, the more empowered we are.  However, if we achieve a 
functioning that we value, but are forced to do so, our process freedom is violated, our 
agency is frustrated, and our achievement is not a reflection of empowerment.   
 
168 As explained in the following chapter, Nussbaum may not recognize the distinction.  
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Our capability sets reflect the opportunities we have to realize objectives we 
value.  Expanding one’s capability set to include more valuable and valued capabilities is 
an empowerment process.  Again, other things being equal, the more valuable capabilities 
we have, the more power we have to decide about and achieve valuable functionings.  If 
we lack certain basic capabilities we may be considered impoverished, oppressed or 
disempowered.  It is noteworthy that both the process and the status of individual 
empowerment can be accounted for within the freedom aspect of both sides of Sen’s 
agency/well-being distinction.   
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Empowerment Concepts of  
Nussbaum’s Version of the Capability Approach 
A bifurcation between political values and broader social values is also required by some 
of the more specific precepts that lie at the heart of the capabilities approach, such as 
freedom of association, the free choice of occupation, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
travel.  
Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. 2006.
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I begin a detailed examination of the concepts and role of 
empowerment within the capability approach by identifying and engaging several aspects 
of the fundamental concepts and structure found in Amartya Sen’s version of the 
capability approach.  I discussed how the distinctions between agency and well-being and 
between capabilities and functionings give shape to key concepts of Sen’s account.  I 
submit that the two central concepts of agency and capability-set expansion can be 
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helpfully understood as the fundamental empowerment concepts of Sen’s version of the 
approach.   
In this chapter I continue my examination of the concepts and role of 
empowerment in the capability perspective by considering Martha Nussbaum’s version of 
the capability approach.  I compare and contrast the concepts and role of empowerment 
of Nussbaum’s version with those of Sen’s version.  Particular attention is paid to the 
debate over whether or not Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach can properly 
account for human empowerment without making use of Sen’s well-being/agency 
distinction, and the related charge that her approach is significantly flawed by 
comparison to Sen’s account.169 It quickly becomes apparent that the debate over 
empowerment is closely linked to a debate over the differences in the capability-valuation 
process – that is the process used to determined which capabilities individuals and 
communities should value – in each version of the approach.  As mentioned in previous 
chapters, Nussbaum advocates the use of a list of ten “central human functional 
capabilities” as a key part of her valuation process.170 
I conclude that although Nussbaum’s version does not make use of Sen’s well-
being/agency distinction, and does propose a list of central capabilities to be used in the 
capability valuation process, her approach nevertheless has a strong role for 
empowerment.  Moreover, as within Sen’s account, the role of empowerment within 
Nussbaum’s version of the approach can be helpfully represented both in the form of 
 
169 See, David A. Crocker.  Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapters 5 and 6.  See also Robeyns’s 
mention of the different concepts of agency in Sen and Nussbaum in Ingrid Robeyns. “The Capability 
Approach: A Theoretical Survey.” In Journal of Human Development. Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005. 
Routledge. (pp. 93 – 114. Here, p. 105.) 
 
170 See the end of this chapter (p. 156) for the most recent version of  Nussbaum’s list of central human 
functional capabilities. 
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agency and especially as the process of expanding the set of valuable capabilities an 
individual enjoys.  It is important to be clear that I am not here arguing that Nussbaum’s 
account is superior (or inferior) to Sen’s account.  Rather, I am making the more modest 
– but not uncontroversial – claim that (contrary to scholarly critiques) empowerment 
(including concepts of individual and group agency) plays a strong – and not so very 
different – role in both Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions of the capability approach.  
Moreover, I suggest that many – but not all – of the differences of the role of 
empowerment between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach are 
more a matter of style than of substance.  
 
1. Nussbaum and Sen; Capabilities and Functionings; Agency and Well-Being 
Nussbaum accepts Sen’s distinction between capabilities and functionings but not his 
distinction between agency and well-being.  Although she agrees with Sen that “the 
concepts introduced by these distinctions are important” she claims that “all the important 
distinctions can be captured as aspects of the capability/function distinction.”171 Before 
discussing why Nussbaum does not embrace Sen’s distinctions, or how her version of the 
capability approach might shape her own capabilities/function distinction, it is important 
to be clear about what Nussbaum is not claiming.   
Nussbaum is not claiming that the empowerment concept Sen calls “agency” is 
misguided or an unimportant part of the capability approach.  Indeed, (as I explain in 
greater detail below) several of Nussbaum’s central capabilities, including “bodily 
health,” “bodily integrity,” “sense, imagination, thought,” “practical reason,” “affiliation” 
 
171 Martha Nussbaum. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge 
University Press.  Cambridge. 2000.  (Here, p. 14.) 
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and “control” deal directly with an individual’s abilities to reflect on one’s own life and 
make choices about how to live, both at the level of the individual and the group or 
community level.172 Moreover, Nussbaum increasingly uses the term “agency” in a way 
that is compatible with Sen’s use and argues that people should be recognized as “sources 
of agency and worthy in their own right, with their own plans to make and their own lives 
to live…deserving of all necessary support for their equal opportunity to be such 
agents.”173 Hence, it is not agency as a concept that Nussbaum is reluctant to accept and 
systematically use; rather it is Sen’s well-being/agency distinction.    
Nussbaum provides two related reasons for avoiding Sen’s distinction:  (1) she is 
“not sure that any extra clarity is added by using a well-being/agency distinction” or “that 
any important philosophical distinctions are blurred by sticking to a simpler set of 
distinctions”174 and (2) she “fears that the Utilitarian associations of the idea of ‘well-
being’ may cause some readers to suppose that [Sen] is imagining a way of enjoying 
well-being that does not involve active doing and being.”175 I consider (2) presently and 
return to (1) below.   
The “Utilitarian associations” that Nussbaum fears refer to utilitarian approaches 
to development that seek to maximize utility.  The approaches Nussbaum is concerned 
with typically rely on subjective reports of individual welfare.  On such accounts the term 
“well-being” is used interchangeably with “welfare” and both terms are used to represent 
a passive state of preference satisfaction.  As Nussbaum explains: “[B]y focusing on the 
 
172 See the complete list of Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities on page 156 of this essay.  
 
173 Nussbaum, 2000. p. 58. 
 
174 Ibid. p. 14. 
 
175 Ibid.  
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state of satisfaction, Utilitarianism shows a deficient regard for agency.  Contentment is 
not the only thing that matters in a human life, active striving matters too.”176 
Nussbaum contends that some people (especially those familiar with 
utilitarianism) may conflate Sen’s relatively objective concept of well-being, which 
reflects freedoms and achievements of actively being and doing, with the more traditional 
utilitarian concept of “well-being” which is passive, and problematically subjective.177 
She argues that we can steer clear of this confusion by avoiding Sen’s well-being/agency 
distinction, which may suggest to some that all the action is on the agency side of the 
dichotomy.  It is worth underscoring that Nussbaum’s refuses to adopt Sen’s 
agency/well-being distinction not because she does not value agency as a central 
empowerment concept within the capability approach, but because she is concerned that 
adopting the distinction may result in some confusing the approach with a view that has a 
“deficient regard for agency.” 
I believe that Nussbaum is correct in thinking that some, especially those familiar 
with the passive utilitarian concepts of welfare and well-being, might initially find Sen’s 
use of “well-being” confusing or even misleading.  I am not convinced, however, that this 
initial confusion of some requires avoiding the Sen’s use of the well-being/agency 
distinction.  Many academic fields, including economics and philosophy, are loaded with 
technical jargon, and Sen’s technical use of well-being is not the only concept that calls 
 
176 Martha Nussbaum. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership. The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. 2006. (Here, p. 73.) 
 
177 Sen and Nussbaum both argue convincingly that such utilitarian approaches to development are inferior 
to the capability approach because they rely on interpersonal comparisons of mental states and reported 
welfare.  There is evidence that such reports are misleading.  As the discussion of widows vs widowers 
who survived the Bengalese famine discussed in Chapter Three shows, many women suffer from “self-
adaptive preference,” that is they condition themselves to be expect less, and therefore report a higher level 
of utility, than men in the same circumstances.  See: Nussbaum 2000. pp. 111 – 161, Sen, Amartya.  
Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press.  1999. (Especially, p. 53.) 
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for continual attention to redefinition.  For example, Aristotelian scholars must 
continually remind readers that “eudaimonia” is not “happiness” as we generally 
understand the concept, and utilitarian economists must stress that their use of “utility” 
extends beyond simple hedonic pleasure.  I submit that it is not obvious that any initial 
confusion that might result from Sen’s use of the term “well-being” would be damaging 
enough to the success of the approach to condemn the use of Sen’s well-being/agency 
distinction.  This is true even if using the distinction may require that Sen and other 
sympathetic capability theorists must continually explain or even stress the sometimes 
active role of “well-being” within the capability approach.   
It is possible that the benefits of using Sen’s agency/well-being distinction may 
outweigh the costs of some initial confusion for some people, and any efforts to make 
clear that “well-being” need not be passive within the capability approach.  But 
Nussbaum does not seem to recognize any benefits of using Sen’s agency/well-being 
distinction.  As mentioned above, she does not think any clarity is added by using the 
distinction or that “any important philosophical distinctions are blurred by sticking to a 
simpler set of distinctions.”178 Indeed, Nussbaum claims that all the important concepts 
and distinctions represented in Sen’s account “can be captured as aspects of the 
capability/function distinction.”179 
As I read Nussbaum,180 she holds that what Sen calls “agency freedom” can be 
represented entirely within the category of capability.  For Nussbaum, if an individual has 
 




180 See Nussbaum 2000, Chapter 1, especially pp. 86 – 96. 
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the capability to do activity X – that is, the freedom to choose and achieve the 
functioning X – then she is capable of acting as an agent with regard to X.181 In other 
words, agency is a central part of the concept of capability, for capability for X represents 
both one’s freedom to choose and to achieve X.  Similarly, Sen’s “agency achievements” 
can be accounted for as a subset of functionings:  those functionings an individual 
autonomously chooses and freely achieves.182 In this way, both the freedom and the 
achievement aspect of Sen’s concept of agency can be represented by the 
capability/functioning distinction.  
Recall that if one has the option, that is, the capability, to be well-nourished, then 
she can decide as an agent whether to achieve the functioning being well-nourished (by 
eating) or not (by fasting).  Because she is able to choose to fast or to eat, the functioning 
she achieves will be what Sen calls an agency achievement.  The starving person lacks 
the capability, that is, the ability to choose to be well-nourished.  (She also lacks the 
capability to fast, that is, the ability to choose not to be well-nourished.)  Because she has 
no choice but to starve, the functioning she achieves – starving – does not reflect her 
agency, but rather her impoverished capability set.  If my interpretation is correct, then 
Nussbaum believes that we would do well to replace Table Four (on p. 100 of Chapter 
Four) which represented Sen’s distinctions of Agency and Well-Being, and Freedom and 
Achievement with Table Seven (below) which represents only the distinction between 
capability and functioning. 
 
181 I am here concerned with what Nussbaum calls “combined capabilities.” See. Nussbaum 2000, pp. 84 – 
85.  
 
182 In contrast Crocker proposes that agency achievement is a kind of achievement distinguishable from 
functionings; which, for Crocker, are all strictly well-being achievements.   
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Freedom to achieve - opportunities to 
make choices and decisions about and 
realize goals and objectives including, but 
not limited to personal well-being. 
 
Achievements - realized goals and 
objectives, including, but not limited to 
personal well-being and passive 
achievements (for example, digesting food.) 
2. The List 
David Crocker proposes an additional reason for Nussbaum’s reluctance to make use of 
Sen’s distinction between agency and well-being.  He claims that “there are reasons 
inherent in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach that require that she reject Sen’s normative 
duality of agency and well-being in favor of an integrated and complex norm of human 
functioning composed of both functionings and capabilities.”183 Crocker is suggesting 
that Nussbaum cannot accept Sen’s distinction because of deep structural and normative 
differences between Sen and Nussbaum’s accounts.  This claim is one part of a larger 
argument in which Crocker contends that “although Sen and Nussbaum share many 
commitments and principles with respect to their foundational concepts, there are 
fundamental, important and growing differences between them.”184 
Crocker (correctly) describes Sen as holding that persons as individual and 
collective agents “should decide their own actions rather than having them decided by 
 





others or by impersonal events.”185 The emphasis in this position, according to Crocker, 
is on the contrast between “a person or group deciding for itself and being the ‘recipient’ 
of someone else’s decision (even if it coincides with what the person herself would 
decide).”186 Sen leaves it to the agents involved in the relevant community to determine 
what capabilities to value, and how to understand and weight them in relation to local 
beliefs and circumstances through a process of democratic deliberation the details of 
which are also determined by the community.  It is assumed that this valuation process in 
which the details of process and outcome are completely left to the relevant community is 
an empowering exercise of agency.187 Crocker contrasts this account of Sen’s position 
with the following description of Nussbaum’s account: 
Nussbaum gives priority to a vision of truly human 
functioning and capabilities—of which practical reason is 
one such. This vision, the result of philosophical argument, 
is to be enshrined in a nation’s constitution and should 
function to protect but also constrain individual and 
collective exercise of practical reason.  Nussbaum restricts 
the scope of practical agency to that of specifying the 
norms the philosopher sets forth and the constitution 
entrenches…The basic choice that Nussbaum leaves to 
individuals and communities is how to specify and 
 




187 I discuss this process in greater detail in my article: Keleher, Lori. “Does Sen’s Capabilities Approach to 
International Development Imply a Form of Deliberative Democracy that is Bad for Women?” in Parceling 
the Globe: Philosophical Exploration in Globalization, Global Behavior, and Peace. Poe, Danielle and 
Eddy Suffrant eds. 2006.  Note: my views on how to interpret Nussbaum’s use of a list have changed since 
I wrote this article.    
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implement the ideal of human flourishing that she offers as 
the moral basis for constitutional principles.188 
Crocker is correct that Nussbaum puts forth a set of central capabilities that reflect 
a philosophical account of what is universally or truly human, and that she argues that 
basic political principles underpinning these capabilities should be guaranteed by 
constitutions.  It is not fair, however, to suggest that Nussbaum “restricts the scope of 
practical agency to that of specifying the norms the philosopher sets forth and the 
constitution entrenches.”  Or that she leaves individuals and communities with only the 
basic choice of “how to specify and implement the ideal of human flourishing that she 
offers.”  In claiming that Nussbaum constrains individual and collective agency, Crocker 
is suggesting that her account has an impoverished role of agency, and in turn 
empowerment (at least in comparison to Sen’s account).189 
I believe that the scope of both individual and group agency within Nussbaum’s 
version of the capability approach is more robust than Crocker may recognize.  I believe 
that within Nussbaum’s version, agency extends beyond “specifying the norms the 
philosopher sets forth and the constitution entrenches” and offers individuals and 
communities much more than the basic choice of “how to specify and implement the 
ideal of human flourishing that she offers.”  Indeed, I submit that (as with Sen’s version) 
empowerment in the form of both agency and capability-set expansion play a robust role 
 
188 Ibid.  
 
189 In Chapter 5 of his Ethics of Global Development Crocker argues that “Nussbaum’s concepts of 
practical reason and control are less robust and less defensible than Sen’s ideal of agency.”  For reasons I 
will not directly address here, but should be apparent in this section, I believe that in limiting his 
comparison with Sen’s ideal of agency to only two of Nussbaum’s listed capabilities, as opposed to 
considering her account as a whole (including her use of the concept capability), Crocker has failed to fully 
appreciate the role of empowerment as agency on Nussbaum’s account, and consequently mis-framed the 
debate. 
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within Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach.  Moreover, I propose that many of 
the differences in the representation of empowerment within Nussbaum and Sen’s 
account are more (but not necessarily entirely) a matter of style than substance.    
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach proposes an “open-ended and 
humble” list of central capabilities that “can always be contested and remade.”190 
Nussbaum’s list is not a “fixed forever” list as some scholars suggest.191 Indeed, the 
current list and its role within Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach is itself a 
product of revision.  Nussbaum claims that the current list “represents the results of years 
of cross-cultural discussion, and comparisons between earlier and later versions will 
show that the input of other voices has shaped its content in many ways.”192 However, 
critics are quick to point out that the significant revisions of Nussbaum’s list (not to be 
confused with specifications of the list’s items discussed below) have all been made by 
Nussbaum herself, albeit in and through philosophical dialogue with others.  Moreover, 
revisions have not been made through political deliberation by the individual 
communities or the people of nations who Nussbaum proposes enshrine her list in their 
constitution.  This criticism has both a practical and a theoretical dimension.   
In response to the practical dimension – that is, who has actually shaped the 
content of the list that appears throughout Nussbaum’s work – one might simply say that 
in Nussbaum’s published writings, it is to be expected that we get a list that Nussbaum 
herself has revised (albeit in light of her discussions with others, including, for example, 
 
190 Nussbaum, 2000. p. 77. 
 
191 See, for example, Crocker’s citing of Sen in: Chapter 6 of 2008.  
 
192 Nussbaum, 2000. p. 76.  (Emphasis mine.) 
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poor women in India).193 But (as I discuss in greater detail in my response to the 
theoretical aspect of the criticism) Nussbaum gives us several reasons to believe that she 
would happily count other – and different – versions of the list being used by projects, 
communities, or constitutions at work in the world, not as a rejection of her current 
version of the list, but as a level of some success for her overall view.   
Although I am not aware of any nation that has actually enshrined Nussbaum’s 
list of central capabilities in their constitution, Nussbaum points proudly to the 
constitutions of several nations that embody, at least to some extent, the spirit of her 
list.194 “Indeed it is by design that the capabilities list starts from an intuitive idea, that of 
human dignity, that is already basic to the constitutional framing in many of the nations 
of the world (prominently including India, Germany, and South Africa).”195 I take 
Nussbaum’s reference to the constitutions of such culturally diverse countries as a sign of 
her willingness to see the idea of human dignity that grounds her list used in various 
ways, including, but not limited to, its use in these constitutions, which she had no part in 
writing.   
In response to the theoretical dimension of the objection, I submit that it does not 
follow from the fact that the philosopher is the only one who has revised the list that she 
 
193See Nussbaum, 2000, p. 78, n. 82.  
 
194 Moreover, some development practitioners (including Peter Davis of Development Alternatives Inc.) 
make use of (versions of) Nussbaum’s list when implementing projects in Africa and other parts of the 
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195 Nussbaum, 2006, p. 155. It is interesting to note that on this same page of the relatively recent 
publication (2006), Nussbaum seems to suggest that is not necessarily asking that constitutions enshrine her 
list as she writes: “One way of thinking about the capabilities list is to think of it embodied in a list of 
constitutional guarantees.”  (Emphasis mine.) 
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is the only one that can, or is permitted to, revise the list.196 Nussbaum tells us that “we 
should view any given version of the list as a proposal put forward in a Socratic fashion, 
to be tested against the most secure of our intuitions as we attempt to arrive at a type of 
reflective equilibrium for political purposes.”197 Moreover, it is clear that Nussbaum 
believes the list can and should reflect “a wide range of religious and other views about 
human life.”198 She explains that: “a concern for cultural variety (both within a nation 
and across nations) has been a prominent part of [Nussbaum’s] version of the approach.  
This concern is internal to the capabilities list itself.”199 
It is with this concern in mind that Nussbaum explains her consideration of “the 
list as open-ended and subject to ongoing revision and rethinking, in the way that any 
society’s account of its most fundamental entitlements is always subject to 
supplementation (or deletion).”200 Thus, Nussbaum clearly holds that it is always 
possible for items to be both added to and taken away from her version of the list.  She 
adds that: “This open-endedness is even more important when we extend the approach to 
the international community, because we are more likely to hear in such debates good 
 
196 It is true, as Crocker charges in his Chapter 6, that Nussbaum has left a lot of work to be done in 
explaining exactly how the list is to be modified by communities.  But I believe that the same charge can be 
made of Sen’s relatively under-defined account of valuation through democratic deliberation.  Both 
scholars have done so much work towards developing the capability approach, but there remains much 
work to be done, if not by Sen and Nussbaum themselves, then by the many scholars that seek to advance 
the view.   
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ideas that we did not hear before, or criticisms of our own ways of life that we had 
previously not taken seriously.”201 
I believe these passages show that Nussbaum understands her list (or at least the 
ideal of the sort of list she is proposing) not merely as a product of philosophical 
reflection on her part, but as a consensus which has emerged as the product of a global 
exchange of ideas in an on-going debate about what is required for life with dignity.  
Understood in this way, any version of the list is more like a snapshot of an ongoing 
revision process that can be used as a proposal, or a starting point for further debate by 
various members of national and global political communities as constitutions are written 
and amended, than a fixed forever list carved in stone to be handed down from the 
philosophers on high.  
Critics tempted to argue that the international consensus Nussbaum is concerned 
with generating is the product of deliberating elites, like philosophers, are reminded that 
Nussbaum’s “current version of the list reflects changes made as a result of [her] 
discussions with people in India.”202 It is a safe assumption that these people include the 
poor, and often marginalized, women featured throughout her book (specifically, Women 
and Human Development (2000)).  Again, I suggest that the fact that Nussbaum herself 
made the final decisions about exactly what is included in her current version of the list 
reflects that the list is found in her book.   
In fairness to critics in general, and particularly those who share Crocker’s belief 
that Nussbaum’s list is a fixed list, it is clear that Nussbaum does not see her list as just 
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one example of many extremely diverse, or even conflicting, but equally acceptable lists.  
Nussbaum emphasizes that her list can accommodate, indeed, is designed to protect, 
pluralism,203 but rejects the idea that the concept of human dignity – in which her list is 
grounded – is culturally or morally relative.  Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is an attempt 
to capture the central political requirements for a life of dignity implicit in “an 
overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive 
conceptions of the good.”204 For Nussbaum, the items on the list currently do, and 
always must, reflect a deep and universally shared understanding of human dignity – a 
concept that should be informed by international debate and reflect a common ground 
found among a wide range of views.205 
It follows from Nussbaum’s understanding of universally shared values that any 
newly proposed items that fail to garner an “overlapping consensus” when debated by the 
international community may be judged as unsuitable for the list.  Likewise, there are 
some items on the list that Nussbaum considers to be “more fixed than others.”  As she 
explains:  
For example, it would be astonishing if the right to bodily 
integrity were to be removed from the list; that seems to be 
a fixed point on our judgments of goodness.  On the other 
hand, one might debate what role is played by literacy in 
 
203 See: Nussbaum, 2006, especially: pp. 78 – 80, and pp. 295 – 306.  Martha Nussbaum.  “Capabilities as 
Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics vol. 9 (July/November): pp. 33- 
59. 2003.  
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human functioning, and what role is played by our 
relationship to other species and the world of nature.206 
It is important be clear that even with regard to the “more fixed” items on the list, 
Nussbaum says that it would be “astonishing” but not a violation of the process she 
proposes for generating a list, if they were removed from the list.207 As the above cited 
texts show, there is ample room for deliberation and debate about revision in the form of 
the addition and deletion of the items on the list itself – and not just in the specification 
and implementation of the ideal of human flourishing represented in Nussbaum’s own 
list.  I must confess however, that I would share in Nussbaum’s astonishment at any 
community (especially the global community) that chooses not to include some 
specification of the right to bodily integrity, which includes “being able to move freely 
from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e., being able 
to secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic 
violence…”208 on their list of valuable capabilities.   
Not only is there some room for deliberation about the items on the list itself, but 
I believe that the scope of individual and group agency in implementing the list is wider 
than Crocker may have recognized.  The list is intended to shape public policy decisions 
of communities, but not the basic choices of individuals and cultural communities, 
 
206 Nussbaum, 2000, p. 77. 
 
207 It is important to be clear that Nussbaum does not permit the addition and subtraction of items on the list 
of central functionings based on the global consensus because she holds the relativist position that what is 
right is determined by the global consensus, because what is right just is a matter of global consensus.  
Rather, Nussbaum holds that there are certain universal (albeit, pluralistic,) normative truths about what is 
required for a life with dignity, and that the best way to discover these truths is through on-going cross-
cultural deliberations.   
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beyond respecting each other as sources of agency, and in a manner consistent with 
human dignity.  As Nussbaum writes: “[I]t is important to be respectful of the many ways 
citizens choose to live, provided that those do not cause harm to others in areas touched 
upon by the central capabilities.”209 
Nussbaum holds that those who design public policy, including – but not limited 
to – constitutions, should seek to provide, protect, and restore a basic social minimum of 
central substantive freedoms: “the structure of social and political institutions should be 
chosen, at least in part, with a view to promoting at least a threshold of these human 
capabilities.”210 She also holds that the items on the list are irreducible separate 
components and that there are “limits on the trade-offs that it will be reasonable to 
make.”211 In other words, those making public policy should seek to provide, protect, 
and restore all the capabilities on the list.  Each and every item must be accounted for at 
some level and in some way.  We cannot, for example, make up for a failure to protect 
bodily integrity by providing the means for more of another item on the list, say (a 
longer) life, or vice versa.  As Nussbaum puts it: “[I]n some form all the items of the list 
are held to be part of a minimum account of social justice: a society that does not 
guarantee these to all its citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of being 
a fully just society.”212 
Nussbaum adds that the list is not “an exhaustive account of political justice; there 
may be other important political values, closely connected with justice, that it does not 
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include.”213 In other words, as discussed above, Nussbaum would support the 
identification and addition of capabilities representing such important values as distinct 
non-tradable items of the list.  As I argue below, when properly understood, I do not 
think that this requirement of including all the items on the list without trade-offs 
prevents Nussbaum from having a strong account of individual or group agency.  In what 
follows, I first discuss the implementation of the list and its consequences at the national 
or political level, and then consider the significance of this use of the list for individuals 
and groups at the local or cultural community level.  
Nussbaum does not attempt to strictly dictate how nations, states, or similar 
politically identifiable communities214 are to understand or to weigh the capabilities on 
the list as they construct their constitutions.  Instead she says they “can be more 
concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances,” and that the 
“threshold level of each of the central capabilities will need more precise determination, 
as citizens work toward a consensus for political purposes… through interpretation and 
deliberation.”215 Thus, while political communities should not fail to protect bodily 
integrity altogether, they may for some reason at some time decide by consensus, 
generated through deliberation, to exercise their agency as they limit, for example, the 
bodily mobility aspect of bodily integrity (for example by instating a curfew restricting 
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mobility after a certain time, or even all together for a period of time216) in accordance 
with local beliefs and circumstances.   
In every community, the thresholds for some capabilities may be set in 
accordance with the availability of limited resources.  Sadly, some, especially poor 
communities, may sometimes fall short of meeting their own (democratically determined) 
ideals.  They may fail, for example, to achieve the standards or thresholds they set for 
themselves in some important areas, or to provide every item on their list, or both.  In 
such cases, governments and/or community policy makers (influenced by politically 
active citizens) must make tough choices about what core needs can and should be 
promoted and protected in light of their specific resources and values.   
Nussbaum offers that such tough choices can be made using a cost benefit 
analysis that recognizes the weightings communities assign to the items on the list and 
the fact that each and every item on their list is distinctly valuable.217 She insists, 
however, that circumstances in which citizens are pushed below the threshold of basic 
functioning for any item are “tragic” and suggests that such tragedies signal that the 
country must continue to work towards offering citizens all that is required for human 
dignity, or a life of human flourishing.218 This observation on Nussbaum’s part does not 
restrict the agency of communities in choosing how to live their lives by somehow 
forcing them to achieve a standard in each of the ten areas that she (Nussbaum) has 
 
216 For example, Pueblo Indians in parts of the state of New Mexico in the US have agreed to limit the 
mobility of some tribal and all non-tribal members living within their villages during particular feast days 
in order to preserve the integrity of sacred ceremonies.  Non-tribal members must either leave the village, 
or board up the windows and doors of their homes and remain inside at all times during the ceremonies, 
which can last for several days.   
 
217 Nussbaum, 2000, p. 81. 
 
218 Ibid.  
142
chosen.  Rather, it laments the fact that individuals and communities do not have the 
necessary social and material resources to achieve the thresholds they themselves have set 
for the items on the list they have shaped in accordance with the values of their 
community.  
Nussbaum’s critics may still argue that there is a sense in which a political 
community’s list is not truly its own because it must be based on – that is not violate – 
the items on the list of minimum requirements for a universal understanding of human 
dignity according to the consensus generated by global debate.  This is true.  According 
to Nussbaum, a community’s list must protect the human dignity of all individuals.   
As I understand Nussbaum’s proposed use of a list, a community may participate 
in global deliberations, and in this way contribute to the universal conception of human 
dignity, and in turn the list (including by adding or removing items).  They may also 
include any additional capabilities that emerge in their own deliberations as valuable to 
the protection and promotion of human dignity to their community’s list (so long as they 
do not violate the dignity of individuals in ways protected by the global list).  Finally, 
they may further significantly shape their list as they decide (through democratic 
deliberation as a community) how to interpret, weight, provide, promote, and protect the 
capabilities on the list in accordance with their own customs, values, and beliefs.  They 
may not, however, develop a list of their own which violates or fails to protect the 
freedoms recognized by the global community as a whole, as the minimum requirements 
for human dignity (which have been developed as a result of – or perhaps in spite of – 
their particular country’s contributions to the debate).   
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Critics are correct that Nussbaum’s view limits the range of acceptable political 
policies a country or other political community may adopt.  For example, the Taliban’s 
ideas of what is required for human dignity (especially with regard to the treatment of 
women) have failed to garner a global consensus,219 and would not be acceptable, 
according to Nussbaum’s view.  However, I do not believe that requiring communities to 
include – in some form – a global consensus of the minimum requirements for human 
dignity severely restricts the practical agency of policy makers.  There remains plenty of 
room for deliberation, cultural identity, and even moral pluralism in Nussbaum’s process. 
Thus, although Nussbaum’s proposed use of a list can, in some cases, prevent a political 
community from adopting a list that is truly their own, there remains plenty of 
opportunities to exercise practical agency both in debating the foundations or items of the 
list at the level of the global community level and for shaping and implementing the list 
at the political community level.   
Nussbaum makes it very clear that she is not claiming that each individual – or 
cultural (or otherwise non-political) community of self identified individuals with shared 
ideals (for example, Amish, Orthodox Jews, or Jehovah Witnesses as they exist within 
the United States) – should be required to achieve any level or threshold of any of the 
functionings her list identifies as central to a fully human life.  Her goal is to enhance 
 
219 While in power from 1996 – 2001 the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, was recognized by only 
three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.  Of course, as explained in note 39 
above, Nussbaum does not oppose the Taliban’s treatment of women because is fails to garner global 
support.  Rather she understands the lack of global support of the Taliban’s treatment of women as a 
reflection of the Taliban’s violation of universal normative principles of human dignity.  Again, for 
Nussbaum, such universal principles are likely to be recognized, if not discovered, through a global 
deliberation about what is required for a life of human dignity.   
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what Sen calls “opportunity freedom” by creating “spaces for choice rather than 
dragooning people into a desired total mode of functioning.”220 As she explains:  
The claim that is made by the use of a single list, then, is 
not that there is a single type of flourishing for the human 
being, but, rather, that these capabilities can be agreed by 
reasonable citizens to be important prerequisites of 
reasonable conceptions of human flourishing, in connection 
with the person as a political animal, both needy and 
dignified; and thus these are good bases for an idea of basic 
political entitlements in a just society.221 
It is important to note that for Nussbaum: “The conception of the person as a political 
animal includes an idea related to the contractarian idea of ‘freedom’:222 the person is 
imagined as having a deep interest in choice, including the choice of a way of life and the 
political principles that govern it.”223 Accordingly, it is in order to promote the freedom 
and choice, or agency of persons, that Nussbaum requires governments to work to 
provide citizens with the option or capability to decide for themselves, whether or not to 
achieve certain valuable functions.  As she explains:  
[F]or political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for 
capabilities, and those alone.  Citizens must be free to 
determine their own course after that. The person with 
plenty of food may always choose to fast, but there is a 
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221 Nussbaum, 2006, p. 182.  
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also recognizes a wider range of types of beings who can be free.” (Nussbaum, 2006. p. 88.) 
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great difference between fasting and starving, and it is this 
difference I want to capture.224 
Choice is good in part because of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism: other fellow citizens make different choices, and 
respecting them includes respecting the space within which 
those choices are made.  The citizen in question may also 
believe that choice is good for them: to be a nonvoter in a 
country that has no elections expresses nothing much about 
human values; to pursue nonreligion in a state that 
persecutes religion expresses nothing much about the 
values of the religious person.  If we place the accent firmly 
on capability rather than functioning, it is not an 
implausible to ascribe to them the thought that a dignified 
life for a human being requires these capabilities—which 
include of course, the right not to use them.225 
For Nussbaum, the decision not to achieve a certain functioning, for example, political 
participation, can be made by an individual agent or a group or community of agents, for 
example, the decidedly non-political and consequently non-voting Amish who (as 
individuals or groups) choose to live in the United States which has universal voting 
rights, or Jehovah Witnesses who (as individuals or groups) may refuse emergency blood 
transfusions, but choose to live where such emergency medical care is universally 
provided.  Nussbaum adds that: 
Just as a person who chooses to ruin his health and not 
avail himself of any reasonable health care may yet 
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consistently support public health care as an essential 
minimum condition of a decent human life, so too, these 
people might consistently support choice in this area, even 
though they also believe that they themselves can rightly 
make only one (negative) choice.226 
Thus, use of Nussbaum’s list does not force individuals or cultural communities to 
achieve every functioning on the list.  In contrast, it asserts that citizens should have the 
capability, that is, the freedom to choose as autonomous agents which functionings to 
achieve, and which to pass up, as they live their lives in accordance with their own 
conception of the good (and without harming others).227 In this way, Nussbaum, like Sen 
(as discussed in Chapter Four, see especially, p. 118), believes that the capabilities an 
individual chooses not to realize (that is, the un-choosen capabilities in the individual’s 
capability set) are an important reflection of the freedom an individual enjoys.  The 
options an individual has, but chooses not to pursue reflect an individual’s level of 
empowerment, and in this way, are an important part of well-being.   
Moreover, Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach can be understood as 
seeking to empower individuals by ensuring that their capability sets includes – as a 
minimum – certain critically valuable capabilities; especially, those capabilities that are 
minimum requirements for human dignity identified by the global community.  As a 
careful look at the items on the list reveals, being empowered in this way means being 
empowered to seek to expand one’s own capability set to include capabilities not 
 
226 Ibid. 185. 
 
227 I find Nussbaum’s position on this very similar to Sen’s position as he writes: “[T]he denial of 
opportunities of basic education to a child, or of essential health care to the ill, is a failure of social 
responsibility, but the exact utilization of the educational attainments or of health achievements cannot but 
be a matter for the person herself to determine.” (Sen. 1999. p. 288.) 
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specified by the list, but determined to be valuable by the individual (or community).  
Thus, the important understanding of empowerment as capability-set expansion found in 
Sen’s version of the capability approach also plays a robust role on Nussbaum’s version 
of the approach.   
Indeed, I submit that Nussbaum’s choice not to use Sen’s distinction between 
well-being and agency, in favor of “sticking to a simpler set of distinctions,”228 results in 
more emphasis on capability-set expansion than on Sen’s account.  This is because both 
what would qualify as an expansion of agency freedom, and what would qualify as an 
expansion of well-being freedom on Sen’s account, would simply be considered an 
expansion of one’s capability set on Nussbaum’s account.  It follows that both Sen and 
Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach can accommodate the same sort of 
empowerment of individuals (and groups) but choose to represent it differently.  
In addition to the relatively implicit inclusion of agency as a necessary part of 
capability, a closer look at the capabilities Nussbaum names in the current version of her 
list reveals that she explicitly stresses a strong role for empowerment in the form of both 
individual and group agency.  Nussbaum’s inclusion of “affiliation” in her list of basic 
human functionings makes it clear that, like Sen’s use of the concepts of well-being and 
agency, and of freedom and achievement, her use of the concepts of capabilities and 
functionings extends beyond the individual agent.  Affiliation entails “being able to live 
with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage 
in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to 
have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship.” 
Nussbaum adds that “Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that 
 
228 Nussbaum, 2000. p. 14. 
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constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of 
assembly and political speech.”229 On Nussbaum’s account, an individual who is capable 
of affiliation is capable of (1) having (what Sen calls) agency objectives that extend 
beyond one’s own personal advantage, for example, wanting the lives of her children to 
go well, and (2) working with others towards the achievement of shared (yet 
autonomously chosen) goals.  
Several other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list also stand out as empowerment 
concepts for individuals, groups, or both.  (For Nussbaum’s complete list, see p. 156 
below.)  Among the most significant agency concepts in Nussbaum’s view is her 
capability of practical reason, which together with affiliation has a “special importance” 
for “characteristically human thought and planning about one’s own life… [through] 
complex forms of discourse, concern, and reciprocity with other human beings.”230 
Practical reason involves “the ability to form a conception of the good life and to engage 
in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.”231 
Some of the other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list that explicitly address 
empowerment concepts that Sen would call agency include:  
(1) Control over one’s environment – or the ability to “participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life; having the right to political participation, 
protections of free speech and association.”232 
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(2)  Senses, Imagination, and Thought, which includes: “Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works 
and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being 
able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression 
with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious 
exercise.  Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own 
way.”233 
(3) Bodily Health, including reproductive health, which Nussbaum explains by 
citing the 1994 Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) as saying 
that: “Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have … the 
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if when, and how often to do 
so.”234 
I do not cite each of the items on her list here, but instead trust that this sampling of 
explicit use of language that calls for and supports what Sen calls agency is enough to 
make it clear that items on Nussbaum’s list is allows for, indeed encourages a robust role 
of empowerment as agency.  (Again, the complete list of Nussbaum’s “Central Human 
Functional Capabilities” is provided below on p. 156.)  To add this language to the results 
of my above argument, I submit that when one understands Nussbaum’s list as open-
ended, revisable, multi-realizable, and focused on individual capabilities (or freedoms), it 
is clear that her account of practical agency extends well beyond “specifying the norms 
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the philosopher sets forth and the constitution entrenches” and offers individuals and 
communities much more than the basic choice of “how to specify and implement the 
ideal of human flourishing that she offers.”   
Thus, the differences between Sen and Nussbaum with regard to agency do not 
seem to be as significant as Crocker suggests.  When compared to Sen’s valuation 
process, which is left open to the democratic deliberations of the relevant community, 
Nussbaum’s proposed use of a list does provide a different and relatively structured 
process for determining which capabilities a political community should value.  
However, Nussbaum, like Sen, ultimately holds that communities themselves should 
determine which political capabilities they should promote and protect, and that 
individuals and groups of agents should choose, or decide about, their own actions.  
Moreover, Nussbaum can (and does) account not only for agency (as an essential aspect 
of capability), but also for some of Sen’s other key concepts, including: agency freedom 
(as an aspect of capability), agency achievement (as a subset of functionings), well-being 
freedom (as capability), well-being achievement (as functionings).  For his part, Sen has 
recently made it clear that he “has nothing against the listing of capabilities” as long as 
they are not “fixed forever lists” and that he sees “Nussbaum’s powerful use of a given 
list of capabilities for some minimal rights against deprivation as being extremely 
useful.”235 Thus, there is a great deal of common ground between Sen and Nussbaum on 
the role of empowerment within the capability approach.   
So why does Nussbaum avoid Sen’s distinctions?  I propose that Nussbaum does 
not embrace Sen’s agency/well-being distinction not because of the substance of the 
 
235 Sen, Amartya. “Human Rights and Capabilities” in Journal of Human Development. Vol. 6, No. 2, July 
2005. Routledge. (pp. 151 – 166)  (Here, p. 159 – 60.) 
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concepts it identifies – after all, agency and capability set-expansion are central to both 
Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions of the capability approach – but largely as a matter of 
style.  As discussed above, Nussbaum believes that the important concepts of Sen’s 
account are adequately represented in her version of the capability approach, but with a 
set of distinctions she sees as simpler and less confusing: namely the distinction between 
capabilities and functionings.   
As explained above, it is not obvious that we would do well to follow Nussbaum 
in rejecting Sen’s agency/well-being distinction.  The fact that even attentive capability 
scholars (including Crocker) are confused about the role of agency (in particular, and in 
turn, empowerment in general,) on Nussbaum’s account suggests that Sen may be right to 
emphasize his distinction.  It seems that just as those who choose to use Sen’s distinction 
may need to make clear that well-being is not a passive utilitarian concept, those who 
elect to follow Nussbaum in choosing not to use the distinction may have to emphasize 
that agency and autonomous choice are part and parcel of capabilities.  I will not attempt 
to settle the matter of whether or not we should either use or avoid Sen’s agency/well-
being distinction here.  Either choice would require some additional explanation, or 
emphasis, on the role of certain concepts.  More importantly, neither choice excludes a 
strong and central role for empowerment as agency or as capability-set expansion.   
Instead, I rest my case for claiming (contrary to scholarly critiques) that 
Nussbaum, like Sen, makes use of the robust empowerment concept of agency.  
Furthermore, in light of (1) their (at least partial) agreement on the use of lists and 
democratic deliberation in valuation, and (2) the fact that despite emphasizing different 
language of empowerment, both Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions of the capability 
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approach make sense of empowerment, not only as agency, but also as capability-set 
expansion in the various spheres of life; I submit that many of the often cited differences 
in the interpretation and role of empowerment of the two versions are more a matter of 
style than of substance.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter considers the meaning and role of empowerment within Martha Nussbaum’s 
version of the capability approach.  Neither Sen nor Nussbaum explicitly use the 
language of empowerment.  However, after critically engaging the empowerment 
concepts used in each account, I have come to the conclusion that empowerment plays a 
robust role on both versions of the capability approach.   
I propose that two of the most important forms of empowerment found within the 
capability approach are (1) agency, and (2) capability-set expansion.  Agency, or the 
ability to decide for oneself and act autonomously to bring about change in the world, is 
heavily emphasized on Sen’s account as a critical dimension of his agency/well-being 
distinction.  Nussbaum rejects Sen’s distinction, but often uses the language of agency 
and freedom as she explains her approach.  Moreover, she systematically accounts for 
agency as part of the capability/functioning distinction.  For Nussbaum, agency is already 
represented within the concept of capabilities.  If an individual has the capability to 
achieve functioning X, then the have the ability to decide for oneself and to act 
autonomously to achieve X where the achievement of X is a change in the world. 
In focusing on the capability/functioning distinction, Nussbaum places great 
emphasis on empowerment as capability-set expansion.  (Of course, given Nussbaum’s 
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use of agency and capability, capability-set expansion is also a promotion of agency.)  
For Nussbaum, this sort of empowerment involves ensuring that individuals have certain 
valuable capabilities so that they can freely choose for themselves what to do, be, and 
achieve, in their own lives.  As I argued in Chapter Four, Sen’s account can also be read 
as advocating empowerment as capability-set expansion.  This advocacy is most obvious 
in Sen’s promotion of what he calls well-being freedom, which reflects one’s capability 
set.  I believe this understanding of empowerment as capability-set expansion is an 
extremely important, but little talked, about theoretical and practical contribution of the 
capability approach to the understanding of development in general and the role of 
empowerment within development in particular.  I discuss and explain this significance 
of this contribution in greater detail in Chapter Six.   
 Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach can (and does) encourage and 
account for the enhancement of individual and group agency, primarily as capability-set 
expansion.  Sen’s version of the approach can (and does) encourage and account for the 
capability-set expansion and the promotion of valuable capabilities, as he calls for the 
bolstering of both agency and well-being freedom.  Thus, it seems that although they use 
different language and at times emphasize different aspects of empowerment, Sen and 
Nussbaum are – at some level – both promoting the same robust role of empowerment in 
human development:  enhancing the substantive freedom of individuals to achieve a 
lifestyle they value.  In view of this common ground shared by the scholars, I suggest that 
many of the empowerment related differences found in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions 
of the capability approach are not substantial, but rather matters of style. 
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This suggestion will undoubtedly spark debate (if not ire) among capability 
theorists, so I want to make clear what I am not claiming.  I am not claiming that 
differences of style are completely insignificant:  the style of an approach may make it 
more or less attractive, confusing/clear, easy/difficult to implement and/or to evaluate, 
and so forth.  For example, one may prefer to talk in terms of more or less robust agency 
(as Nussbaum herself often does), than in terms of more or less robust capabilities.   
I am also not claiming that there are no differences between Sen and Nussbaum’s 
versions of the capability approach.  Sen clearly advocates the use of an agency/well-
being distinction, which Nussbaum avoids.  Nussbaum clearly advocates the use of a list 
of central capabilities, which Sen avoids.  These differences may lead some to favor one 
approach, and others another.  My current project does not involve the sort of analysis 
that would be needed to justify recommending one approach as superior to the other.  I 
have argued, however, that Nussbaum’s proposed use of a list, does not severely restrict 
the freedom, or agency, of individuals, groups, or even political communities, in deciding 
what to value, and especially how to live their lives.   
I have not argued that use of the sort of list proposed by Nussbaum (as opposed to 
the relatively under-defined deliberatively democratic valuation process in Sen account) 
would not make any difference.  Nussbaum’s list provides political communities with a 
detailed starting point for debate and some clear guidelines to be used in the process of 
revision and weighting of the list of capabilities.  Sen’s approach leaves all of these 
matters almost entirely up to the deliberations of the communities themselves.   
One consequence of this difference is that empowerment in the form of 
capability-set expansion on Nussbaum’s approach is focused on ensuring that every 
155
individual’s capability set includes – as a minimum – the basic capabilities universally 
required for a life with dignity as identified by a global consensus (to which the local 
community may have contributed) and further revised, specified, and weighted by 
national and local political communities.  In contrast, empowerment in the form of 
capability-set expansion on Sen’s approach seeks to expand individual capability sets in 
accordance with whatever the national and local community themselves have 
democratically determined to be valuable, independent of any Nussbaum-type list of 
universal requirements identified by a global consensus.  I believe that this is a genuine 
difference between the two approaches.  However, I do not believe that this difference 
undermines either my claim that practical agency play a robust role with both Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach, or my suggestion that many (but not 
necessarily all) of the differences in the role of empowerment found within the two 
versions are more a matter of style than of substance. 
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Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Functional Capabilities236 
1. Life.  Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health.  Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity.  Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 
and reason — and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and 
basic mathematical and scientific training.  Being able to use imagination and thought in 
connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth.  Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected 
by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, 
and freedom of religious exercise.  Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to 
avoid non-necessary pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to 
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger.  Not having one’s emotional 
development blighted by fear and anxiety.  (Supporting this capability means supporting 
forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.  (This entails protection for the liberty 
of conscience.)  
 
236 Nussbaum. 2000, pp. 78 – 80. 
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7. Affiliation.  (a)  Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be 
able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have 
the capability for both justice and friendship.  (Protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the 
freedom of assembly and political speech.)  (b)  Having the social bases of self-respect 
and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to 
that of others.  This entails protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity or national origin. 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over one’s Environment.  (a)  Political Being able to participate effectively 
in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, 
protections of free speech and association.  (b)  Material Being able to hold property 
(both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis 
with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.  In work, being 
able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful 
relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.  
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Chapter Six 
Institutionalized Power and Empowerment 
 
There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements.  It 
is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom and 
to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom. 
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999.
[G]ender relations do not operate in a social vacuum, but are products of the ways in 
which institutions are organized and reconstituted over time. 
Naila Kabeer, Institutions, Relations and Outcomes, 1999.  
 
Introduction 
Chapter Two of this essay argues that the capability approach to human development 
offers a superior conception of empowerment than the traditionally dominant economic 
growth approach of development does or can provide.  The detailed examination of the 
role of empowerment in both Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s versions of the 
capability approach in Chapters Four and Five finds that empowerment plays a robust 
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role in both versions; and that while neither version systematically uses the term 
“empowerment” the concept of empowerment is central to each account both as agency 
and as capability-set expansion.  Together, the previous chapters make it clear that the 
capability approach is a valuable approach for understanding, cultivating, and evaluating 
empowerment in international development.   
Despite its proven value in these areas, prominent scholars, including friends of 
the capability approach, have expressed concern over the ability of the approach (in 
general, and Sen’s version in particular,)237 to address adequately the relationship 
between institutionalized power (defined presently) and inequality.  Economist Marianne 
Hill claims that the capability approach “does not analyze the role of institutionalized 
power in causing or perpetuating inequalities in individual opportunities to achieve” and 
that “[u]ntil…the capability approach addresses the issue of social power, the analysis of 
well-being will be incomplete, and decisions made to enhance human capabilities will 
systematically fall short.”238 Philosopher Christine Koggel argues that: “If not entirely 
absent in Sen’s account, power and oppression are not sufficiently recognized as factors 
in inequality in women’s lives that are relevant to the kinds of policies required … for 
increasing women’s freedom and agency.”239 Although the specific criticisms vary, the 
general concern (or complaint) can be understood as a worry that Sen does not do enough 
to address the important role that institutionalized power plays in generating, reinforcing, 
 
237 Most of the literature concerning the capability approach’s ability to address social power focuses on 
Sen’s account.  However, I believe that the central concerns of scholars apply, perhaps in slightly different 
ways, to Nussbaum’s version as well.  I suspect that Sen’s approach simply receives more attention mainly 
because it is the original version of the capability approach.  In this chapter, I too focus on Sen’s version.   
 
238 Marianne Hill. 2003. "Development as Empowerment." Feminist Economics 9 (2-3): pp. 117-135. 
(Here, p. 117.) 
 
239 Christine Koggel. 2003 “Globalization and Women’s Paid Work: Expanding Freedom?” Feminist 
Economics 9 (2-3): pp. 163 – 183 (Here,  p. 165). 
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and reproducing the inequalities that prevent or limit various groups of individuals from 
acting as agents or expanding their capability sets – that is, from experiencing, or 
engaging in, empowerment.  
This chapter has two main parts.  The first part offers a detailed explanation of 
one version of the general concern that Sen does not do enough to engage 
institutionalized power.  The second part critically analyzes Sen’s work on inequality and 
empowerment, including his treatment of institutionalized power.  I do not take up 
specific charges of scholarly critics (like Hill and Koggel).  But I do consider the general 
concern as it is explained in Part One.   
I find that although Sen clearly acknowledges the importance of institutionalized 
power – especially as it relates to gender inequality and its relationship to empowerment 
as agency – he does not fully engage it.  I submit, however, that this failure to account for 
every aspect of institutionalized power is not a fatal flaw of either Sen’s work or of the 
capability approach.  After all, Sen is obviously aware of the issues and has done some 
important work in the right direction.  Moreover, I believe his work, and the capability 
approach, can be extended to more adequately address the relevant issues of 
institutionalized power.  I end with the suggestion that work done in feminist economics 
(including Nailia Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach240) and philosophy (including 
Marilyn’s Frye’s work on social categories241 and Christine Koggel’s Relational Theory 
 
240 Naila Kabeer and Ramya Subrahmanian. eds. Institutions, Relations, and Outcomes: Framework and 
Case Studies for Gender Aware Planning. London: Zed Books. 1999;  Naila Kabeer, ed. Inclusive 
Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions. London: Zed Books. 2005; Naila Kabeer. Reversed Realities: 
Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. London: Verso Books.  2003; Candida March, Ines Smyth, 
and Maitrayee Muckhopadhyay.  A Guide to Gender-Analysis Frameworks. Oxfam Publishing. Oxford.  
1999. 
 
241 Marilyn Frye. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. The Crossing Press. California. 1983. 
Marilyn Frye. “Categories and Dichotomies” as it appears in Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories. Lorraine 
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of Equality242) can provide the basis for a philosophically and practically more complete 
understanding of institutionalized power and, in turn, empowerment as agency and 
capability-set expansion.  Although I do not make a case for it here, in future work I 
intend to show that such an understanding would not only fit nicely within the capability 
perspective, but would also extend and enhance both Sen’s work in particular and the 
capability approach in general.   
 
Part One: Institutionalized Power 
Scholars, as we have seen, have suggested that Sen’s work on the capability approach 
does not do enough to deal with the important role that institutionalized power plays in 
generating, reinforcing, and reproducing the inequalities that limit or prevent various 
groups of individuals from acting as agents or expanding their capability sets, that is, 
from engaging in empowerment processes, or being empowered.  In order to understand 
this general concern about Sen’s work on the capability approach, we must understand 
institutionalized power and several related key concepts.  In what follows, I offer an 
explanation of these key concepts, before explaining why the concern is significant for 
Sen and for the capability approach. 
The complex concept of institutionalized power has deep roots in Marxist and 
socialist thought as well as in various strands of feminist philosophy and economics.243 
Code. ed. Routledge. 2004. (pp. 73 – 74).  Marilyn Frye. “Categories in Distress” as it appears in Feminist 
Interventions in Ethics and Politics. Barbara S. Andrew, Jean Keller, et. al. eds. Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc. 2005. (pp. 41 – 58).  
 
242 Christine M. Koggle. Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1998.  
 
243 The relevant concept of power is central to several – but not all – feminist theories including Marxist, 
socialist, postmodern, and radical feminism.  (It is often contrasted with the more atomistic concept of 
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Institutionalized power can be understood as power that exists as a result of social 
differences – including inequalities – present in the social relations, which are 
systematically generated, reinforced, and reproduced by both formal and informal 
institutions.  Institutions at work within a given society may include the international 
community, the state, the legal system, the military, the political party, the market, the 
firm, the banking system, the church, the village, the community, the tribal council, the 
household, the family, marriage, and many others.   
These institutions embody frameworks of “rules,” or patterns of behavior, that 
define social groups and social relations.  Both formal and informal institutions may 
explicitly profess (and sometimes strive for) one official set of rules, which may include, 
for example: “all are equal before the law” while actually operating within another, 
unofficial, and often implicit, framework of rules, for example, one in which people (of 
any color, but especially black people) who murder white people are much more likely to 
be sentenced to death than people who murder black people.244 An adequate analysis of 
institutionalized power requires us to look beyond the official and explicit rules of 
institutions and to understand the unofficial, but nevertheless powerful, social rules of 
intuitional frameworks.  Social rules are not absolute.  There may be exceptions to the 
rules, and the rules may change over time. 
 Social groups are social categories that are created, perpetuated, and recreated by 
institutions.  Examples of social categories include: women, men, the elderly, wives, 
 
power discussed by liberal feminists.) Power also plays a role in feminist economic approaches that draw 
on these philosophical feminist theories, see for example, Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach (see 
note 4).  
 
244 According to the Amnesty International’s report “Death by Discrimination:  The Continuing Role of 
Race in Capital Cases:”  “Even though blacks and whites are murder victims in nearly equal numbers of 
crimes, 80% of people executed since the death penalty was reinstated [in the US in 1977] have been 
executed for murders involving white victims.” http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510462003
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widows, the able-bodied, Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Brahmans.  Institutionalized 
norms determine how individual group members (are expected to) relate to one another in 
the context of society.   
Social relations are the structural relationships of social groups.  Gender relations 
are one type of social relation.  Gender relations describe the relationships between men 
and women within a given society or institutional framework.245 As products of 
institutions, such relationships define the roles, responsibilities, and freedoms, and in 
turn, the power shares of individual group members: including who does what, who gets 
what, who decides what, who controls what (and whom), who serves whom, and so forth.  
The differences in the roles, responsibilities, freedoms, membership conditions, and 
relative power shares of social groups are social differences.  Social differences between 
men and women are gender differences.   
Unfortunately, the power available to the individual members of the different 
social groups in the institutionalized relations of society is often unequal.  The 
inequalities of institutionalized power found in social relations often represent a relative 
(or, as we shall see, in some cases absolute) deprivation of some groups and a privileging 
of others.  Although social groups, social relations, and social differences are all products 
of changeable social patterns, institutions – which are controlled by privileged groups – 
tend to work to reinforce current social roles and in turn, social inequalities, thereby 
confirming the social power (or control) and advantages of the privileged groups. 
 
245 For the sake of simplicity, in this example, I restrict gender to the categories “women” and “men.”  As I 
do so, I am aware of the irony that in making this move I am privileging these categories and excluding 
altogether various other categories, that are often argued to be gender categories (including queer, 
transvestite, and others) from the set – or category – of “gender categories.” 
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Sex and Gender   
Institutions work to generate, reinforce, and reproduce the current system and perpetuate 
the inequalities of social relations in at least two ways.  First, institutions conflate social 
kinds with natural kinds, and thereby allow social differences to appear to be fixed 
natural and objective facts about the way things are. Second, institutions defend current 
social systems – oppression, inequalities, and all – as essential to a valuable and valued 
culture; thereby allowing social differences to appear to be cultural treasures that reflect 
the way things ought to be. I consider each of these two ways in which institutions work 
to generate, reinforce, and reproduce inequalities of societies, before explaining why 
social inequalities can be oppressive and deadly. 
Within the institutions that make up society, the social categories of various 
groups, including race, skin color, ethnicity, caste, tribe, and even social class (through 
phrases like “blue blood” and “good breeding”) are often conflated with related 
biological categories and cited as a basis for various social roles and inequalities.  For 
example, the social categories of gender “woman” and “man” are often conflated with the 
significantly different biological categories of sex for human beings: “female” and 
“male.”  Male and female human beings exhibit basic biological differences, for example, 
different reproductive organs and abilities, and different chromosomal make ups.246 For 
the most part, however, male and female human beings are biologically similar.   
 
246 Biologists may be quick to point out that natural kinds (or natural categories) are not as neat and 
absolute as they are often portrayed.  “Male” and “female” may be clear and tidy natural categories when 
compared to the relatively messy social categories of “men” and “women.”  But even seemingly tidy 
dichotomies of “male” and “female” have trouble with, for example, hermaphrodites, abnormal 
chromosomal make ups, and elective “sex changes” in which reproductive organs are transformed, while 
chromosomal make ups remain the same.  
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Both males and females are helpless at birth, susceptible to disease, and to injury 
and death. They both require nutritious food, clean water, protection from harsh 
environments, and sometimes medical attention to survive.  Both males and females are 
capable of learning language, new concepts and skills.  They are both capable of 
reasoning, performing difficult tasks, introspection, making sense of the world, having 
hopes, fears, goals, and plans of their own, and of cooperating with others.  They are both 
capable of feeling pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy, and of being cruel and kind.  These 
few biological differences and many biological similarities are universal for males and 
females.  They occur throughout the history of the modern human species and across 
cultural and geographical boundaries in every society and in every social category of 
gender, race, religion, ethnicity, caste, and so forth.  
In contrast to sex differences, gender differences are neither universal nor fixed.  
The roles attributed to women and men are products of social practice that can, and often 
do, vary from one society to another and change over time.  As the Oxfam “Guide to 
Gender-Analysis Frameworks explains: 
Sex is a fact of human biology; gender is not.  The 
experience of being male or female differs dramatically 
from culture to culture.  The concept on gender is used by 
sociologists to describe all the socially given attributes, 
roles, activities, and responsibilities connected to being a 
male or a female in a given society.  Our gender identity 
determines how we are perceived, and how we are expected 
to think and act as women and men, because of the way 
society is organized.247 
247 March. 1999. p. 19. 
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However, when sex differences are conflated with the gender differences the social 
determined attributes of “women” and “men” created within a particular society are 
perceived to be fixed natural traits that are rooted in biology and hence are taken to be 
brute facts about the world that cannot be changed.  When social differences like gender 
are taken to be natural biological traits, the different roles, responsibilities, freedoms, 
membership requirements, and relative power shares of social groups are misunderstood 
to be natural (hence good – the way nature and/or God intended them to be) and therefore 
unchangeable facts about groups of human beings.   
Consider, for example, that in many societies formal and informal institutions 
encourage the belief that because females bear children and males do not, women are 
categorically and naturally more qualified, and therefore, better, parents than men.  It is 
often inferred from this that all and only women should rear children.  In some cases, it is 
further inferred that women who do not have children, or women who do not care for 
children full time, are not “real” or “good” women.  In more extreme – but certainly not 
uncommon – cases, the role of women is restricted entirely to the domestic sphere.  
Indeed in some cultures (for example in parts of rural India248), women are actually 
secluded from public view.  
Consequently, women’s participation in institutionalized public sphere activities, 
for example the market, the state, or the academy, is formally or informally restricted.  
The dubious and unofficial (indeed, often implicit,) grounds for their restriction is that 
because women are designed (by nature or God) for the domestic sphere, it would be 
 
248 Miller, Barbara, D. “Female Labor Participation and Female Seclusion in Rural India: A Regional 




unnatural, counter to their design, or even wrong, for them to participate in the public 
sphere.  In addition to the social stigma of “bad” woman; women who participate in the 
public sphere often do not receive the same privileges as men in the public sphere (as I 
make clear below).249 
Likewise, men who care for children – especially men who care for children full 
time – or do not have a robust public sphere involvement deviate from the socially 
determined role for men.  Consequently they are often excluded from many of the 
privileges granted to men (or “real men”) in society.  The often implicit grounds for their 
exclusion are that men are not designed for domestic participation.  So, individuals – both 
females and males – are socially penalized, often by exclusion, for deviating from the 
assigned gender roles of their society.   
Both formal and informal institutions generate, reinforce, and recreate social roles 
and relations.  Consider, for example, just a few of the ways in which institutions in the 
United States promote and preserve gender relations.250 Institutionalized norms dictate 
that full time employment is required to qualify for important benefits, such as health 
insurance, and that full time employment is at least forty hours a week.  This norm 
contributes to the social expectation that one parent of a family works forty hours a week 
(so that the family can have benefits) while the other stays home to care for children.  A 
 
249It is worth noting that so called “stay at home moms” in the US also feel excluded from public sphere 
based social communities.  This social phenomenon in the US is called “The Mommy War,” and is an 
example of what some feminists call the double bind of oppression – there is no empowering choice for 
women.  As Washington Post Writer Tracy Thompson writes: “Feminists say they value sisterhood, but 
behind the scenes, stay-at-home mothers often criticize office-going moms for neglecting their kids, and 
working mothers often disparage their at-home counterparts for getting some sort of retro free ride.”  For 
more see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/mommywars/mommy.htm
250 I chose to discuss gender roles in the United States in order to make it clear that limiting social roles, 
inequities, and oppression are not simply problems that plague developing nations. 
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forty hour minimum work week, makes it more difficult for couples to share child care 
and wage earning responsibilities, than would, for example, public health care, or an 
institutionalized system that allowed workers who work a minimum of 25, or 30 hours a 
week to earn benefits – which would allow two parents more of an opportunity to work 
both in the public sphere and in the private sphere.251 
Despite the 1963 federal law known as the Equal Pay Act – that is, the official 
institutional rule – it is also an institutionalized norm that men make more money than 
women.  On average, women who work full time in the Unites States earn seventy-seven 
cents for every dollar earned by men who do “comparable work.”252 This is a clear 
example of an inequality resulting from institutionalized gender bias.  (I discuss social 
inequalities and their consequences in greater detail below.)  This norm not only 
encourages families deciding to have a parent stay home to care for children to choose 
the woman (long after biologically significant factors like recovery from labor or breast 
feeding are relevant253), but it also plays a role in reinforcing the stereotype that women 
 
251 Consider the following example of an institutionalized Swedish policy that together with affordable 
child care facilitates rather than discourages women to participate in the public sphere: “Anna [Eriksson] 
and her partner, Henrik Persson, 33, live just outside Stockholm with their 16-month-old son and have 
another baby on the way.  Swedish couples — women and men — get 13 months paid leave and another 
three months at a fixed rate.  Of that, 60 days must be taken by the mother, another 60 by the father, and the 
rest can be divided however they choose. (New mothers in the U.S. who have worked one year receive 12 
weeks unpaid leave.) "The system means there's no financial hardship," says Anna, "and your job is still 
waiting for you afterward." (By law, employers must hold a new mother's job for her for the duration of her 
maternity leave.)” Women in Sweden still earn only 83% of the pay that men earn for comparable work.  
Hayworth, Abilgail. “The Best Country for Women” MSN News. June 27, 2007. 
 
252 Moreover, there is no state in which women earn as much as men; and people of color consistently earn 
less than white people, with women of color earning less than men in the same racial or ethnic category.  
US Census Bureau: “Current Population Survey” 2005. 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income.html It is also worth noting that according to the United 
Nation’s 2006 Human Development Report, there is there is no country in the world in which women make 
as much money as men.   
 
253 It is not necessary that men and women should be treated identically, only equally.  Societies and 
institutions should recognize relevant biological difference between females and males for example, by 
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(including single and childless women) are less competent contributors to the public 
sphere.   
Thus women are not only likely to have less money, and consequently a lower 
standard of living (or a need to depend on a man for material support), but also less social 
capital, or power to influence public sphere institutions, discourse and policies, for 
example, the wage gap between men and women.254 The fact that women are 
consistently underrepresented in elected US public offices may be a reflection of this 
claim.  The US has never had a female president or vice president, and despite women’s 
relatively great gains in public office in recent years, there are still significantly fewer 
women governors, senators, and congressional representatives.255 
These are just a few of many interwoven institutionalized norms that make up the 
social fabric of society.  Countless other formal and informal institutions such as the 
church, “mom’s groups,” and family expectations also play a role in reinforcing certain 
gender roles and social power distributions often justified with appeals to biology or 
nature.  These limited social roles result in limited options, or capabilities, for both 
women and men, but especially women, who in the United States and throughout the 
world consistently find themselves on the disadvantaged side of social relations.  In many 
cases (as discussed below), members of disadvantaged social groups face grave 
deprivations of basic needs including food and medical attention, as well as violence, and 
even death.  
 
accommodating breastfeeding mothers in the work force, or making testicular cancer screenings available 
to men.  
 
254 The same holds true for people of color. Cf. note 10. 
 
255 The presence of people of color in US politics is even lower. 
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Despite the institutionalized beliefs of members of a given society, gender roles 
and relations are not natural or fixed facts.  Indeed, gender roles and relations can and do 
change, even within one generation.  For example, professional women are much more a 
part of society than they were in our mothers’ or our grandmothers’ generation.  
Moreover, the current generation has introduced the increasingly socially recognized 
category “stay-at-home-dad.”  It is also true that gender roles and relations can and do 
vary, even within societies found in a single country – although many in the United States 
recognize the category of stay-at-home-dads, others still view arrangements in which men 
are primary caregivers and women are primary bread winners as “unnatural” and 
therefore wrong.  
These changes and variations as well as even a cursory examination of social 
roles in various societies reveal enough differences in gender roles to make it clear that 
social roles are not unchangeable facts about the world.  As economist Naila Kabeer 
explains: 
Some societies allow large areas of overlap in the lives of 
men and women while others are organized in ways which 
maintain a very rigid segregation between the world of men 
and the world of women, what men do and what women 
do.  What they tend to share is the idea that their own way 
of organizing roles and relations between women and men 
is the ‘natural’ and hence, only way of doing it.  In many 
South-east Asian societies, it is believed that women are 
naturally more commercial and concerned with money and 
they play a prominent role in trade and commerce.  In much 
of South Asia, of course, women are considered to be 
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hopeless with money, and financial matters are entrusted to 
men.256 
As the world becomes increasingly connected through technological advances, including 
easier travel, the internet, and satellite television, it becomes clear that there is more than 
one way to understand social relations and roles, and in turn, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to defend social roles as objective biological facts true of human beings 
throughout the world.  Of course, as discussed in the above example, even 
technologically advanced – or well developed – and relatively heterogeneous societies 
like the United States, institutions continue to produce, reinforce, and recreate social roles 
and relations – including inequalities – that are often defended as “natural” on biological 
grounds.    
 
Gender Roles and the Sanctity of Culture  
Another common line of defense for the inequalities generated and sustained by 
institutionalized power is that social relations are a matter of culture, and therefore a 
valuable and treasured aspect of identity for all involved.  As Kabeer observes: “A 
defense based on the sanctity of culture… moves us away from disputes over facts to 
disputes over values.”257 Thus, the fact that human beings, regardless of race, ethnicity, 
religious tradition, caste, or gender all share overwhelming biologically similarities, but 
have very different social roles within different societies, poses little or no threat to 
 
256 Naila Kabeer. “From Feminist Insights to Analytical Framework: An Institutional Perspective on 
Gender Inequality” in Naila Kabeer and Ramya Subrahmanian. Eds. Institutions, Relations, and Outcomes: 
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institutionalized power inequities justified by appeals to cultural values.  Moreover, the 
rules of official institutions that explicitly call for equal treatment of all can be quickly 
denounced on the grounds that social differences, and even inequalities, are a valued part 
of the informal, or “extra-institutional,” culture.  
Unlike biological facts, cultural norms and values are not expected to be 
independent facts about the world; instead they exist in the values and belief systems of 
society members.  Of course, in many cases, appeals to sanctity of culture are intended to 
justify a particular society’s brand of gender relations that conflate biological sex with 
gender.  Moreover, in some cases, culture is conflated with biology in a different sense.  
Arguments are made that by being born into a certain culture from parents of a certain 
culture, one is inextricably tied to the values of that culture as a matter of fact. Yet, such 
beliefs about membership in the cultural community are themselves products of culture 
that vary greatly from society to society.  For our present purposes, culture can be 
understood as the collective value system of a social community.  
 The formal and informal institutions of a given culture work to generate, 
reinforce, and recreate the values and beliefs of that culture, sometimes simply for the 
sake of reinforcing and recreating them – that is, for the sake of tradition.  Many of the 
values and beliefs of cultures are about social roles and relations.  Unfortunately, in many 
societies the role of some social groups, often women, is one of subordination reinforced 
by institutionalized violence justified as a part of the relevant culture.  As economist 
Kanchan Mathur explains:  
In some societies, the threat and practice of violence is used 
to ensure women remain within socially-defined boundaries 
of behavior and space; in others their status as “property” 
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of male family members deprives them of rights over their 
own bodies and sexuality within the familial sphere; in yet 
others, violence against women may constitute a 
legitimized and routinised aspect of prevailing cultural 
definitions of gender.258 
Institutions, limited social roles, inequalities, and even practices of violence, are all 
defended with appeals to the sanctity of culture.  In some cases, many of the individuals 
who are trapped in subordinate roles in which they are denied rights and subjected to 
violence are among those who defend the oppressive practices of their cultures.   
Consider the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), or female circumcision, 
which takes place in twenty-eight African countries as well as several other parts of the 
world.  FGM is a procedure in which all or part of the external female genitalia is 
removed, usually with crude instruments (including, pieces of broken glass and old razor 
blades) that have not been sterilized, and no anesthetic.  This institutionalized practice is 
reinforced by the market, the family, religion, marriage, the community and various 
overlapping institutional forces.   
Performing such circumcisions is an established trade for some women who 
depend on the practice for their livelihood.  Female circumcision is believed to ensure 
marital fidelity, enhance fertility, and promote child survival.  In fact, FGM makes 
intercourse extremely painful – which may limit infidelity.  However, FGM can also lead 
to sexual dysfunction, which undermines fertility.  Moreover, FGM increases the risks of 
child and maternal mortality in labor.  Nevertheless, men will refuse to marry (and to pay 
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dowries for) girls259 who have not been circumcised.  In societies that practice FGM, 
female genitalia are believed to be unsightly and dirty; removing them is said to be 
necessary in order to promote health.  In fact, the procedure often results in infections, 
and in some cases death.  Some believe that the procedure is required by Islam, but the 
practice predates the Islamic faith.  The procedure is often considered a right of passage 
into womanhood.260 
Citing the above social norms as their reasons, families who want to promote or 
preserve their good name in the community look past the pain, health issues, and risks of 
death as they subject their young daughters to the procedure.  Likewise, girls who want to 
be (viewed as) “good women” and eligible for marriage within the community (as young 
as nine years old) agree to endure the procedure despite the pain and the risks.  As they 
do so, they reinforce and recreate the social roles of the “good family” and “good 
woman” within their cultural society.   
The United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization (WHO), and several 
other national and international organizations recognize female genital mutilation as an 
act of institutionalized violence against women.  Girls who are subjected to FGM lack 
several valuable capabilities, including Martha Nussbaum’s central capabilities of bodily 
health and bodily integrity.  Yet, countless men and women have defended the 
excruciatingly painful, ultimately unhealthy, and sometimes deadly, practice of FGM as a 
traditional act sacred to their culture.  They often reject the criticism and concerns of the 
 
259 The fact that in some communities that practice FGM girls are often given by their families to marriages 
to men with multiple wives in exchange for dowries as young as nine years old is a distinct, but related 
oppressive cultural practice.   
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UN and the WHO as mere outsider interference.  For example, Eunice Sitatian Kaelo, a 
Maasai woman from Kenya describes her mother as saying: 
Female circumcision is our culture.  Why should we be 
forced to abandon it when we were born into it?  
Abandoning our culture would be annoying our ancestors.  
It would bring a curse to the entire community.261 
Thus, at first blush it seems that at least some women choose FGM as a valuable part of 
their culture, and that discontinuing the practice would undermine their agency.   
 However, it is very unlikely that women are acting as agents (at least not the 
robust sense of the word found in the capability approach) when they defend female 
circumcision, or any system of violence or oppression.  Cultural violence is often 
perpetuated by oppressive institutions that render genuine agency impossible.  Given the 
rules of the society in which they find themselves, girls who submit to FGM (or accept 
other forms of violence as simply part of being a woman) may feel forced to choose the 
lesser of two evils.  For example, a girl can either risk her life while submitting to an 
excruciatingly painful procedure and gain the acceptance of the community, or shame her 
family (and her ancestors) and be ostracized by her community and all of its resources.  
This “choice” seems even less like an act of agency when one thinks that girls are often 
subjected to FGM at a very young age – as young as nine years old in the case of the 
Massai.   
Moreover, from within the confines of any society, it is often difficult to 
recognize the institutional patterns that we take to be part of our lives, even when they 
 
261 Olekina, Ledama.  “FGM: Maassai Women Speak Out” In Cultural Survival Quarterly. Issue 28, 
Volume 4, December 2004. Cambridge, MA.  
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result in terrible inequalities, oppression, violence, and death.  As Simone Weil tell us: 
“Someone who does not see a pane of glass is not aware of not seeing it.”262 Agents have 
some understanding their choices.263 As a Massai, Kaelo herself was proud to be 
circumcised as a young teenager during a coming of age ceremony.  It pleased her family 
and she gained status in the community.  However, she has since become more aware of 
the risks involved and declared that it is her life’s ambition to abolish the procedure 
among the Massai.264 
Whether defended as matters of fact, or in the name of cultural sanctity, 
institutionalized power too often results in the relative deprivation of the members of 
some social groups and privileges others by confining individuals to certain narrow – 
often oppressive – social roles.  These social roles are continuously reinforced and 
recreated by society’s various formal and informal institutions through both official and 
implicit social rules.  Rigid institutionalized social roles prevent development of agency 
and limit the expansion of capability sets of individual members of social groups.  For 
members of underprivileged or subordinate social groups, these limitations frequently 
result in social, and sometimes violent, oppression (as discussed above), as well as grave 
material deprivations, and even death.   
 
262 Simone Weil. “Are We Singing For Justice?” in Ecrits de Londres, trans. Marina Barabas.   
 
263 What exactly it means to understand a choice is an interesting and important epistemological question.  
It is also, beyond the scope of this essay.  How well one must understand a choice in order to act as an 
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sufficient to say that a young girl of nine or ten years old acting on the encouragement of her parents (the 
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In many cases, honoring the responsibilities and privileges associated with social 
relations are taken to be so important that doing so is on par with – or even trumps – 
meeting the universal biological needs of some socially disadvantaged human beings.  In 
the case of gender relations, such inequalities result in the oppression and death of 
millions of women throughout the world.  Recall from Chapter One that Sen uses the 
phrase “missing women” to refer to the many women that would be alive today if their 
access to medical treatment, food, and other essential needs had been equal to the access 
men in their communities enjoy.  Although women face disadvantages and oppression in 
many parts of the world, missing women are especially prevalent in paternalistic cultures 
in which resources are scarce.  However, Sen effectively shows that discrepancies in 
survival rates of male and females has less to do with scarcity of resources and more to 
do with patriarchical societies.  (I discuss this in greater detail in Part Two of this 
chapter.)  
In light of the gravity of social inequalities resulting from institutionalized rules, 
or patterns, it is clear that an approach to human development should account for the role 
that institutionalized social power plays in generating, reinforcing, and reproducing such 
oppressive and deadly inequalities, and work against such power structures to empower 
individual members of disadvantaged groups.  As stated in the introduction to this 
chapter, some scholars have expressed concern that Sen’s work on the capability 
approach does not do enough towards promoting empowerment in the face of 
institutionalized power.  In the following section, I assess Sen’s work on inequalities and 
empowerment.  
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Before moving on to Part Two, I want to make clear that any consideration of 
inequality or oppression within the context of development reveals the painful reality that 
women are by far the largest and most consistently oppressed group.  For this reason 
“empowerment issues” are often equated with or reduced to “women’s issues.”265 I
believe that such a reduction is a mistake.  When we reduce all social empowerment to 
female empowerment, we fail to recognize not only the limitations of the social category 
of men, but also the complex reality that individuals participate in more than one social 
group and that such participation can result in cross-cutting inequalities in the structural 
hierarchy of society.  Any adequate theory of empowerment must recognize that 
institutionalized social power creates and sustains not only inequalities rooted in the 
social relationships of gender, but also inequalities that exist in relationships among other 
social groups or categories including: caste, race, social-economic class, age, marital 
status, educational status, sexual orientation, religion, tribe and so forth.   
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter One, there is no country in which women 
are treated as well as men.266 Furthermore, as Kabeer rightly points out, gender is by far 
the most significant social relation because “for any given category of disadvantaged 
groups in society, women, by and large, suffer from all of the disadvantages of men in 
their class but in an intensified form as a result of direct gender discrimination in the 
allocation of resources and responsibilities.”267 Thus, while we must be careful not to 
commit the common mistake of simply reducing empowerment issues to women’s issues, 
we are justified in focusing on gender relations and the inequalities that affect the lives of 
 
265 For example, the United Nations’ empowerment index is a “Gender Empowerment Index.” 
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women when discussing and analyzing institutional social power (as I have done in this 
section and Sen does throughout his work).  Sen does not make the mistake of equating 
social inequality or empowerment issues with women’s issues.  He does, however, focus 
almost exclusively on gender relations and women’s agency. 
 
Part Two: Sen, Institutionalized Power, and Empowerment  
In this section, I assess Amartya Sen’s work in light of concerns that he fails to offer an 
adequate account of the important role that institutionalized power plays in generating, 
reinforcing, and reproducing the inequalities that prevent or limit various groups of 
individuals from acting as agents or expanding their capability sets – that is, from being 
empowered.  I discuss the valuable – and often overlooked – contributions that Sen 
makes towards understanding the relationship between institutionalized power and 
empowerment as he focuses on gender roles and gender inequalities.  I find that although 
Sen does recognize the significance of institutionalized social roles, he does not do 
enough to address fully the many issues of institutionalized power that are relevant to 
empowerment.   
However, I submit that this failure to engage fully all of the issues of 
institutionalized power is not a major deficiency either of Sen’s work, or of the capability 
approach.  Sen is aware of the significance of institutions and social power, and has done 
some important work in the right direction (or so I argue).  Moreover, I propose that both 
his work, and the capability approach, can be extended (with some help from feminist 
theory) to offer a more complete and compelling account of the relevant issues of 
institutionalized power.   
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Survival Ratios, Inequalities, and Empowerment 
One reason Sen’s critics may often overlook his contributions towards understanding the 
institutionalized power is that his analysis does not focus on institutions directly.  
Consequently he seldom uses the language of institutions and institutionalized power.  
This failure to focus on the level of institutions and social power weakens Sen’s treatment 
of institutional power and empowerment.  (I discuss these limitations at the end of this 
chapter.)  Nevertheless, I believe that Sen can and should be read as understanding and 
addressing many of the issues of institutionalized power raised in Part One.  Sen’s 
important work (much of which has been conducted with economist Jean Drèze) has 
made clear just how serious the institutionalized social inequalities women face truly are.   
Instead of analyzing institutional rules, Sen focuses on statistical analysis, most 
significantly, female to male survival ratios.268 Sen explains that he focuses on this ratio 
not only because “this indicator of gender inequality is important in its own right” but 
also because “it sheds some interesting light on other aspects of gender relations, and 
through that on a number of interlinked features of … society.”269 In Sen’s work such 
“other aspects of gender relations” and relevant “interlinked features of society” are 
usually represented by statistical findings that reflect institutionalized gender relations.  
For example, female literacy, paid labor, property rights, political participation, fertility 
rates, and more.  Increased female participation in these areas often serves as proxies for 
enhanced agency, or empowerment, within Sen’s account.  
 
268 Female to male survival ratios represent how many females are alive for every living male.  So, if the 
ratio is 1.05, then there are 105 females for every 100 males.  Likewise if the ratio is 0.86, then there are 
only 86 females for every 100 males.  
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Sen has shown that when given equal care and access to important resources 
including food and health care, women tend to have lower age-specific mortality rates 
than men.  In other words, when women have relatively equal basic capabilities, they 
tend to live longer than men, resulting in comparatively high female to male ratios.  For 
example, in the North America and Europe the female to male ratio is around 1.05.270 
However, in much of the world – particularly in Asia and North Africa – millions of 
women are “missing” in the sense of being dead prematurely as a result of avoidable 
gender biases in terms of access to essential resources.  In such places, female to male 
ratios range from .98 in North Africa to as low as .86 in parts of North India.271 
One remarkable contribution of Sen’s work is the revelation that the differences in 
female to male ratios found in different parts of the world are not determined by the 
availability of resources or economic growth within a region.  Rather the differences are 
largely correlated with institutionalized differences in the gender relations of the relevant 
societies.  It is worth noting that Sen’s work consistently recognizes institutionalized 
patterns and practices, even if he does not consistently refer to them as 
“institutionalized.”   
Consider the range of female to male ratios in India.  In the northwestern states of 
Haryana and Punjab, which have experienced rapid economic growth since 
independence, and which have far higher per-capita incomes than other Indian states, the 
female to male ratios are very low: 0.86 and 0.87, respectively.272 However, in the 
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southern part of the country, ratios are relatively high: 0.99 in Tamil Nadu, 0.98 in 
Andhra, and most notably 1.06 in Kerala.273 Sen explains: 
These regional patterns of female-male ratios are consistent 
with what is known of the character of gender relations in 
different parts of the country.  The north-western states, for 
instance, are notorious for highly unequal gender relations, 
some symptoms of which include the continued practice of 
female seclusion, low female labour-hour force 
participation rates, a large gender gap in literacy rates, 
extremely restricted female property rights, strong boy 
preferences in fertility decisions, widespread neglect of 
female children, and drastic separation of a married woman 
from her family.  In all these respects, the social standing of 
women is relatively better in south India.274 
Furthermore, in Kerala, where the female to male ratio is 1.06 (higher than any of the 
major regions in the world, except Eastern Europe),275 there is “a major success in the 
expansion of female literacy, considerable prominence of women in influential social and 
professional activities, and a tradition of matriliny.”276 
The institutionalized values of societies reflected in these statistical social 
differences are also to blame for the fact that many “women tend to fare quite badly in 
relative terms compared with men, even in the same families.”277 Girls and women are 
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often not valued as much within the household and therefore do not enjoy the same basic 
capabilities as boys and men, including the freedom to be well nourished.  This 
institutionalized practice holds true, even when there are sufficient resources to ensure 
proper nourishment for the whole family, and in spite of periods of economic growth.   
In fact, Sen has found that in many parts of India “higher levels of poverty tend to 
go with higher female-male ratios.”278 Sen suggests that this may because “the 
partnership aspect of gender relations is stronger in poorer households, where survival 
depends on effective cooperation, than among privileged households where women tend 
to have more dependent and symbolic position.”279 Sen presents evidence that suggests 
that this “more dependant” feature of the role women as a social group within the 
household, may affect the status of women in different classes and castes differently.  
This suggests that in at least some castes and classes, the systematic oppression and 
deprivation of women and girls is likely to be defended as a matter culture. 
It is a common, and well supported,280 social anthropological hypothesis that as a 
region experiences economic growth, the lower (scheduled) castes engage in a process of 
emulation of higher – more patriarchal – castes, in which the role of women is limited 
and subservient.  Tragically, the lifestyle of women plays the role of some sort of a social 
status symbol during this process.  (A stay-at-home wife is thought to be a sign of 
success.)  In other words, as lower castes experience some economic gains, the role of 
women is often more restricted in the household; and this restricted role is correlated with 
 








the deadly deprivation and low survival rates of women and girls.  Thus, Sen’s work can 
be understood as showing that, insofar as economic expansion or upward economic 
mobility has an influence on female to male ratios in regions (of India) where society 
reinforces and recreates patriarchal gender relations, it seems that economic growth 
actually leads to some intensification of gender bias (especially among scheduled castes). 
Sen concludes: “Achieving greater gender equality involves a process of active social 
change which is not automatically linked with economic growth.”281 
Sen shows that economic development, understood as a simple increase in GDP 
(as within the economic growth perspective discussed in Chapters One and Two,) does 
not promise a remedy for – and may actually intensify – the sort of institutionalized 
gender bias that generates the social power inequalities that, in turn results in the 
premature deaths of girls and women.  Sen also provides evidence that human 
development efforts that target the empowerment of women and girls, that is, the 
expansion of female capability sets as well as the enhancement of female agency, are 
very effective in mitigating gender bias in survival rates.  Statistical analysis shows that 
capabilities that are likely to give women more voice in the home, including education 
(especially literacy) and paid work outside the home, are among the most significant 
variables in raising female to male ratios (in India and elsewhere).282 As Sen writes: 
[W]orking outside the home and earning an independent 
income tend to have a clear impact on enhancing the social 
standing of women in the household and society.  Her 
contribution to the prosperity of the family is then more 
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visible, and she also has more voice, because of being less 
dependant on others.  Further, outside employment often 
has useful “educational” effects, in terms of exposure to the 
world outside the household, making her agency more 
effective.  Similarly, women’s education strengthens 
women’s agency and also tends to make it more informed 
and skilled.283 
Sen is aware of the importance of institutionalized power differences in both formal and 
informal institutions.   He clearly works to show that it is the social standing of women in 
the household and society and not simply GNP, or even household income, that must be 
changed if women are to be empowered as effective agents, and to enjoy the basic 
capabilities that not only enhance their well being, but also make possible their survival.   
Sen also suggests that when women are empowered (through education, 
employment, property rights, etc.), all people – men, women, girls and boys – benefit.  
When women are literate and work outside the home, their own social standing (or, share 
of social power) is not the only one improved.  The social status of girls also improves, 
which, in turn, results in a more equitable intra-family distribution of resources, including 
food and medical care.  In other words, there is a correlation between higher levels of 
female literacy and labor force participation, and lower levels of female disadvantage in 
child survival.284 
Women’s employment alone does not seem to have a clearly significant influence 
on overall child mortality rates, that is, rates for girls and boys, under five.  (Yet, Sen 
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suggests that more research needs to be done on this topic.)  This is most likely due to the 
fact that women who work outside of the home are often burdened with a “double day” 
doing all that is required of them at their job and all the domestic chores of the private 
sphere including child care.  Moreover, as Sen notes: “men typically show great 
reluctance to share the domestic chores.”285 Under such circumstances, child care is only 
one of many important duties women must juggle, and therefore may not significantly 
improve.  
Unlike women’s employment, women’s literacy has a strong and obvious 
influence on child mortality rates in many countries throughout the world.  For example, 
when other variables are kept constant, “an increase in the crude female literacy rate 
from, say, 22 per cent (the actual 1981 figure [for India]) to 75 per cent reduces the 
predicted value of under-five mortality for males and females combined from 156 per 
thousand (again, the actual 1981 figure) to 110 per thousand.”286 In contrast, an increase 
in male literacy from 22 to 75 per cent only reduces mortality rates for children under 
five from 167 per thousand to 141 per thousand.  Furthermore, a 50 per cent reduction in 
economic poverty only reduces under-five mortality rates from 156 per thousand to 153 
per thousand.287 
Sen shows that an increase in women’s empowerment, represented by an increase 
in female literacy, paid labor, property rights, and other statistical proxies for women’s 
empowerment, also results in some real benefits to the lives of men.  Not only do men 
benefit from the ideal and material contributions women make through work and public 
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participation, men also enjoy a less violent society.  Sen reports that in India, as well as 
other parts of the world, “homicide rates are highly correlated (inversely) with the 
female-male ratio in the population.  This correlation is very robust.”288 When one 
considers that men are both the victims and the perpetrators of the vast majority of 
homicides289 it is clear that lower homicide rates benefit men, perhaps even more so than 
the rest of society.  
Finally, Sen presents evidence that suggests that when women are empowered as 
agents within the household and society, they have fewer children.  This is good not only 
for women, but also for the environment, upon whose limited resources everyone 
depends.  As Sen notes: “The adverse effects of high birthrates powerfully include the 
denial of substantial freedoms—through persistent childbearing and child rearing—
routinely imposed on many Asian and African women.”290 Moreover, lower fertility 
rates reduce the “general problems of environmental overcrowding from which both men 
and women suffer.”291 It is remarkable that female literacy and female labor participation 
are the only known variables to have a significant effect on fertility rates.   
 
Sen’s Contributions Examined 
It is clear that even though Sen neither focuses his analysis on the rules of institutions, 
nor always uses the language associated with institutional power, he has made several 
valuable contributions towards understanding institutionalized gender roles, gender 
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inequalities, and their relationship to empowerment.  I consider the following to be 
among his most significant contributions to understanding institutionalized power:  (1) 
gender inequalities rooted in social roles results in the premature death of millions of 
women.  (2) Deadly gender inequalities do not automatically decline – but, in fact, may 
intensify – as a region experiences economic growth.  (3) Increases in certain capabilities, 
for example, literacy, paid labor participation, property ownership, and so on, among 
women, lead to women having a higher status in the household and society, and in turn to 
lower child mortality rates, lower homicide rates, and lower fertility rates (which are 
good not only for women, but also for the environment).   
Two important and overlapping lessons can be drawn from this third contribution.  
First, changes in the rules or patterns generated and sustained by formal public sphere 
institutions, for example, gender aware labor codes and educational programs, can have a 
great influence on the patterns informal private sphere institutions, for example, food 
distribution in the household.  In other words, contrary to popular belief, institutions are 
not separate and independent entities (as implied, for example, by the often professed 
official US policy of “separation of Church and State”).  Instead, norms, values, and 
practices cut across institutions in such a way that a change in the (official or unofficial) 
rules one institution can influence the rules of other institutions – even those in a different 
sphere of life.  (Consider the influence both religious beliefs and scientific work have on 
the political issue of whether or not to fund stem cell research in the US.)  Second, the 
benefits of female empowerment extend beyond women to all people in society – men, 
girls, and boys.  Hence, female empowerment is not just a “special interest issue” that 
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benefits only some sub-set of the population, but is important to the well-being of all 
people. 
Sen’s analysis provides important empirical evidence that an increase in female 
employment and literacy are the keys to female survival.  However, statistical analysis 
alone cannot tell us how to bring about such increases in a patriarchal society in which 
men dominate women and the dependence of women is valued as a means to increased 
social status and power.  Sen goes beyond statistical analysis as he makes clear that he is 
aware that a change in the roles of women in a patriarchal culture requires a change in 
social norms and values.  That is to say, Sen understands that in order for oppression and 
tragic inequalities justified on the grounds of culture to change, the culture – that is the 
norms and values of society – must change.  Neither simple increases in economic 
resources, nor mere changes in the official or explicit rules and policies of formal 
institutions, will result in expansion of capability-sets or the enhancement of agency of 
women.  
Sen goes further to say that he believes that democracy – particularly a robust 
democracy in which women are full participants in public dialogue – is vital to changing 
sexist social norms and values.  Sen holds that: “the practice of democracy gives the 
citizens an opportunity to learn from each other, and can profoundly influence the values 
and priorities of the society.”  He adds that, “[v]alue formation is as much a democratic 
activity as is the use of social values in the determination of public policy and social 
response.”292 
292 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom. Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 2002. 
(p. 25.) 
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Sen acknowledges that bolstering democracy in general, and the participation of 
women (and other underprivileged social groups) in particular within a society where 
privileged (male) elites are likely to use their dominant share of social power to recreate 
and reinforce their advantage is not easy.  Indeed he concedes that value shaping “public 
dialogs are…hard to achieve...despite [formal] democracy, because of the low level of 
elementary education, especially for women;”293 and that social inequality “often 
prevents the underprivileged from participating effectively in democratic institutions, and 
gives disproportionate power to those who command crucial resources such as income, 
education and influential connections.”294 In other words, Sen recognizes that we are 
faced with a serious problem: women need a robust democracy to change values enough 
to gain access to paid labor, education, and other empowering capabilities that enhance 
voice and social power.  Yet, a robust democracy is difficult to achieve without the 
education and enhanced voice and social power of women.   
Sen offers two complementary solutions to what he calls “the problem of 
voicelessness:” assertion and solidarity. For Sen, assertion, or self-assertion, occurs 
when oppressed or underprivileged individuals assert themselves through political 
organization or mobilization, for example, through the establishment of a women’s 
cooperative that supports individual women as they attempt to enter the market place.  
Sen is aware that many underprivileged do not have real opportunities for self assertion 
due to the current institutional power structures.  As he explains: 
The daily struggle leaves them with little leisure to engage 
in political activity, and efforts to do so sometimes invite 
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physical repression.  Lack of formal education and access 
to information restricts their ability to intervene in public 
discussions and electoral debates, or to make effective use 
of the media, the courts, and other democratic institutions.  
Lack of adequate collective organizations further enhances 
this political marginalization.295 
Where there is little or no opportunity for assertion, Sen believes that solidarity must play 
a major role in expanding the capabilities of the underprivileged.  Solidarity with 
oppressed groups occurs when individuals or social groups, who are not themselves the 
primary victims of social injustice but are better placed to advance the cause of the 
underprivileged due to their own relatively privileged positions in society, align 
themselves with the disadvantaged group and organize political movements on their 
behalf. 
Although solidarity is a valuable and often necessary part of the empowerment, 
there are risks and problems with solidarity movements.  Solidarity movements can result 
in an overly dependent relationship in which the unprivileged group fails to gain their 
own voice.  Such movements can be an inauthentic representation – or worse – a 
misrepresentation of the unprivileged group’s interests.  Moreover, as Sen points out, the 
most disadvantaged and voiceless social groups are often “unattractive partners” for 
solidarity-based movements, which tends to reinforce their marginalized position within 
the social framework.  
It is clear that Sen does a lot of work towards addressing the important role that 
institutionalized power plays in generating, perpetuating, and recreating the inequalities 
 
295 Sen. 2002. p. 29. 
192
that prevent or limit various groups of individuals from acting as agents or expanding 
their capability sets – that is, from actively engaging the empowerment process or being 
empowered.  He makes several important observations about the effects of capability-set 
expansion to include “agency enhancing” capabilities that improve the social standing of 
women both in the household and in society.  He recognizes the need to change social 
norms and values – and not just GNP, household incomes, or official institutional policies 
in order to combat oppression.  He makes a useful proposal about how to advance 
empowerment through democratic participation – at times facilitated by assertion and 
solidarity – in the face of the reality of institutionalized inequalities of social power, 
including inequalities of voice in public dialogue.  These are all important steps towards a 
complete account of empowerment in the face of oppression generated by 
institutionalized power.  
Despite these important contributions, however, it can nevertheless be argued that 
Sen stops short of fully accounting for many of the relevant issues of institutionalized 
power.  In not directly engaging institutional frameworks; Sen’s work inevitably fails to 
capture all of the relevant issues.  It is only through directly analyzing the official, and 
especially the unofficial, rules of institutions that generate and reinforce social roles that 
we are able to get a more complete picture of how gender and other social relations, and 
in turn inequalities and oppression, are generated and maintained.  Without focusing on 
institutions and social power, Sen’s important statistical focused work can provide only 
part of the story of how we are to understand the institutional frameworks that determine 
social relations, and in turn, to transform social roles.  
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Sen recognizes, for example, that men are often unwilling partners in women’s 
empowerment.  He mentions “problems arising from inflexible male participation”296 and 
that due to male influence and gender bias “it is much harder for women to start a 
business enterprise, even of a very modest size.”297 But he does not fully analyze the 
social relationship between men and women.  With the exception of his observations 
about homicide rates, Sen does not comment on how a change in the social role of 
women is bound to change the social role of men.   
For example, Sen laments that men are unwilling partners in the domestic sphere 
and that this results in a double day of work for women and – by no coincidence – low 
standards of care for children.  Yet he does not address how the attitudes and social role 
of men, or any other aspects of gender relations, can and should change as women 
become increasingly empowered.  Sen fails to address the fact that a change in the 
institutionalized social role of women is a change in the social framework as a whole, 
and, as such, it will affect the role of men.  For example, when the role of women 
changes from having no say in household decisions to having some say in such decisions, 
the role of men – who previously had complete say in such decisions – has also changed.  
If she now has some power in household decisions, he cannot retain complete power in 
the same decisions.   
As we seek to bring about the changes that empower women, it is important to 
recognize and understand how men will adjust (positively and negatively) to changes in 
the role of women.  Put more generally, Sen does not offer a way to understand the 
relational aspects of social relations (including gender relations) and their part in 
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determining social (gender) roles.  This is important, because as discussed in Part One of 
this chapter, these institutionalized social relationships that define the roles, 
responsibilities, and freedoms, and in turn, determine the power shares of individual 
group members.   
 In addition, Sen does not do enough to address the fact that institutions are not 
themselves neutral.  He helpfully makes clear that female literacy and participation in the 
work force are empowering in that they give women a greater voice in both the private 
and the public sphere.  He also concedes that, due to gender bias (or implicit social rules), 
it is much more difficult for a woman to start a business than for a man to do so.  
However, Sen does not go further to explain what the implicit rules of social bias are, or 
the role that such rules play in reinforcing gender roles in the work place, in schools, or in 
court houses, nor does he explain how we can work to change biased rules.   
This shortcoming is significant because the very institutions that Sen is counting 
on to be the instruments of empowerment, including schools, the work place, and even 
the parts of the robust democracy that Sen calls for (for example the press, political 
parties, and so on,) are themselves infected with gender biased social rules.  Thus, Sen’s 
call for democracy, assertion, and solidarity is not enough to understand how to transform 
biased institutional frameworks and the resulting oppressive and sometimes deadly social 
roles.  To sum up, it seems Sen does not do enough to show how his framework can 
represent either the complete complex reality of social relations or the often biased 
institutions that make up our societies.  Consequently, he does he provide a complete 
understanding of what can be done to empower individual members of disadvantaged 
groups in oppressive societies.  
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I do not believe, however, that Sen’s incomplete treatment of institutionalized 
power should be seen as a fatal flaw of his work or of the capability approach.  After all, 
Sen has already made – and continues to make – several momentous (indeed, Nobel Prize 
winning) contributions to international development ethics in general and several quality 
contributions towards our evaluation and understanding of institutionalized power in 
particular.  Moreover, he is clearly aware that more work needs to be done towards 
recognizing the complex social and cultural relations that result in social inequality, even 
if he chooses to leave that work for another time, or for others to pursue.  For example, 
Sen acknowledges that there are patterns of interest in “the association between gender 
inequality on the one hand, and cultural and political distinctions (such as the scope for 
religion-based politics)” on the other, which call for “further social, anthropological and 
cultural investigations.”298 Sen quickly adds that he does not attempt – at least not the 
current context – to take on such investigations.  Thus, it does not follow from the fact 
that Sen has not fully analyzed the role of institutionalized power in generating and 
sustaining inequalities, that he is unaware of the importance of such analysis.  Nor does it 
follow that the capability perspective cannot accommodate a more complete analysis of 
institutionalized power and inequalities.   
One could argue, however, that Sen’s failure to place a greater emphasis on 
institutional power is a sign that he does not recognize how very significant it is for 
empowerment and agency.  I concede that such a failure – a failure to recognize fully the 
importance of institutional power – would certainly be at least a minor defect in Sen’s 
work.  However, I am not convinced that we have enough evidence to conclude that Sen 
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does so fail.  We do know – based on his work discussed above – that he at least 
recognizes the importance of such power and – to some extent – the consequences of 
social inequalities.  Furthermore, in this chapter I am only concerned with making the 
weaker, but nevertheless significant, claim that while Sen might (or might not) fully 
recognize the importance of institutionalized power, the account that he gives of this 
important factor as it relates to social inequality and oppression is valuable, but limited.  
Again, this limited treatment should not be considered an incurable shortcoming of either 
Sen’s work or the capability approach.     
 
A Promising Direction:  Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach 
Although I do not attempt to develop such an account in this essay, I believe (and 
intend to demonstrate in a future project) that work done in feminist economics and 
philosophy would prove exceptionally helpful in augmenting the capability approach’s 
empowerment concepts of agency and capability-set expansion in a way that fit nicely 
within the capability approach .  For example, Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach,
focuses directly on both the official and the implicit social rules of the formal and 
informal institutions that make up society.  Compared to Sen’s focus on statistical 
information (including male to female survival ratios) as proxies for empowerment, this 
direct focus on the level of institutions facilitates a deeper and more informed 
understanding of institutionalized power and its role in producing and reproducing gender 
relations and oppressive and deadly inequalities.  In this way, Kabeer makes possible a 
more complete understanding of how to cultivate empowerment in the face of such 
institutionalized forces.  As Kabeer explains, her “framework is intended to direct 
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attention to the existence of gender inequalities in the prevailing distribution of resources, 
responsibilities and power and to analyze how they are thrown up by operations of the 
institutions which govern social life.”299 
In focusing on institutions, Kabeer’s approach evaluates the explicitly expressed 
or official ideologies and rules professed by institutions (for example, “all are equal 
before the law”).  Kabeer observes that the official principles of institutions – including 
informal institutions – do not often represent the actual social rules and inequalities that 
are generated and sustained by institutions.  She notes that when inequalities are 
explicitly observed within institutions, they “tend to be explained in terms that justify 
them.”300 
Thus, inequalities within the family and community tend to 
be attributed to natural difference, divine will, culture and 
tradition while inequalities within firms, bureaucracies and 
other public bodies are rationalized as the operation of 
neutral market forces or merit based rules of recruitment 
and promotion.301 
Accordingly, there is not only a level of official policy at which most institutions 
explicitly pledge to uphold principles of justice and equality, but also a level of official 
explanations and rationalizations for the inequalities that systematically occur despite 
their pledged efforts.  Both levels of explanation are, of course, separate from the actual 
social practices upheld and systematically reproduced.  However, the official policies and 
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explanations are frequently and uncritically reproduced in all areas of society through text 
books, public policy, the media, and public discourse.  Kabeer holds that: “[I]t is the role 
of analysis to move beyond the “official” ideologies professed by, or attributed to, 
different institutional arenas to a critical empirical scrutiny of the actual rules and 
practices through which their different organizational forms are constituted.”302 This 
point, which is not mentioned by Sen, is crucial because political movements and 
development interventions that neglect to look beyond the levels of official “value-
neutral” policies and explanations will fail to grasp and engage the actual roots of 
oppressive inequalities.   
Kabeer’s approach also fully explains another point Sen does not take far enough: 
the essential role social relations in understanding institutional power and empowerment.  
Kabeer understands that from the moment a child enters the world the child is recognized 
not just a boy or a girl, but as a son or a daughter.  As she explains:  
[W]hile the parent-child relationship is gender neutral as a 
concept, in reality it refers to highly gendered relationships 
between mothers, fathers, daughters, and sons, which are 
enacted by individual women, men, girls, and boys at the 
individual level but which are also governed by cultural 
norms and values that spell out how they treat each other 
and what they can expect of each other.303 
Kabeer recognizes that institutionalized gender relations, including gender inequalities 
are entrenched in society and individual concepts of identity: “they have taken root in the 
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hearts and minds of both women and men.”304 Consequently, they will be difficult to 
change.  Kabeer considers in depth what such changes might mean for both women and 
men, the strategies some may use to resist change (including, the idea that change is 
unnatural, or will destroy the culture, or the family, and so forth).  She also considers 
strategies that may be employed to overcome such resistance, including recruiting the 
support of men.   
Most significantly, Kabeer makes a compelling case for transformative 
development practices.  Transformative development strategies do not simply attempt to 
integrate women and girls into existing institutions (for example, schools, the work force, 
politics, and so forth) with existing male biases.  Instead such strategies seek to transform 
the gender biased values, norms, and practices of such institutions.305 Kabeer appreciates 
that such transformative strategy is a long term strategy and that “most women will need 
resources to cope with the present situation before they can take on the task of 
transforming that situation.”306 
I will not further elaborate on Kabber’s contributions to the theory and practice of 
development in the face of institutionalized power here.  Instead, I briefly suggest that her 
account is compatible with the capability approach.  Like the capability approach, 
Kabeer’s approach is an approach to human development.  Oxfam describes the approach 
as concerned “not simply about economic growth, or improved productivity,” but with 
“human well-being” and “human dignity” which, on this view are “seen as concerning 
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survival, security, and autonomy, where autonomy means the ability to participate fully 
in those decisions that shape one’s choices and one’s life chances at both the personal and 
the collective level.”307 Thus both approaches hold that development must extend 
beyond markets and economic growth to all spheres of life.  Moreover, Kabeer’s 
conception of empowerment can be read as promoting not only capability-set expansion 
(or changes in the distribution of “resources and opportunities”), but also enhancing 
agency among the disadvantaged.  For Kabeer: 
Empowerment processes seek to bring about changes in the 
distribution of material and symbolic resources and 
opportunities between men and women within the 
development process but also—and crucially—to bring 
about changes in the beliefs and values which they have 
assimilated in the process of acquiring a gendered sense of 
selfhood where these constitute a constraint on their 
capacity for exercising agency in their own lives.308 
Even though I cannot in the present essay provide more than a suggestive account of 
Kabeer’s work or more than an adumbration of its potential use within the capability 
perspective, I believe the anticipations I do provide show that Kabeer’s work would 
extend and enhance Sen’s work and the capability approach.  Furthermore, in so doing, I 
have begun to defend my claim – and will do so more thoroughly in future work – that 
Sen’s account and the capability approach can be extended to accommodate a more 
adequate and complete understanding of institutional power and empowerment.  
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Likewise, although I will not do so here, I plan to show in future work that not 
only work done in feminist economics, but also work done in feminist philosophy can be 
very valuable in augmenting the concept of empowerment within the capability approach.  
Specifically, Marilyn Frye’s work on social categories and Christine Koggel’s “relational 
theory of equality” can provide the philosophical groundwork for an understanding of 
empowerment as the process of expanding the social categories (and in turn the social 
relations and social roles) we can create, participate in, and occupy.  On this view, people 
empowered as agents decide (at least to some extent) for themselves what it means to be 
a “real man” or a “good woman” and how individual members of such categories relate 
to others (for example, gender relations), including the roles they are expected to play.  I 
expect that extending the concept of empowerment in this way is not only philosophically 
interesting, but also practically useful, for example, in alleviating what the World Bank 
calls “gender anxiety.”  Gender anxiety is anxiety about what it means to be a “good 
woman” or a “good man.” People experience gender anxiety as institutionalized gender 
roles in their societies change.  Of course, this concept of “gender anxiety” can be 
extended to make sense of “race anxiety,” “caste anxiety,” “age anxiety” and various 
other forms of social anxiety that might emerge as institutionalized social roles change. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered the concern expressed by scholars that Sen does not 
sufficiently recognize the important role that institutionalized power plays in generating, 
reinforcing, and reproducing the inequalities that prevent or limit various groups of 
individuals from acting as agents or expanding their capability sets – that is, from 
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actively exercising and experiencing empowerment.  After a detailed explanation of this 
criticism, I presented Sen’s many and significant contributions towards understanding 
and combating the oppressive and deadly inequalities that result from institutional 
inequalities.   
I found that Sen is certainly aware of the importance of institutionalized power, 
even if he does not systematically analyze institutions or consistently use the language 
often associate with social power.  He is also aware of (at least part of) the role it such 
power plays in generating inequalities and limiting empowerment.  I concede, however, 
that Sen fails to give an adequate or complete account of institutionalized power.  
Specifically his account fails to (1) grasp adequately the relational aspects of social 
relations and their part in determining social roles and, in turn, individual power shares; 
and to (2) account fully for unofficial rules, or biases, in the institutions that make up our 
societies.   
I submit, however, that this shortcoming is by no means fatal to Sen’s work or, 
more generally, to the capability approach.  After all, Sen has not only made several 
valuable contributions towards understanding institutional power and power inequities as 
they relate to oppression and empowerment; but he also recognizes that there is important 
work yet to be done.  Moreover, I believe that Sen’s work so far, and the capability 
perspective in general, is well suited to accommodate such additional work towards 
understanding and combating institutionalized power and its role in preventing and 
limiting empowerment.  I suggest and intend to show in future work that work done in 
feminist economics and philosophy offer promising and insightful tools for conducting 




This project begins with a comparative evaluation of two international development 
perspectives: the traditionally and still dominant economic growth perspective and the 
relatively new capability perspective.  Both s use many of the same key terms, and 
profess to value and promote many of the same ideals (including poverty, participation, 
empowerment, and many others), often through the same channels (for example, 
education, democracy, health care, and so forth).  However, my evaluation reveals that 
the two approaches define key terms differently, and have very different ideals, goals, 
and means.   
The economic growth approach is an approach to economic development, as such 
it seeks to reduce or eliminate poverty understood as income poverty defined by the 
percentage of people living under the poverty line (one or two US dollars a day) or by a 
low (or falling) GNP.  The capability approach, in contrast, is an approach to human 
development.  It defines poverty as a deprivation of valuable and valued capabilities, or 
freedoms (for example, the freedom to be well nourished), and understands development 
as a process of expanding such freedoms.   
204
These central goals shape the scope of the concepts and the means of 
development in each approach.  For example, within the economic growth  participation 
and empowerment are restricted to the market, and education, democracy, and health care 
are valued as instrumental goods, and only to the extent that they result in an increase in 
GNP.  In contrast, within the capability perspective, participation and empowerment are 
sought in every sphere of life – public and private – and education, democracy, and 
health care are valued both as instrumental freedoms that allow individuals to do and be 
the things they value (that is, to achieve valued functionings), and as valuable for their 
own sake.  Because education, democracy, and health care are seen as valuable for their 
own sake – and not as means to a higher GNP – those operating within the capability  
will work to bring the about regardless of whether or not they increase GNP.  My 
comparative evaluation makes clear that the capability approach has both a richer, more 
accurate, understanding of poverty and development, and a more a more comprehensive, 
and therefore, a theoretically and practically superior, concept of empowerment than the 
economic growth perspective does or can provide.  
 After making my case for the capability approach as a superior approach to 
international development, I consider Thomas Pogge’s critique of the approach.  Pogge 
argues that the capability approach has several serious shortcomings, and therefore the 
attention it receives from academics and policy makers cannot be justified.  However, a 
careful reading of Pogge’s criticism reveals that his critique of the capability approach is 
based on a misunderstanding of the approach and therefore unfounded.   
Pogge fails to represent fully the role of capabilities as opportunities valued for 
their own sake.  He makes the mistake of limiting the capability approach to a mere 
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resource distribution system, and consequently fails to acknowledge the important role of 
empowerment within the approach.  Finally, Pogge misrepresents the capability approach 
as he overlooks Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s focus on meeting thresholds of 
basic or central capabilities, and attributes to them an elaborate and complex vertical 
ranking process that takes into account all the properties of natural human diversity that 
neither Sen nor Nussbaum could accept.  I conclude that it is Pogge’s account of the 
capability approach, and not the capability approach itself, that cannot be justified.  
 Having identified and defended the capability approach and especially the role 
empowerment plays within the approach as generally superior to other approaches at 
work in development in Chapters One, Two, and Three, I turn my focus to a more 
detailed evaluation of the role of empowerment within both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
versions of the capability approach in Chapters Four and Five.  My examination of Sen’s 
account explains his use of several empowerment concepts.  I question Sen’s use of 
“Realized Agency Success” as an agency concept on the grounds that it does not require 
any act of agency on the part of the individual who enjoys the success.  Although neither 
Sen nor Nussbaum systematically uses the word empowerment, I observe that Sen’s 
account can be read as offering two valuable and central roles for empowerment: agency, 
which is the subject of many discussions of empowerment within the capability literature, 
and capability-set expansion, which until now, seems to have gone unnoticed as an 
empowerment process within the capability approach.   
 In evaluating Nussbaum’s account I find that – as on Sen’s account – 
empowerment plays a strong role both as agency and (perhaps especially for Nussbaum) 
as capability-set expansion.  This finding is not uncontroversial, as many capability 
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scholars hold that because Nussbaum rejects Sen’s distinction between well-being and 
agency and proposes a list of central capabilities, she cannot offer a robust account of 
agency, and therefore of empowerment.  My controversial finding that (like Sen), 
Nussbaum has a strong concept of empowerment, is followed by the even more 
controversial suggestion that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are 
more a matter of style than substance.   
 After explaining the role of empowerment within the capability approach in some 
detail, I consider a general version of an often expressed criticism of Sen’s work as it 
related to empowerment.  Specifically, I investigate whether Sen does enough to engage 
the role of institutionalized power in generating, reinforcing, and reproducing inequalities 
that prevent individuals from being empowered.  After providing an explanation of 
institutionalized power and its relevance to empowerment, and in turn, development, I 
evaluate Sen’s contributions to our understanding of this subject.   
As we look closely at the realities of institutionalized power differences among all 
people, it becomes painfully obvious that women are the greatest victims of oppression 
and the most in need of empowerment.  Sen’s work focuses on female to male survival 
ratios and other statistics that can be understood as proxies for female empowerment 
(including literacy rates, employment rates, fertility rates, and so forth).  Sen makes 
powerful connections between the presence of basic capabilities that enhance female 
agency, like literacy, and dramatic increases in survival rates of not just women, but also 
children.  Sen recognizes that institutions, including the family, the marketplace, and the 
community are interlinked such that a change in one institution (female education) can 
result in a change in another institution (female survival).  He also realizes that changes, 
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and especially empowerment processes, in these institutional spheres depend more on 
cultural values and norms than on economic resources.  Sen proposes a robust democracy 
as the means for changing norms and values and in this way bringing about 
empowerment in the face of institutionalized power inequalities.   
Despite Sen’s contributions, all of which are steps in the right direction, Sen stops 
short of offering a completely adequate account of institutional power and the role it 
plays in limiting empowerment processes and achievements.  However, I argue that that 
this shortcoming is not a fatal flaw of Sen’s work or the capability approach.  After all, 
Sen has not only made several valuable contributions on the topic, but he is also aware 
that more work needs to be done.  Moreover, I submit that Sen’s work and the capability 
approach in general are well suited to accommodate a more complete understanding of 
institutionalized power and an enhanced concept of empowerment for development.  
There is good reason to believe that feminist economics and philosophy (for example, 
Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach, Marilyn Frye’s work on social categories, and 
Christine Koggel’s relational theory of equality) can provide the groundwork for 
extending Sen’s valuable work in such a way that enhances – but does not replace – the 
empowerment concepts of capability-set expansion and agency at work in the capability 
approach.  
 Taken as a whole, this project can be understood as making a strong case for the 
role of empowerment within the capability approach, and in turn the approach itself.  I 
propose that the capability approach offers two valuable central concepts of 
empowerment: agency and capability-set expansion.  These concepts play a role in 
understanding empowerment processes in every sphere of life from the household, to the 
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market, to the government, and beyond.  They make sense of empowerment and its 
obstacles, including not only economic poverty, but also the more sophisticated obstacles 
of institutionalized power.  Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the concepts as 
they exist in the capability approach can be enhanced to better understand and overcome 
the oppressive forces that prevent individuals from achieving lives they have reason to 
value.  
The project has a lot to offer both the theory and the practice of development.  
Many of the contributions will benefit both theory and practice (as these areas are not 
isolated).  Development theory and practice will benefit from a clear articulation of the 
differences that exist between the capability  and the economic growth  despite the 
surface level agreements of the approaches; from the recognition of the important role of 
institutionalized power in development; and from the acknowledged potential of feminist 
thought in the context of development and empowerment – especially in recognizing the 
important need for transformative – not simply integrative – change in social policies.  
Capability theorists will benefit from the explanation of empowerment as both capability-
set enhancement and agency; from my suggestion that Sen and Nussbaum are more alike 
than most recognize; and from a clear understanding of Thomas Pogge’s criticisms, and 
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